

**A POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST:
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS, POLITICAL PERFORMANCE,
AND POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA**

by

Qing Yang

B.A., China Foreign Affairs University, 2002

M.A., University of Pittsburgh, 2004

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of
Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2012

UMI Number: 3537923

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 3537923

Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

This dissertation was presented

by

Qing Yang

It was defended on

December 3, 2012

and approved by

Barry Ames, Andrew W. Mellon Professor, Department of Political Science

Jonathan Harris, Professor, Department of Political Science

Thomas Rawski, Professor, Department of Economics

Dissertation Advisor: David C. Barker, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science

**A POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST:
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS, POLITICAL PERFORMANCE,
AND POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA**

Qing Yang, PhD

University of Pittsburgh, 2012

Political trust is indispensable for effective government operation and regime stability. The endemic low levels of political trust observed in many democracies have raised some important questions: Why do people trust or distrust political institutions? What are the sources of political trust? Literature on political trust is extensive, but generally suffers from two common limitations. First, most studies on trust have focused on either political culture or political economy as the main sources of political trust. The real political sources of trust have been missing from current discussions. Second, most research on political trust excludes non-democratic societies. The high levels of political trust in authoritarian societies have been treated as an anomaly.

This dissertation attempts to address these two issues by studying the political sources of political trust in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. I argue that people trust institutions when they perceive institutions trustworthy. Trustworthiness arises from the commitment and capacity of institutions, and it is shaped by the political context of institutional arrangements. In other words, citizens trust institutions when they believe that institutions are committed to and capable of fulfilling their trust, and their perceptions of institutions are conditioned by institutional arrangements.

To explore the political sources of political trust, I have used multilevel analyses with comparative data from East Asian societies and other countries. The statistical results highlight the significant effects of institutional settings and political performance. On the one hand, institutional features such as regime types, party systems, executive systems, and party allegiance that individuals are embedded in shape the way they trust institutions. On the other hand, institutional political performance consistently showed strong influence on the levels of political trust in different regimes and settings. By bringing political factors back into equation, I hope my dissertation will help provide a more comprehensive understanding of political trust.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	XII
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 THE PUZZLE: THE POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST	1
1.2. THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF & THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS	5
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	9
2.1 DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS.....	9
2.1.1 Trust and Trustworthiness: Trust as a Relational Concept.....	9
2.1.2 Alienation, Trust, and Political Support: Objects and Dimensions	11
2.1.3 The Empirical Meaning of Political Trust.....	13
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: THE CULTURE VERSUS PERFORMANCE DEBATE..	20
2.2.1 A Survey of the Literature: the Decline of Political Trust in Democracies.....	20
2.2.2 Theories of Political Culture: Social Capital and Cultural Values	23
2.2.3 Political Economy of Political Trust: Institutional Performance Approach..	28
2.3 THIS DISSERTATION: THE OVERLOOKED POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST.....	31
2.3.1 Political Performance of the Institutions and Authorities	32

2.3.2	Political Context: Institutional Designs and Political Trust	38
3.0	ARGUMENT IN BRIEF	45
3.1	ARGUMENT IN BRIEF AND PROPOSITIONS.....	45
3.1.1	Political Performance and Political Trust.....	45
3.1.2	Institutional Designs and Political Trust	47
3.1.3	Control: Other Sources of Political Trust.....	54
3.2	RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA AND OUTLINE	57
3.2.1	Data	57
3.2.2	Research Plan.....	59
4.0	PATTERNS AND SOURCES: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL DATA	62
4.1	PATTERNS OF THE LEVELS OF POLITICAL TRUST ACROSS THE WORLD ...	63
4.2	SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST – EVIDENCE FROM THE TWO MAJOR THEORETICAL TRADITIONS	66
4.2.1	Two Major Theoretical Traditions	66
4.2.2	Social Trust and Political Trust – Revisit Political Cultural Explanations ...	67
4.3	POLITICAL SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST – A MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS.....	74
4.3.1	Country and Individual Level Sources of Political Trust.....	76
4.3.2	Methodology (HLM).....	82
4.3.3	Statistical Results and Discussions	84
4.4	DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION.....	91

5.0	EXPLAINING POLITICAL TRUST: EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES	94
5.1	POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA: LEVELS AND TREND.....	95
5.2	RECALL THE HYPOTHESES IN EAST ASIAN CONTEXT	97
5.2.1	The Economic Growth Hypothesis	98
5.2.2	The Asian Values Hypothesis.....	99
5.2.3	The Political Performance Hypotheses	99
5.2.4	The Institutional Designs Hypotheses.....	100
5.3	DATA AND MEASUREMENT	104
5.4	EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA DEMOCRACIES	107
5.4.1	Political Trust in Seven East Asian Democracies.....	107
5.4.2	Sources of Political Trust in the Five Political Institutions	110
5.5	MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA	112
5.5.1	A Multilevel Analysis of Political Trust in East Asian Democracy	113
5.5.2	A Multilevel Analysis of Political Trust in East Asia (All Countries).....	117
5.6	CONCLUSIONS	120
6.0	POLITICAL TRUST IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA.....	123
6.1	THE VALIDITY OF SURVEY RESEARCH RESPONSES IN CHINA.....	124
6.2	SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN CHINA.....	126
6.2.1	Trust and Political Institutions in China	126

6.2.2	Political Sources of Political Trust in Authoritarian Regimes.....	130
6.3	TRUST IN OTHER NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN EAST ASIA	142
6.4	THE INVERSE TRUST GAP IN CHINA	146
6.5	SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS.....	152
7.0	CONCLUSIONS.....	155
7.1	THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE DISSERTATION.....	155
7.2	THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TRUST	159
7.2.1	The Consequence for Support for Democracy.....	159
7.2.2	The Effects on Political Participation.....	161
7.2.3	The Impact on Voluntary Law Compliance	163
7.3	IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS	165
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	168

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Political Trust Mean across the World (2005).....	64
Table 4.2 Coefficients from a Three-Wave Cross-Lagged Model of Social Capital and Political Trust.....	73
Table 4.3 Analysis of Variance for Political Trust	85
Table 4.4 Determinants of Trust in Political Institutions	87
Table 5.1 Estimated Effects of Perceived Political Performance (Asian Democracies).....	108
Table 5.2 Determinants of Political Trust in Five Key Institutions, 2005	111
Table 5.3 ANOVA for Political Trust in East Asia (Democratic Countries Only)	114
Table 5.4 Multi-Level Determinants of Political Trust in East Asian Democracies	116
Table 5.5 ANOVA for Political Trust in East Asia (All Countries).....	118
Table 5.6 Multi-Level Determinants of Trust in Political Institutions (All Countries)	119
Table 6.1 Factor Analysis of Trust in Political Institutions in China	128
Table 6.2 Determinants of Political Trust in China	137
Table 6.3 Interaction Effects of Resistance Factors.....	141
Table 6.4 Sources of Political Trust in Five Non-Democratic Asian Societies	144
Table 6.5 Relative Trust in Local Level and Central Level Institutions in China.....	147
Table 6.6 Sources of Trust in Central and Local Governments in China	151
Table 7.1 The Effects of Political Trust on Democratic Support	160
Table 7.2 The Effects of Political Trust on Political Participation.....	162

Table 7.3 The Effects of Political Trust on Voluntary Law Compliance 164

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 The Ladder of Political Trust.....	16
Figure 4.1 Three-Wave Cross-Lagged Model of Social Trust (ST), Associational Activism (AS), and Institutional Trust (IT)	71
Figure 4.2 Political Trust and Institutional Settings	79
Figure 5.1 Political Trust in East Asia, by Country (2005).....	95
Figure 5.2 Political Trust in East Asia, by Institutions	97
Figure 5.3 The Levels of Democracy in East Asian Societies	102
Figure 6.1 Political Trust by Institutions in China.....	129
Figure 6.2 Democracy Index for 4 Non-Democratic Asian Societies	143
Figure 6.3 Trust Gap in East Asia.....	148

PREFACE

I am most grateful to my dissertation committee: David Barker, my dissertation chair who showed the greatest support when I needed it most; Barry Ames, Jonathan Harris, and Thomas Rawski, who patiently read through various drafts and consistently gave excellent advice. My deepest gratitude goes to Wenfang Tang, who has guided me and helped me tremendously throughout my doctoral studies. This project also benefited from insight and critiques from Steven Finkel. I am very fortunate to have these wonderful advisors.

This dissertation is dedicated to my family: Mom, Dad, Chiu Man, and Andrew. Thank you for your unconditional love and belief in me. I love you.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE PUZZLE: THE POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST

Political trust in government and its institutions ensures that government operates effectively, making decisions without resorting to coercion and retaining leeway in times of insufficient short-time performance (Easton 1965; Gamson 1968). Political trust is important to different types of regimes. As a multilevel concept, trust links macro-level outcomes with the micro-level attitude. It is based on individual choices and affects institutional outcomes such as efficient government and political legitimacy (Levi & Stoker 2000). For democratic countries, loss of trust, especially long-term distrust, can harden into cynicism and harm democratic governance and representation (Nye 1997; Hetherington 2005). Lack of legitimacy may contribute to the breakdown of democratic systems (Finkel, Muller, and Seligson 1989). For non-democratic systems, endemic distrust may threaten regime legitimacy and cause political turmoil or even regime change, as in the case of the soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s (Hardin 1998; Di Palma 1991; He 1996).

However, a “trust crisis” first became evident in the US in the 1960s and then spread to many advanced industrial countries. Public trust and confidence in institutions, as well as politicians, declined across industrialized democracies (Putnam, Pharr, & Dalton 2000; Norris 1999b). Meanwhile, low levels of political trust have been observed in Latin America and

Central and Eastern Europe in the past decades (e.g. Catterberg & Moreno 2006; Mishler & Rose 2001a). Reports from these different areas of the world seem to draw very pessimistic conclusions about political trust. As a result, numerous researches has been done to find out why the public have become disaffected and lost faith in the government and democratic institutions in these regions over the last few decades. These studies all pointed to a central question: what determines the public trust in political institutions?

To answer this important question, extensive researches have explored various economic and cultural sources of political trust. Scholars have studied how social capital, post-materialist values, and subjective and objective economic performance may affect political trust. While the existing literature greatly enhanced our understanding of the origins of political trust, it also produced some inconclusive or even contradictory findings. Several reasons may have contributed to this inconsistency in the literature. Theoretically, many studies failed to account for the effects of political factors such as political performance of institutions and institutional settings. Among numerous studies on political trust, few researches have systematically examined the political sources of trust. Methodologically, many studies have been limited to a certain group of countries and failed to take into account the institutional settings in which individuals are embedded. Thus, to better understand the nature and sources of political trust, we need to look beyond the debate about the relative significance of political culture and political economy and focus on the sphere of real politics. The following questions remained unanswered in the existing literature on trust: Why do people trust political institutions? Beyond political economy and political culture, what other political factors affect public trust in political institutions? Specifically, what kinds of political performance influence people's trust in

institutions and how? Do people across countries trust institutions the same way? Or do institutional settings play a role in the public trust in institutions?

Meanwhile, research on political trust in East Asia has been surprisingly limited. The region should not be left out from the current discussion. East Asia presents a very interesting pattern of political trust compared with other regions in the world, and studies of trust in East Asia may contribute significantly to the current debate on the sources of political trust. What are the levels of political trust in East Asian societies? How is the pattern different from other parts of the world? What are the sources of political trust in East Asia? How do East Asian political systems retain a high level of public support while the rest of the world seems to be losing it? Do East Asians trust political institutions because of the traditional Confucian cultural values, or as a result of the economic miracles? Or, is there something else about political trust that the current culture versus performance debate cannot adequately explain? How does the study of trust in East Asia contribute to the existing literature of political trust?

These are the questions that drive this dissertation. With the continuing erosion of political trust across the world, answers to these questions becomes important both to democratic theories of political support and regime change, and to the comparative study of regime strengths and legitimacy. To address these questions, I will study two political sources of political trust in this dissertation: institutional settings and political performance of institutions. To maximize the institutional variance, I will first examine whether and how these political factors affect public trust in political institutions across the world. Then, I will turn to the effects of political performance and institutional features in East Asia, an important region that should not have been left out from the existing discussions on political trust. Using multi-level analysis, I will develop and test hypotheses of both the contextual and individual level sources of political trust.

This study hopes to advance our comprehension of the nature and political bases of institutional support.

A review of the existing literature in the field shows that a cultural approach and performance approach have provided competing explanations for trust in institutions (Mishler & Rose 1997; 2001a; Campbell 2004; Newton 2006). While there is no agreement on the origins of political trust, the existing literature attempting to explain political trust can generally be framed within the culture-performance debate. On the one hand, the political cultural school argues that trust in institutions has its origins in political culture. Social capital and personal values play an independent role in shaping political trust (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1999b). On the other hand, institutional performance explanations hold that political trust is largely based on people's calculations of the material gains and evaluations of the incumbent performance (Mishler and Rose 1997). The culture-performance debate has sparked many interesting and important discussions on the sources of political trust in democratic countries, both theoretically and empirically.

However, while the two major theories have helped to improve our understanding of political trust, they predominantly focused on political culture and political economy. Existing literature failed to give enough credits to the real politics sphere. The political characters and political output of the institutions have not been addressed sufficiently in the extensive literature about trust despite their relevance to political trust. First, although scholars were right about the role of institutional performance on political trust, most of them have failed to look beyond economic output of the government and study the political dimension of institutional performance. Second, the effect of institutional settings on trust has been largely overlooked in most of the researches. Among the very few studies that have taken this political factor into

considerations (Anderson & Guillory 1997; Norris 1999c), empirical results have been far from conclusive, pending further research. Moreover, one important institutional feature that has been missing from the literature is regime type. The existing literature has been largely limited to the democratic settings. Although some scholars have claimed that regime types may make a difference in political trust, few have empirically examined the claim or specified how the regime types affect trust. Comparative research and in-depth case studies on causal mechanism of political trust in non-democratic countries have been surprisingly limited.

1.2. THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF & THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The purpose of this dissertation is to reduce these gaps in the literature by studying the political sources of political trust at both country and individual levels. I hope to contribute to the current discussion on political trust by bringing trust back to its political origins and advancing the studies on the political sources of political trust. Specifically, I am interested in two political sources: the institutional arrangements of political systems, and the political performance of institutions and government. The study aims to look beyond the current debate of culture versus performance, and draws attention to the important political sources of political trust that have been overlooked in the current literature.

The central hypothesis of the dissertation is that political trust originates in the perceived trustworthiness of institutions, not only economic but also political trustworthiness. The trustworthiness of institutions arises from commitment and capacity of the institutions, and it is shaped by the political context of institutional arrangements. In other words, citizens trust

institutions when they believe that the institutions are committed to and capable of fulfilling their trust, and their perceptions of institutions are conditioned by the characteristics of the institutional arrangements.

These political factors have not been sufficiently studied in the existing literature of political trust, and they have been particularly missing in East Asian context. These political sources of political trust are of the key interest of this dissertation.

This comparative research focuses on East Asia and China in particular for the following reasons. First, East Asia presents a naturally heterogeneous setting of different institutional designs. East Asia has an established democracy (Japan), many consolidating democracies (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan), semi-democracies like Singapore and Hong Kong, and non-democratic countries such as China and Vietnam. The diverse institutional designs provide an exciting setting to examine the institutional effects on political trust. Second, if political trustworthiness is important for political attitudes and behavior, Asian countries may present a hard case. Although corruption is generally regarded as an economic evil (Seligson 2002), the puzzling coexistence of corruption and economic growth in East Asia has raised the question of culpability of corruption in East Asian context (Wedeman 2002, 2012). The level of corruption is the most important indicator of political trustworthiness, and its effect on political trust is of key interests for this research. In this dissertation, I will examine the effect of political performance on political trust in the East Asian setting and see whether and how corruption affects people's political trust. Third, the study of effects of Confucian values in East Asia can contribute to the debate between culture and performance on the sources of political trust. We can sort out the relative importance of the roles of the Confucian values that emphasize deference to authority and the economic miracles of East Asian governments in shaping political

trust. Fourth, empirical studies on political trust are scarce in East Asia, as most studies have been limited to Western and Eastern Europe, and North and South America. We can explore and test the hypothesis and generalize theories using this relatively new setting.

China is a particularly interesting case. Most research on political trust, either cross-country analysis or comparative case studies, has largely excluded China and treated it as an anomaly (e.g. Norris 1999c; Chang & Chu 2002). Some dismissed the Chinese case due to China's authoritarian system, and others doubted the reliability of reports indicating a surprisingly high level of trust. In contrast, I argue that not only should China be included, it also deserves serious attention to enhance our understanding of political trust. First, studies on political trust have been limited to democratic settings, and the case of China provides a different and important institutional setting: the authoritarian arrangement. Second, the surprisingly high level of political trust in a repressive authoritarian system goes against many theoretical predictions, and rather than simply dismiss it as anomaly, we need in-depth case studies to understand this puzzle. Third, political trust is essential for societies under great transformation like China. Sinologists have mainly attributed political support in China to either the very fast economic growth or the traditional Confucius culture. Though political performance should theoretically contribute to political trust, explicit and clear political discussion has been missing from the current analysis of China. I will examine the effects of specific authoritarian settings and political performance on political trust in China, both theoretically and empirically.

In this dissertation, I am most interested in the roles of political factors in explaining political trust in East Asia. The first three chapters discuss the theoretical framework and present the major arguments of the project. After theoretical discussions, this dissertation will empirically examine the sources of political trust. The empirical work will be carried out at both

the country level and the individual level. In Chapter 4, relying on global data from the World Values Surveys, I will study the two political sources of political trust, focusing on the effects of institutional settings. The chapter puts East Asia in a broader comparative framework and compares the patterns and trends of political trust in East Asia with other regions of the world. Chapter 5 and 6 will focus on the sources of political trust in East Asia and study the twelve East Asian societies using data from the Asian Barometer. Specifically, I want to study how political performance and institutional characteristics affect East Asian citizens' trust in political institutions. Chapter 5 focuses on seven East Asian democracies, and Chapter 6 examines trust in five non-democratic societies, paying particular attention to the Chinese case – an “outlier case” identified by several studies of trust. I want to examine whether Chinese people trust political institutions based on their perception of institutional trustworthiness and how authoritarian settings affect citizens' political trust. I will also study the sources of the high level of political trust and the large center-local trust gap in China. Chapter 7 studies the consequences of political trust and summarizes the main findings of the dissertation.

2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I will first discuss the meanings of the key concepts in this dissertation. Starting with the definitions, I will next review existing literature on both democratic and non-democratic settings, and revisit the political culture versus economic performance debate vis-à-vis the sources of political trust. Next, I will focus on what has been overlooked by the current literature and propose the main argument of the dissertation. By bringing political factors back into equation, I hope my dissertation will help reduce the gap in the existing literature and provide a more comprehensive understanding of political trust.

2.1 DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS

2.1.1 Trust and Trustworthiness: Trust as a Relational Concept

Trust is a simple yet contested term. We use the word in our daily conversations, yet there is no consensus on the exact meaning of trust (Levi & Stoker 2000). One thing that theorists do agree on is the relational nature of trust. Trust arises from social relations and it involves two parties: the truster and the trustee. Trust is the truster's belief that the trustee will contribute to the

truster's well-being and refrain from causing damage upon the truster (Offe 1999). Trust involves risky and uncertain outcomes.

Becker (1996) summarizes the philosophical debate over the definition of trust into two major approaches: non-cognitive and cognitive account. The non-cognitive school emphasizes the complexity of the modern world and focuses on the truster's psychological dispositions (Luhmann 1979; Baier 1986; Dunn 1990). In the non-cognitive account, trust is "fundamentally a matter of our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational structures that are not focused on specific people, institutions, or groups" (Becker 1996: 44).

In contrast, cognitive definition of trust focuses on the trustee's side. Hardin's (1996; 1998; 2002) encapsulated-interests definition of trust conceptualizes trust as a rational choice made on the basis of the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee. In other words, trust is grounded in the truster's evaluation of the trustee's incentive to be trustworthy. The cognitive approach of trust is more dominant and relevant in discussions in political sphere. Following the cognitive and rational approach, the attributes of trustworthiness assure the truster that the trustee will not betray a trust.

The objects of trust can be individuals or institutions. Hardin's (1996) encapsulated-interests conception of trust can be generalized to fit political institutions. Political scientists are more concerned with political trust, i.e. trust in political actors such as officials, political system, and political institutions. Political trust, as compared to interpersonal or social trust, is the primary concern of this dissertation.

2.1.2 Alienation, Trust, and Political Support: Objects and Dimensions

Sociological studies on *alienation* are a precursor to analysis of political trust. Alienation refers to “an attitude of separation or estrangement between oneself and some salient aspect of the social environment” (Olsen 1965, 202). To explicate the concept, Seeman (1959) decomposed alienation into five essential component parts: normlessness, meaninglessness, powerlessness, social isolation, and self-estrangement. Relating these modes of alienation to attitudes towards political systems, Finifter (1970) specified two dimensions of political alienation: political powerlessness and political normlessness, which are different terms to label efficacy and trust (see also Gamson 1968; Seligson 1980). Together with powerlessness, and meaninglessness, Gilmour and Lamb (1975) treated distrust as a key dimension of political alienation.

Easton’s (1965; 1975) analysis of political support is another catalyst for the political discussion of trust. Social scientists discuss political support both as attitudes and as behavior. When discussing its attitudinal form, Easton distinguished between different dimensions and objects of political support. In *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, Easton (1965) identified three objects or levels of political support: political community, the regime, and the authorities. Political community emphasizes the nation that bind people together in a common political enterprise, and support at this level shows a sense of belonging and willingness to cooperate in the community. Political regime refers to the most basic aspects of the system: the underlying values of the political system and institutions of the government. Political support for the regime is more fundamental in character. Political support for authority includes support for both particular officials and for the entire leadership. Following the Eastonian classification of political support, scholars have proposed some more specified ladders of political support (see Nye & Zelikow 1997; Norris 1999b; Dalton 1999). These distinctions between different objects

of political support are necessary, as there are “significant theoretical and empirical gradations within different parts of the regime” (Norris 1999b: 9-13). For instance, a person can strongly identify with her political community but not with the current regime’s principles; or, a citizen may trust political institutions but not political actors.

The different objects identified above fall into two dimensions of political support: specific support and diffuse support (Easton 1975). This is a key distinction that shaped almost all of the following literature on political trust and support. *Specific support*, or effectiveness, as Lipset (1960) put it, is sentiment toward the incumbent political authorities. Specific support is more volatile, fluctuating with the evaluations of what the political authorities do and how they do it. *Diffuse support*, or in Lipset’s (1960) term, legitimacy, is a much more durable and basic concept. It is support for the regime and is “independent of outputs and performance in the short run” (Easton 1975: 444-5). Diffuse support is the much more influential dimension (Easton 1965). As students of regime change, we are more concerned with diffuse support that fundamentally affects the regime strength.

Political trust is a major indicator of political support, and the two terms often go hand in hand in the trust literature. Like political support, political trust has different objects: trust in authorities, in institutions, and in the regime or system. However, scholars use the same label “political trust” for different kinds of trust and research on different kinds of trust often produces contradictory results. For instance, while some scholars treat political trust as synonymous with diffuse support (Gamson 1968; Miller 1974a; 1974b), others find it more sensitive to the incumbent performance (Citrin 1974; Muller & Jukam 1977). In the following section, I argue that this disagreement is a result of measurement inconsistency as well as conceptual confusion.

2.1.3 The Empirical Meaning of Political Trust

Given its normative and empirical importance, it is no surprise that there is an explosion of work studying the issue of the decline of political trust (e.g. Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; Braithwaite & Levi 1998; Warren 1999; Norris 1999a; Pharr & Putnam 2000; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001; Hetherington 2005). Yet what is unusual about this literature is a preoccupation with the measurement issue. Normative discussions and theories about political support and trust are abundant, but the empirical research often reached different or even opposite conclusions (e.g. Miller 1974a; 1974b; Citrin 1974; Muller & Jukam 1977; Seligson 1983; Brehm & Rahn 1997; Hetherington 1998; Newton 1999). A major reason for the divergence is the inconsistent and improper measurement of trust in the literature. Thus, before we discuss and evaluate the contradictory generalizations and conclusions made in various studies of political trust, we need to address the measurement issue first. As Easton (1975: 457) suggested, conceptual clarification and empirical explanation are intertwined in “a mutually nourishing feedback process”. The empirical meaning of political trust is crucial for our understanding of its *real* extent, sources, and consequences.

The Miller-Citrin debate (Miller 1974a; 1974b; Citrin 1974) is a good illustration of this intellectual disagreement: it called the prevailing interpretations of political trust into question and discussed the real meaning of the observed declining trust in the US. Borrowing Stokes’s (1962) American National Election Survey (ANES) trust-in-government questions to measure political trust¹, Miller (1974a; 1974b) found declining trust in the US, and he argued that

¹ The ANES trust-in-government questions ask the respondents’ evaluations on the government “to do what is RIGHT”, “run by a few big INTERESTS”, “WASTES a lot of money we pay in taxes”, and run by CROOKED

political trust is a meaningful measure of political discontent and it is important to democracy and the whole system of government. However, Citrin held the opposite opinion. Analyzing the same data to examine the behavioral consequences of trust, Citrin (1974) believed that political trust as measured by the ANES trust-in-government index taps more sentiments about incumbents than evaluations of the political system or regime. The Miller-Citrin debate on the ANES trust-in-government measure also prompted numerous follow-up discussions (e.g. Muller & Jukam 1977; Abramson & Finifter 1981; Feldman 1983; Seligson 1983; Williams 1985; Citrin & Green 1986; Craig, Niemi, & Silver 1990; Nye, Zelikow, & King 1997; Citrin & Muste 1999; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001; Owen & Dennis 2001). Focusing around ANES trust-in-government measure (and some also proposing new alternative measures), these researchers try to determine whether the decline of the so measured trust represents a decline in system support and whether trust influences political participation the way political theories suggest.

The obsession with the measurement of political trust points to a more fundamental conceptual distinction. As Levi & Stoker (2000: 480) observed, “(o)ne way to make sense of this emphasis in the measurement literature is that the system versus non-system focus was important no matter what concept the index was taken to represent”.

Indeed, the real question raised by the debate concerns the two dimensions of political trust: system-based trust versus incumbent-based trust. On the one hand, system-based political trust is reflective of diffuse support, i.e. public’s supportive attitudes for the regime (including the fundamental values, norms, and institutions of government). On the other hand, incumbent-based political trust is more concerned with specific support, i.e. the public sentiment directed at

people. Stokes (1962), however, when first adopting this measure, did not label it “political trust” but used it only to categorize whether respondents held favorable or unfavorable evaluations of the government. Miller (1974a) first used this measurement for “political trust”, and the measurement is among the most popular measurements in the trust studies in the US (e.g. Aberbach 1969; Aberbach & Walker 1970; Citrin & Muste 1999; Hetherington 1998; 2005).

incumbent leaders and political leadership in general. As with the specific versus diffuse support distinction, we care more about system-based trust, as it is “more consequential for the stability of a political regime” (Muller & Jukam 1977: 1563).

This incumbent versus system distinction seems very obvious, but in reality, many researchers simply use the term “political trust” without explicitly defining its specific dimensions, and they make easy generalizations regarding their results. Unfortunately, this remains the case in many studies decades after the initial Miller-Citrin debate.

In this dissertation, I am more concerned with system based political trust as opposed to incumbent based political trust. I am less interested in the popular daily evaluations of specific leaders, as short-term ebbs and flows are assumed normal and healthy for a well-functioning political system (Pharr & Putnam 2000). Within the dimension of system based political trust, I argue that it is necessary to further distinguish between trust in system principles and trust in institutions since the former is the most fundamental level and it usually changes most mildly and slowly.

As Figure 2.1 shows, we can distinguish political trust by their levels and objects. The bottom level of the trust ladder is trust in incumbent leadership, which corresponds to specific support according to Easton’s classification. The upper two levels of trust correspond to political support directed at the regime, or diffuse support according to Easton’s classification. The higher level political trust stands on the ladder, the more ideal and abstract it represents. Trust in system principles and values is on the top of the ladder, as it is the most ideal level of political trust. Trust in institutions is also system-level trust and is key to regime legitimacy. It stands lower on the political trust ladder because compared with trust in system principles, it is less abstract and more related to the contemporary governments.




Figure 2.1 The Ladder of Political Trust

A large body of existing literature has studied political support using the top and bottom levels of trust illustrated by the ladder. For instance, the widely used ANES trust-in-government measure taps more of incumbency support, whereas questions about the democratic aspirations from the World Values Surveys (WVS) gauge the belief in democratic principles and values.² The democratic aspirations indicator emphasizes the abstract principles and ideals of democracy, and it taps what Mishler and Rose (2001b) called an “idealist” view of democracy. It is often used in comparative studies of political support (e.g. Klingemann 1999; Dalton 2004; Dalton &

² A commonly used item from WVS asks respondents, “I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country?” The four options include “1. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; 2. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; 3. Having the army rule; 4. Having a democratic political system”.

A similar battery of examples from the WVS ask respondents’ opinions on four issues: “a) In democracy, the economic system runs badly; b) Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling; and c) Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order; d) Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government”.

Shin 2006). This idealist approach of democracy is suitable to the setting of established democracies, as it assumes that citizens have a basic understanding of the meaning and practice of democracy.

However, for comparative studies involving transitional/new or non-democracies, belief in democratic principles, the top level of trust, is less appropriate for studying diffuse political support. As the idealist approach of democracy, democratic aspiration indicator may have the following problems in incomplete democracies or non-democracies where citizens have little direct experience with democracy. First, citizens may decline to answer the relevant questions or express “non-attitudes”, i.e. giving opinions that have never been held or thought of before answering the survey questions (Mishler and Rose 2001b).³ Second, the use of normatively-loaded “D-word” in the survey questions runs the risk of social desirability effects, and citizens may show their support for democracy only as an abstract ideal or favored label (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, and Shin 2008). Third, democracy is a contested concept and different societies understand it differently (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997; Shin 1999; Norris 1999b). For instance, while many East European citizens may associate democratization experience with market economic reform, many East Asian citizens equate democracy to populism (Chu, et al. 2008). Thus interpretation of democratic aspiration may be ambiguous for transitional or non-democracies.

In contrast, trust in institutions is the most appropriate level of political trust measures for comparative studies. Compared with the idealist approach to democracy, questions about trust in institutions have a much more “significant realist component” (Mishler & Rose 2001: 314).

³ Take Dalton and Shin’s (2006: Chapter 4 and Chapter 7) book for instance, the conclusion about democratic support in East Asia was largely compromised by the exclusion of a large number of missing values (“don’t know” answers or no answer) of the key variables in China and Vietnam (ranging from 21% to 42%). The results presented in the book are not an accurate reflection of the real popular support in Asia.

While citizens in new or non-democracies have only limited experience understanding of democracy, they have at least some experience with political institutions such as parliament and political parties. Thus when investigating political support in new/transitional or non-democracies, trust in institutions provides more useful information than questions of democratic aspirations. Trust in institutions is intermediate between trust in system principles and trust in political authorities, and it is less volatile than incumbency support, and less abstract than belief in political principles and values. As this dissertation aims to study political support in East Asia where types of political regimes are diverse and democratic transformation remains incomplete, I will focus on trust in institutions rather than democratic aspirations or incumbent support.

So, the middle rung of the ladder, i.e. trust in institutions, is the primary focus of this dissertation. I will study trust in political institutions and different levels of government. Unless specified otherwise, by “political trust”, I am referring to trust in institutions. As political trust is institution specific (Landry 2011), I will focus on the five key political institutions for comparative purposes.⁴ Specifically, I use the following question from the World Values Survey and Asian Barometers to measure the political trust in institutions:

“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4)?”

I use the mean level of trust in five key political institutions: the national government, political parties, parliament, the legal system, and the civil service. The index is converted to 0-100 scale where 0 means no confidence at all in any institution and 100 means a great deal of

⁴ The original survey questions asked about political trust in around 15 institutions, including the church, the armed forces, the press, television, labor unions, the police, the court, the government, political parties, parliament, the civil service, major companies, environment organizations, women’s organizations, charitable or humanitarian organizations, etc. Trust in some of these institutions was not asked in all countries, but political trust in the five key political institutions was asked in almost all of the countries in the survey.

confidence in all five political institutions. The five institutions I included for analysis as objects of political trust are highly inter-correlated. The high Cronbach's Alpha value suggested that they reflect an orientation towards political institutions in general and together they form a reliable scale (also see Norris 1999). However, we should also notice that political trust is institution specific in terms of different functions of institutions. For instance, trust in legal institutions, societal institutions, and political institutions may have different sources and consequences. In the following analyses, I will study the respective level of political trust in each of the five institutions and compare their sources. I will also examine trust in 15 different institutions in China.

This section discussed the conceptual and empirical meanings of political trust. In summary, I understand political trust as a relational concept. It is grounded in the truster's evaluation of the trustee's incentive and capacity to be trustworthy. I also emphasized the important distinction between incumbent versus system based trust. However, although the existing studies have identified some partisan and incumbent-based characters of the ANES measure of political trust, they also noticed the long-term and continuing declining trend of trust despite the change of administrations and against alternative measures of political trust. The next section will focus on the extent and reasons behind this decline.

2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW:

THE CULTURE VERSUS PERFORMANCE DEBATE

In this section, I will review the major theoretical approaches that have been provided to explain levels of political trust. These two competing explanations are drawn from the political culture and political economy traditions. The debate between political culture and economic performance schools has sparked interesting discussions and greatly enhanced our understanding of the sources of political trust.

2.2.1 A Survey of the Literature: the Decline of Political Trust in Democracies

The vast majority of the literature of political trust has focused on trust in democratic regimes. There seems to be a general belief that political trust is declining in the established democracies, but the extent varies across objects of trust and across different countries.

The academic interest in political trust started in the US, and there have been ample studies to chart its longitudinal change. Overall, political trust in both political leaders and the government has been on the slide in the US since the 1960s.⁵ Comparable trends in other established democracies are more polychromatic. However, the main message echoes the theme of declining trust. Survey data from both individual countries and cross-national comparative

⁵ Drawing on a collaborative poll by Washington Post, Henry Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, Blendon et al. (1997) found that except for a very mild rebound in the early 1980s, the public trust in leaders of the executive branch and congress fell from a high 40% in the 1960s to only 10% in the late-1990s. Trust in the US government has also declined dramatically. Largely relying on ANES data, researchers found that despite fluctuations, the level of political trust in politicians and the government has demonstrated a general downward trend (Orren 1997; Norris 1999b; Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn 2000; King 2000; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2000; Alford 2001; Hetherington 2005). Between 1950s till the mid 1960s, people were still supportive of politicians and the government. Then, the decline of political trust was first observed in the US between 1965 and 1980. The trust level moved upward a bit and returned to a more favorable position in the 1980s, and it declined again through the 1990s. Trust in the major democratic institutions also fell (Lipset 1994; Dalton 1996; Putnam et al. 2000).

surveys like World Values Surveys confirmed the basic picture of the slide across countries with diverse backgrounds.⁶ Fortunately, unlike trust in political leaders and in democratic institutions, the levels of trust in democratic values and principles have not declined. The trust crisis has not transformed into a “crisis of democracy” in established democracies (Kaase & Newton 1995; Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000). Meanwhile, the new democracies have continued to show very low level of public confidence in government and democratic institutions. Scholars have reported low levels of political trust in Central and Eastern Europe (Mishler & Rose 1994; 1997; 1999; 2001a) and Latin America (Seligson 1983; Moreno 2001; Catterberg & Moreno 2006).

To understand the decline of political trust in democracies, much research has worked on the bases of political trust and hoped to find the reasons for variations in the levels of political trust. Search for the origins of political trust started in the US, as Americans seem to have lost more faith in their government than people in other countries (King 2000). A number of factors have been offered to explain this exceptional slide within the US. Researches found the minimal influence of the social-psychological factors on political trust (Stokes 1962; Cole 1973; Craig 1996; Citrin & Muste 1999; Newton & Norris 2000). Different social groups in the US, including the disadvantaged groups, display similar patterns of political trust (Hetherington 2005). Thus, many concluded that political trust is a political phenomenon and is better explained by political factors than by personal or social factors.

As a result, researchers turned to the dynamics of the domestic politics in the US for an answer. Studies have examined various possible sources in the US, such as the US government’s policy outcomes, major traumatic political events, and the changing criteria of American

⁶ The erosion of trust has happened in different countries, such as Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, Canada, Finland, and Japan, etc. (e.g. Lipset & Schneider 1987; Listhaug 1995; Hayward 1995; Cuitice and Jowell 1997; Pharr 1997; Patterson 1999). Levels of political trust in politicians are sliding in most advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 1999; Norris 1999b; Patterson 1999; Putnam et al. 2000); and political trust in democratic institutions fell less dramatically, but has also registered a modest decline in 19 OECD countries (McAllister 1999; Dalton 1999).

people.⁷ The menu of explanations for the declining trust in the US seems complete, and they pointed out many intriguing contributors for the decline of political trust in the US. However, these researches generally suffer from two problems. First, a large proportion of the researches rely on the controversial ANES measurement. Though researchers have extensively discussed the possible problems with the ANES measurement, many US studies continue to use the measurement due to the data availability.⁸ Improper measurement of this key concept seriously compromised the validity of the researches' conclusions, as the measurement may capture the incumbent government rather than the overall system and institutions. Second, many studies tend to focus predominantly on the country-specific political factors such as Watergate and presidential approval. We need to go beyond the particular circumstances in the US, examine trust in countries with different political settings, and develop theories that can travel a wider range.

Comparative and cross-country studies help to achieve this goal. A number of comparative researches have studied political trust in different settings other than the US.⁹ These comparative case studies greatly enhanced our understanding of political trust. On the one hand, through historical studies and individual level analysis, they highlighted and confirmed the roles of government performance and political culture in shaping political trust. On the other

⁷ The list of explanations include the US government's economic performance and policy outcomes (Citrin & Green 1986; King 1997; Lawrence 1997; Alesina & Wzciarg 2000), the higher expectations and different criteria American people use to evaluate the government nowadays (Nye 1997; Hetherington 2005), the major traumatic political events such as the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal (Weatherford 1984; Neustadt 1997; King 2000; Parker 1995; Chanley et al. 2000; Bowler & Karp 2004), the size and scope of the federal government (Mansbridge 1997; Pew Research Center 1998), the changing role of the media and TV effects (Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbring. 1979; Patterson 1993; Cappella & Jamieson 1997), and the evaluations of the congress and the president (Hetherington 1998; Chanley et al. 2000).

⁸ The ANES data set provides rich and valuable information to explore the issue of trust both horizontally and longitudinally. Many researches, especially those using more sophisticated analyses (e.g. longitudinal and multilevel studies), rely on ANES data (e.g. Hetherington 1998; 1999; 2005)

⁹ These studies have extended the research scope to West European countries (e.g. Hart 1978; Bowler & Karp 2004; Holmberg 1999; Fuchs 1999; Campbell 2004), Japan (e.g. Pharr 1997; 2000; Otake 2000); Central and Eastern Europe (Sztompka 1996; Rose 1994; Mishler & Rose 1997; 2001a; Finkel, Humphries, an Opp 2001), and Latin America (Seligson 1983; Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis 2000; Moreno 2001; Catterberg & Moreno 2006).

hand, scholars started to employ cross-country surveys such as World Values surveys to explore the fundamental sources of political trust (e.g. Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000). Many of these cross-country studies study political trust at the macro level.

So far, these studies in established and emerging democratic countries have produced interesting research on political trust. Most explanations that account for political trust fall into two contending schools: the political culture school and the political economy school.

2.2.2 Theories of Political Culture: Social Capital and Cultural Values

The political culture school believes that political trust originates in cultural norms and personal values that are deeply rooted in societies and exogenous to the political sphere. This school argues that political and social values gradually transform and affect the public's philosophy towards government through childhood socialization and adulthood social experiences (Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1999b; Newton & Norris 2000). Specifically, three cultural explanations are most prevalent in explaining political trust: social capital arguments, cultural values hypothesis, and Asian values thesis.

2.2.2.1 Social Capital Model

The idea of social capital has long been developed and studied in social sciences. For its modern usage, Coleman (1988) emphasized the public goods aspect of social capital to distinguish it from physical capital and human capital. Putnam (1995: 664-665) defined social capital as “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests”. Social capital facilitates coordination and

improves the efficiency of society (Putnam 1993). According to social capital theories, high level of social capital is crucial for satisfactory government performance and collective well-being such as good economic development and less social problems (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1995; Brehm & Rahn 1997). Social trust and social network are two key factors of social capital, and they both affect political trust and democracy.

Social trust, or interpersonal trust, refers to people's trust in their fellow citizens. Social capital theories often treat trust as one piece, taking social trust and political trust as two sides of the same coin (Newton 1999). Trust in political authorities and institutions is a "specific instance of trust in mankind" and a reflection of social trust (Lane 1959: 164; Moore, Lare, and Wagner 1985). Political trust is a generalized interpersonal trust (Brehm & Rahn 1997). According to Almond and Verba (1963), if people do not trust their fellow citizens, they cannot possibly trust the elites and institutions that are endowed with considerable power to affect their lives. Interpersonal trust "spills over" into cooperation in social networks and associations, and "spills up" to trust in political institutions and authorities (Putnam 1993; 1995; Mishler & Rose 2001a). People who trust each other's good intention also tend not to perceive others' as political cheaters, and expect the system to work "even if left untended" (Gamson 1968:54). Thus social trust towards the fellow citizens tends to create or promote people's trust in institutions (Newton & Norris 2000).

Social network and voluntary associations is another aspect of social capital. By engaging in community or social associations and participating in voluntary activities, citizens develop and reinforce social trust and civic mindedness (Williams 1988). These associations help build trust and cooperation, and confidence in other institutions (Newton & Norris 2000). Keele (2007) argues that citizens not engaged in civic activity have a weak sense of political

influence, which in turn fuels distrust in political leaders and institutions. Besides, involvement in associations and social networks mediates between individuals and the distant world of politics, thus it is an important prerequisite of their political support (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Brehm and Rahn (1997) hold the opposite opinion. They (1997: 1004) argue that the experience in associations teaches people the virtues of “self-interest rightly understood” and “combating the centralizing tendencies of equality.” So people who participate in associations are more likely to resist the temptations of centralization and have low trust in institutions.

The empirical support for the effect of social capital on political trust has been mixed. Using time-series analysis, Keele (2007) found that social capital provides the best evidence for the long-term slide in trust. Denters, Gabriel, and Torcal (2007) found that social trust, but not civic engagement, contributes to political trust. Brehm and Rahn (1997) not only found the effects of social capital on trust in institutions (though civic engagement is negatively associated with political trust), but also found that the causality flows back from political trust to social trust and civic engagement. However, others failed to confirm the impact of social capital on political trust. Using Eurobarometer and World Values Surveys, Newton (1999: 185) concluded that “there is not a close or consistent association between social and political trust”. Similarly, Newton and Norris (2000) observed that while social trust and political trust are highly correlated at the aggregate level, they are only weakly associated at the individual level.

2.2.2.2 Value Change and Post-Modernization Argument

Another important cultural explanation for political trust focuses on modernization and a corresponding change in values. According to modernization theories, economic development and technological advances bring about changes in public values and belief systems and

gradually transforms the culture of many societies (Inglehart 1990). The process of value transformation, in turn, changes citizens' relationship with the state (Norris 1999c).

First, modernization gives rise to the modern state and a shift in people's worldviews towards materialist rationality. As a result, one basic cultural change is a shift from respect for "traditional-religious authority" toward deference to "rational-bureaucratic authority" (Inglehart 1999b: 238). Religious and communal values are gradually replaced by a more rational perspective and people increasingly look to the state rather than a Supreme Being for security.

The second phase of development is post-modernization, which happens when economic development yields "diminishing marginal gains in material and subjective well-being" (Fournier 1998: 391). Together with changes in economic conditions, there is another shift in values, changing from survival values to well-being values (Inglehart 1997a; 1997b; 1999a; 1999b). Following industrialization, the high level of security brought by economic well-being and the modern state is conducive to a fundamental cultural transformation with economic and political feedback. People are increasingly concerned with subjective well-being, and this, again, shapes their attitudes towards authority. With regard to attitudes towards the government, post-modernization involves a shift from materialist rationality to post-materialist values. Whereas materialist rationality emphasizes a respect to the modern state, post-materialist values are characterized by an de-emphasis of authority, whether religious and traditional or state bureaucratic. Instead, individualist autonomy and subjective well-being are valued and pursued. Norris's (1999a) "critical citizens" thesis vividly captures the characters of this new phase of value change. Critical citizens tend to reject authority, which reduces support and confidence for political institutions and incumbent authorities. The emergence of critical citizens with post-materialist values contributes to the decline of political trust in advanced industrial countries.

Inglehart (1999b) and Dalton (2000: 259) both report “a clear link between post-material values and a lack of confidence in political institutions” for most industrialized democracies. However, many of these studies use simple correlations. In order to establish the proposed relationship, we need stronger evidence with more sophisticated methods and systematic analysis. Besides, empirical evidence for post-modernization or “critical citizens” theory has been limited to World Values Surveys data at the aggregate level. As Inglehart (1999b) argues, culture is deep-rooted, and value change is a gradual and slow process. The focus in value change and socialization process also indicates that the political culture theories are most useful when explaining very long-term longitudinal or cross-national differences in political trust (Norris 1999c). To account for relatively short-term change, we may need to find other sources of explanation. Moreover, more empirical evidence is needed at the individual level to explain individual level variations of political trust.

2.2.2.3 the Asian Values Thesis

The Confucian societies in East Asia have traditionally developed a system of belief and culture that emphasizes harmony and respect for authority. Almond and Verba (1963) argue that values and norms play an independent role in the formation of political trust. People may react to the same stimuli differently because of the different values they assign to events (Inglehart, 1999; Shi, 2001). This is likely to be the case in Asia, where traditional ideas still have a deep impact.

Shi (2001, 2008) argues that the emphasis on deference to authority and hierarchy promotes people’s trust level as a whole. At the aggregate level, these values and norms distinguish East Asia from other societies, influencing the level of political trust as a whole. At

the individual level, people vary greatly in their personal values and orientations. Different people identify with Confucianism to a different extent, contributing to the variation of trust in institutions between individuals.

However, previous studies on Asian values have disagreed on the effect of the traditional hierarchical oriented Asian values on trust. Using 1993 survey data from China and Taiwan, Shi (2001) concludes that compared with government performance, traditional political culture plays a more important role in shaping political trust in Taiwan, yet traditional values play an even stronger role in mainland China. However, Wang and Tan (2006) failed to find any independent effect of Asian values on support for democratic ideals in six East Asian societies.

2.2.3 Political Economy of Political Trust: Institutional Performance Approach

Another predominant approach to study political trust is institutional performance explanations. In contrast to theories of cultural values, this strand of argument treats political trust as rationally based. According to this approach, political trust mostly arises from satisfactory public evaluations of government performance (Hetherington 1998; McAllister 1999; Miller & Listhaug 1999; Mishler & Rose 2001a; Campbell 2004). This rationalist perspective traces back to Downs's (1957) rational choice logic where voters assess the expected utility of voting (Campbell 2004). Similarly, political trust can be viewed as the expected utility of the satisfactory government performance (Mishler & Rose 2001a; Hetherington 1998). Thus, rational citizens believe in governments that are trustworthy, whereas governments seen as untrustworthy generate mistrust. Following this argument, a key question for the institutional performance approach is which aspect of performance matters for political trust.

Most studies have focused on the economic performance of governments (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Lawrence 1997; McAlister 1999; Alesina & Wacziarg 2000; Campbell 2004). Scholars of political economy have long examined the role of economic performance on political behavior and attitudes. For instance, studies on electoral outcomes have established the important role of economic management (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988). Studies of economic voting have found that governing parties are more likely to win elections when national economic conditions are good (Clarke Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Cusack 1999). Following the same logic, if government can successfully generate economic growth, control inflation and reduce unemployment rates, the public will recognize its satisfactory performance and respond with political trust and confidence.

While economic performance has been the most widely studied facet of system performance in explaining political trust and legitimacy, researches often reach different or contradicting conclusions. Some have found that economic performance is among the most important predictors for political trust (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Holmberg 1999; Listhaug & Wiberg 1995; McAllister 1999), whereas others reported minimal direct linkage between the two (Lawrence 1997). If we only look at economic performance as measured by objective indicators like economic growth, the performance theory does not have sufficient explanatory power. For instance, Japan's rapid economic growth after WWII did not generate much political trust among citizens (Pharr 1997). Similarly, the decline in political trust in the US actually happened *before* the slowdown of productivity growth and increasing inequality (Lawrence 1997).

A key distinction to enlighten the scholarly disagreement regarding the role of economic performance is between subjective versus objective performance. The effect of objective performance on trust is mediated by the public's value-laden perceptions, which are generally

believed more important than actual government performance (Mishler & Rose 2001a). When the public perceives satisfactory economic performance compared with expectations, they credit the government and political system and react with trust; when they perceive that the economic outcome does not meet their expectations, they hold government and political institutions responsible and register low trust. Take the US for instance, the government's wartime success led to over-expectations by the public, which resulted in changing levels of trust in the government (Nye 1997). This emphasis on the side of the public's expectation partly explains why political trust keeps falling in some advanced industrial countries even when real economic output remains good (Miller & Listhaug 1999; Hetherington 2005).

The objective versus subjective distinction is consistent with two approaches of the political economy theories: the macro level and the micro levels (Mishler & Rose 2001a). Aggregate level analysis usually involves objective performance measures, such as the country's economic growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate. Cross-country studies have shown that objective performance is correlated with levels of confidence in government (Miller & Listhaug 1999; Newton 2006). At the individual level, people's perception of government economic performance influences their attitudes towards government. These subjective measures of economic performance matter the most for individual citizens' confidence in institutions and government (Mishler & Rose 2001a).

Economic performance is increasingly recognized as a strong predictor of political trust. However, the political economy approach only captures the economic spheres of institutional performance, while different institutions have different responsibilities and people evaluate governments in multiple areas. For instance, political performance is another important dimension of institutional performance, and it should also be included.

In this section, we reviewed two major competing theoretical approaches to political trust: theories of political culture and theories of political economy. While both approaches offered important insights in our understanding of political trust, they do not adequately explain political trust. To better understand political trust, we need to look beyond cultural and economic spheres and shift our focus to the real political origins of political trust. In the next section, I will try to bring politics back into the equation and explore the political sources of trust.

2.3 THIS DISSERTATION:

THE OVERLOOKED POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST

While it is logical to explain political trust in terms of political culture and political economy, the explanations leave open the specification of real political influences. In this section, I will focus on this less studied aspect, and explore the political origins of political trust. Specifically, I will discuss two political factors: political performance and institutional design.

Institutional quality is important to understand political trust. Generally speaking, institutions create trust in two ways: first, they can inspire compliance with their “moral plausibility” and normative justification of rules; second, they can reduce the perceived risks for the truster by their formal protective and punishing apparatus (Offe 1999: 70). In accordance with these two mechanisms, I will focus on two institutional and political factors that contribute to political trust: the institutional political performance and the institutional designs.

2.3.1 Political Performance of the Institutions and Authorities

The public evaluations of political performance shape levels of political trust. Political trust is a relational concept where citizens are trusters and political institutions are trustees. Trust depends on both the truster and the trustee. Citizens' trust in political institutions arises from the relationship between citizens and political institutions, and it is a product of citizens' belief in the trustworthiness of institutions. Citizens trust political institutions when they believe that institutions are committed to and capable of fulfilling trust. Political performance reflects commitment and capability of the institutions.

Political performance matters for political trust not only in established democracies but also in new democracies and non-democratic countries where governments are not as accountable to the people. To study the effects of political performance, we will return to the theoretical discussion of attributes of trustworthiness. Following the cognitive and rational line, the attributes of trustworthiness assure the truster that the trustee will not betray a trust. Scholars have identified different attributes of trustworthiness, such as integrity, competence, responsiveness, character, equity, fairness, honesty, intrinsic care, accountability, reliability, etc. (Abramson 1972; Weatherford 1984; Tyler 1990; Citrin & Muste 1999; Denters 2002; Li 2008; 2010; Van der Meer 2010). These attributes generally fall into two categories capacity and commitment. Whereas capacity refers to trustee's capability to gain trust, commitment emphasizes the trustees' moral values to care about the trusters and keep their promises.

Trustworthiness of political actors falls along two dimensions: capacity and commitment. On the one hand, political agents have the capacity to act on citizens' interests and respond to their demands, thus making them trustworthy. However, forces like internationalization and

interdependence decrease the citizens' appraisal of government performance and undermine the ability and effectiveness of government (Scharpf 2000). On the other hand, political commitment refers to political agents' willingness and moral obligations to act in the interests of citizens. A committed and competent institution equals a trustworthy institution that creates a higher level of political trust. In this dissertation, I will study the effects of political performance following these two dimensions.

2.3.1.1 Capacity

On the capacity dimension, trustworthy governments and institutions should be able to deliver services as they promised and solve problems as people expected. People would trust institutions and governments if they believe that institutions are competent to perform satisfactorily. Capacity includes both economic and political competence. Whereas economic competence has been discussed extensively, political competence deserves further emphasis as a basis of political trust. One of the most important indicators for political competence or incompetence is the extent of political corruption.

Corruption impairs institutions' ability to fulfill citizens' trust, thus reducing the levels of political trust. Early functionalist research in political science has argued for the positive greasing effect of corruption, as corruption binds society together, promotes harmony, and redistributes public resources (Huntington 1968; Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine 1989; Goldsmith 1999). However, corruption is now generally regarded as an economic and political evil (Seligson 2002; della Porta 2000; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Van der Meer 2010). Corruption also has detrimental effects on political trust because it violates the democratic principles of equality, openness, and democratic accountability. As corruption distorts public

demand and elevates the costs, it results in malfunctioning of public administration and compromises institutional autonomy and credibility. Meanwhile, corruption implies the government incompetence to deal with the problem and improve the government efficiency and accountability. As a result, corrupted leaders and institutions produce distrust in citizens.

Empirical works have partly confirmed the pernicious effects of corruption on political attitudes towards government and system. For instance, Pharr (2000) has demonstrated that media reports of official's misconduct in office can be a better predictor of political trust than economic policy performance in Japan. Bowler & Karp (2004) have shown how political scandals like Watergate greatly eroded trust in government in the US and the UK. Seligson (2002) reported that political corruption undermines democratic legitimacy in four Latin American countries. Morris and Klesner (2010) also found that corruption leads to institutional distrust in Mexico.

However, these studies have been limited to a small number of countries and limited geopolitical settings. One problem with these studies is incomplete model specification. Many studies failed to include important alternative explanations and suffer from potential omitted-variable bias. Indeed, as Anderson and Tverdova (2003: 93) observed, once alternative explanations were included in these studies, the effect of corruption may be "substantially attenuated or reduced to insignificance". To overcome these problems and study the real effects of corruption on political attitudes towards government, we need to control for other theoretically important sources of political trust, and test the effects of corruption against a wider range of countries.

So far, the only good exception in the literature is Anderson and Tverdova (2003), who examined the detrimental effects of corruption in 16 established and new democratic countries.

However, their study has been limited to democratic settings. Besides, the primary purpose of their study was to estimate the effect of corruption on the public evaluations of democratic performance and civil servants rather than on public trust in political institutions. Nevertheless, if corruption negatively affects democratic support as Anderson and Tverdova (2003) reported, we should also systematically test its effects on political trust in institutions. As argued earlier, corruption should also decrease the level of trust in political institutions. Building on the previous research, I hope to study the effects of corruption on political trust while controlling for the established alternative explanations. I will test its effects in both democratic and non-democratic countries in this dissertation.

2.3.1.2 Commitment

On the commitment dimension, trusters believe that trustees will act in the interests of trusters. This commitment may come in two ways: First, the trustee shares the same values or goals with the truster. Second, the truster can punish the trustee by denying future trust (Offe 1999). For trustees, good quality and moral values imply the commitment from the truster. With regard to political trust, fairness and responsiveness are two important qualities of the commitment of institutions.

Fairness or social justice is an important criterion that people use to evaluate government benefits and outcomes (Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw 1985; Jennings 1991). Trustworthy institutions ensure social justice not only in outcomes but also in procedures. Outcome fairness and distributive justice influences political trust. People evaluate government on its absolute output as well as on fairness of outcomes, both of which contribute to confidence in government (Katz, Gutek, Kahn, and Barton 1975). Procedural fairness can be even more important to

political trust (Tyler et al. 1985). Fair institutional procedures make sure that citizens involved are given equal access and opportunities, thus procedural fairness is considered a very important indicator for political performance.

People assess fairness and justice not only on individual bases but on group or society bases. For example, people may feel that an individual is unjustly treated by institutions, or a social group is unjustly deprived of government benefits. Group-related criteria may be more important (Miller & Listhaug 1999). However, as it is almost impossible to satisfy all groups in society, people understand that fairness also means that a society as a whole can benefit.

Responsiveness is another important indicator of political performance. Prompt government responsiveness to the equally weighted preferences of its citizens characterizes a democracy (Dahl 1971). The responsiveness of government and institutions shows commitment to people, and it affects people's confidence in the trustworthiness of institutions.

Unfortunately, empirical evidence for the impact of political commitment on trust has been insufficient (Miller & Listhaug 1999). The above mentioned studies have pointed out the important theoretical implications of fairness and responsiveness, but empirically, they have certain limitations. The empirical examination has been limited to certain groups of people such as college students (e.g. Tyler et al. 1985), certain regions within the US (e.g. Tyler et al. 1985; Miller & Listhaug 1999), or a single country (e.g. Katz et al. 1975). Further studies with "comparative data across time and across countries" are necessary to empirically test and establish the effect of political commitment on political trust (Miller & Listhaug 1999: 215)

Political performance is usually measured subjectively. While actual political performance influences the level of political trust, public perception mediates this effect (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Hetherington & Rudolph 2008). Unlike economic

performance, political performance is more difficult to measure and operationalize. As a result, the public perception matters more than the objective political performance in shaping confidence in political institutions (Yang & Holzer 2006). Perceived political performance and actual political performance are two measures of political performance and their effects on political trust are different. Most researchers have studied the effect of perceived rather than actual political performance.

As it is more difficult for the public to directly evaluate the political performance of the system, the media plays an important role in the priming process of public evaluation of political performance (Hetherington 2005). Scholars have found that the media, especially television, has helped to shape political trust through public evaluations of political performance (Pharr 2000; Norris 2000). Also, bureaucratic encounters, the personal experience with the government leaders or institutions, greatly shape individual evaluations of the system. For instance, Latin American citizens who personally experienced corruption have less faith in regime legitimacy (Seligson 2002).

In short, competence and commitment are two important aspects of political trustworthiness. Citizens' evaluations on these two aspects of political performance affect how much citizens trust political institutions. They represent the first political source of political trust. The second political source of political trust is institutional settings, as I will discuss below.

2.3.2 Political Context: Institutional Designs and Political Trust

Political context matters for political attitude and behavior. People make political decisions and take political actions as individuals embedded in political context. As new institutionalism school argues, structural factors and political context shape individual choices and behaviors. Institutional designs approach focuses on the macro-political characters and structures and examines how these different arrangements affect political trust.

Studies on institutional designs present a new approach to study political trust. Institutional features shape the structure of public attitudes and behaviors in coherent and predictable ways. Through their influence on both the truster and the trustee, different institutional characteristics promote or depress the level of political trust in institutions. In this section, I will first discuss what democratic political contexts affect political support and how, and then go beyond the democratic settings and study the effects of regime types on political trust.

2.3.2.1 Review: Democratic Institutional Characteristics and Political Attitudes

Institutional perspective has largely been neglected from the comparative studies of mass politics. Discussions on political trust have been no exception. Many studies have focused on the individual level variation in political trust in single or a small number of countries. As Anderson (2009: 317) observed, many “studies were considered ‘comparative’ mostly because they were conducted outside of the United States or in a set of (relatively similar) countries, not

because there were strong theoretical reasons to believe that the individual-level relationships differed across countries.” These case studies are important to deepen our understanding of the issue, yet the structural effects of macropolitics and the political context within which citizens are nested are often constant or hidden in these single country studies. Availability of cross-country survey data has shifted some attention to aggregate-level characteristics and their impact on aggregate political attitude and behavior. However, cross-country research on political trust has mainly considered economic and cultural influences. Although new institutionalism school has called for a better understanding of political attitudes within their structural context, few studies have systematically examined the role of institutional designs on political attitude towards the government and institutions.

Studies on institutional effects on political attitudes and behavior have been limited. Only a few noticeable exceptions have studied whether and how certain institutional characters can affect the trustworthiness of institutions. Miller and Listhaug (1990) were among the first to recognize the importance of the institutional focus of political support. Comparing political trust in Norway, Sweden, and the US between 1964 and 1986, Miller and Listhaug discussed how the different features of party systems may influence the confidence in government. Anderson and Guillory’s research (1997) represents another major breakthrough in the institutional effects on political support. They examined how consensus and majoritarian systems may affect democratic satisfaction in eleven European democracies. Norris (1999c) extended the research design to include 25 democracies from around the world. Studying the direct effects of institutional features on political trust, her work has been the most comprehensive discussion on institutional effects on political support so far.

These studies showed that different institutional arrangements exert different influences on political support for democratic performance and institutions. The researches are illuminating for trust studies. They started to link the individual-level political attitudes and national-level political contexts, and brought the institutional settings that have been long ignored into analysis of political attitudes. As Miller and Listhaug (1990: 384) put it,

“Of primary importance to this concern is knowledge about how change in political attitudes at the mass level affects the structure of political institutions - or how institutional factors influence the development of political attitudes which subsequently have consequences for the system. This relationship has compelling implications for the stability of the political regime but it is also indicative of how adaptive the system is to social change. The ability of a polity to survive considerable conflict is crucial. But in a democracy it is equally important to determine the conditions under which institutional stability comes to be seen as rigidity and unresponsiveness.”

However, there are some major problems with the existing discussions on institutional effects. First, given the very limited number of research on the issue, there has been no clear evidence on the proposed relationships between institutional characters and political support. Scholars have reached inconsistent conclusions on the directions or even existence of several institutional effects, and further research is required to clarify on the nature of the relationships. Second, the research designs of existing institutional studies were targeted at democratic systems only, which left out one important institutional feature from the current discussion: the non-democratic systems. As Norris (1999c: 232) admitted, the relationships and effects might be “proven even more significant in a wider range of political systems, if we compared democratic and authoritarian regimes, and this is worth exploring further in future research”. This has not been done yet. Nonetheless, these studies stand a good starting point for further exploration into the relationship between institutional designs and political trust.

2.3.2.2 The Missing Piece of the puzzle: Regime Types and Political Trust

In this dissertation, I hope to respond to Norris's proposal, and compare and study political trust in different types of regimes. Studies of political trust in non-democratic countries have been very limited in the current discussions, and it remains a question how authoritarian arrangements affect political trust. Most comparative studies include only democratic regimes when analyzing the sources of political trust, and non-democratic cases are often treated as anomalous. However, findings from non-democratic countries testify, supplement, and enrich the existing theories of political trust. Thus non-democratic countries should be treated as a missing piece of the puzzle rather than outliers or anomalies.

Democratic experience and regime types make a difference for trust in political institutions through their influence on both institutions' performance and citizens' perception of institutions. If we return to the relational nature of political trust, we can study how regime types affect both trusters and trustees.

Political context structures and shapes citizens' attitudes and behaviors. Institutional characteristics can affect political trust through both trustees and trusters. As political trust is relational, it is shaped by both the trustworthiness of institutions and citizens' belief. First, institutional designs can affect the trustworthiness of the trustee. Institutions come with a set of rules. Through institutional rules such as protective and punishment mechanism and precedent following, institutions help guarantee the trustworthiness of political institutions. Different institutional characteristics have different impacts on citizens' perception of trustworthiness of institutions. Some institutional designs ensure more efficient and responsive functioning of institutions and promote political trustworthiness. With these institutional designs, people tend to

have higher level of political trust. Other institutional settings may decrease the level of political trust as they lack effective assurance mechanism for fulfillment of trust.

Second, institutional arrangements can also shape trusters' perception of trustees' trustworthiness. For instance, certain institutional characters provide citizens with rosier picture of institutions and promote citizens' perception of institutional trustworthiness. As a result, citizens show higher level of public confidence in institutions with these institutional designs. In contrast, citizens in some institutional designs are exposed to more diverse or even negative information of trustworthiness of institutions, and they tend to trust political institutions less.

We can understand the effects of regime types from the above two aspects. From the trustee's side, democratic principles such as democratic accountability and democratic representation provide institutions and authorities with incentives to attract more support from voters. Thus, democratic systems tend to foster citizens' trust and confidence in political institutions. In non-democratic regimes, however, decision-making process is less representative and institutions less accountable, providing less ground for their citizens to trust them. Besides, the repressive nature of authoritarian regimes makes it harder for people to trust the government. As Hardin (1998: 21) commented, "...trust must be harder in China now than it was shortly before the June 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square". Similarly, established democracies should invite higher level of political trust than new and consolidating democracies. In general, we should expect that citizens present higher level of political trust in democratic regimes than in non-democratic regimes.

However, we may have different expectations when we consider the trusters' side. Non-democratic regimes tend to mobilize regime support and public confidence through mechanisms like media control and political education (Geddes & Zaller 1989; Kennedy 2009; Yang & Tang

2010). These mechanisms in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes boost citizens' evaluations and confidence in trustworthiness of political institutions. In contrast, citizens in democratic regimes are usually less exposed to such mechanisms. As a result, we may expect lower level of political trust from citizens in democratic regimes than in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. We will examine these two opposite hypotheses in the following chapters of this dissertation.

We should note that institutional features work at both macro and micro levels. At the macro levels, the duration and levels of democracies are associated with different levels of political trust. Democratic societies may present different patterns of political trust than the non-democratic societies. At the individual level, citizens are exposed to different levels of mobilization and control mechanism, and they have different levels of political trust in institutions.

East Asia is an ideal location to study the effect of regime types on political trust. At the aggregate level, East Asia includes societies with different levels of democracy: the established democracies, consolidating democracies, semi-authoritarian societies, and authoritarian countries. The great variation in institutional settings and levels of political trust provides a good opportunity to examine and compare the different institutional effects on political trust. At the micro level, we can study how authoritarian arrangements such as political education and media control affect citizens' trust in political institutions in case studies. To compare and study political trust in different types of regimes, I will study political trust in authoritarian systems through both cross-country analysis and in-depth case study. First, I will include authoritarian countries in my cross-country analysis of political trust. Second, as this dissertation focuses on political trust in East Asia, I am most interested in the case of China. As the world's largest authoritarian regime today, China presents a good case study to explore the relationship between

political trust and authoritarian arrangements. I will examine which and how authoritarian settings affect Chinese people's political trust and support.

The level of trust in institutions is perplexingly high in China (Chen 2004). Studies on political support in China have basically followed the cultural theories or economic performance theories (Shi 2001; Wang 2005b; Yang & Tang 2010). The traditional Confucian culture and satisfactory economic performance have been identified as the major contributors to high level of political trust in china. The political bases of trust in institutions in China have not been explored in the literature. In this dissertation, I will study whether and how political performance and institutional features affect Chinese people's levels of political trust. I am not denying the roles of political culture and economic performance in trust, but I argue that political corruption and authoritarian arrangements should also contribute to the high level of political trust in China. The case study of authoritarian China tests and complements the existing theories, and contributes to the current discussions of political trust. Sorting out the common and distinctive features of political trust in China and their sources and consequences should illuminate the larger inquiry of sources of political trust.

After laying out the theoretical framework of this research, I will explain the data sources and analytical methods for empirical testing in the next chapter. I will also present my research plan and outline the following chapters.

3.0 ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

3.1 ARGUMENT IN BRIEF AND PROPOSITIONS

This dissertation studies the sources of political trust in East Asia. I reviewed the two major competing explanations for political trust in the existing literature, and discussed their contributions and limitations. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to go beyond these two theories and bring politics back as origins of political trust. I will study the political bases of political trust in East Asia, and I am most interested in the effects of political performance and institutional features on political trust. I argue that political trust lies in the perceived institutional trustworthiness that is determined by political performance of institutions and shaped by institutional settings.

Specifically, if the theories about the sources of political trust that I discussed earlier are right, I expect to find the following relationships:

3.1.1 Political Performance and Political Trust

First, unsatisfactory political performance such as corruption and unfairness reduces political trust. Political institutions that are more capable and more committed to act in citizens' interests and respond to their demands will gain more public trust. Corruption reflects both institutional

capacity and commitment. It distorts public demands, increases political and economic costs, and compromises political accountability, resulting in lost political trust. Fairness reflects institutional commitment. It ensures social justice in both institutional outcomes and procedures, making institutions trustworthy. Corruption and fairness are two most important indicators of political performance, and they should significantly affect political trust.

For cross-national analyses, I expect that

H1a. Levels of political trust are lower in countries where institutions are more corrupt and less fair; and on average, countries with fairer and less corrupt institutions will demonstrate higher levels of political trust at the national level.

At the individual level, I expect that

H1b. People who perceive institutions in their countries more corrupt and unfair will be less likely to trust and support institutions; and those who perceive institutions less corrupt and unfair will trust institutions more.

At the aggregate level, corruption will be measured by Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International, an international civil society organization against corruption. It measures the perceived levels of corruption in public sector in nearly 200 countries around the world. At the individual level, we use citizens' perceived corruption as a measure. The question from the East Asian Barometer surveys that measures perceived corruption is "How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your national government? Would you say hardly anyone is involved (1), not a lot of officials are corrupt (2), most officials are corrupt (3), or almost everyone is corrupt (4)?"

To measure perceived fairness, we use this question from the East Asian Barometer surveys: "We would like you now to compare the present system of government with the one our

country had earlier. In the following areas, would you say that today things are much better than before (1), somewhat better (2), much the same (3), somewhat worse (4), or much worse (5)?”

The item under consideration is “everyone is treated equally by the government”.

3.1.2 Institutional Designs and Political Trust

H2.1. Level of Democratization and Political Trust

Second, institutions matter. Institutional designs exert an independent effect on political trust, and different institutional settings have different effects on political trust. Different structural arrangements have different advantages and political behavior characteristics, and their performance shapes public satisfaction and support for political systems and government. The “new institutionalism” school suggests that we should turn to institutions and understand public attitudes within their structural context. On the one hand, we need to examine how institutional features affect people’s political attitudes at the individual level. On the other hand, to examine the institutional effects, we should also employ the cross-national level analysis where variance of institutional arrangements is maximized.

Level of democratization is an important institutional feature. In this dissertation, I am most concerned about the effects of democratic experience and regime types on political trust. I expect that the regime types and democratic experience affect the average levels of trust in institutions.¹⁰

At the macro level, I expect that

¹⁰ First, democratic and non-democratic regimes may present different levels of political trust. Second, within democracies, democratic history also matters, as the quality and duration of democracy may affect the level of political trust. Besides, new democracies with communist past may behave differently than those without. This will be discussed further in the next section.

H2.1a. Non-democratic regimes may demonstrate higher levels of political trust because their governments often use media control and political education to mobilize regime support and public political confidence.

At the individual level, I expect that

H2.1b. Individuals exposed to different levels of authoritarian control demonstrate different levels of political trust. Media control and political education are both examples of authoritarian mechanisms that affect individual's political trust.

Using comparative survey data, I will test these hypotheses of regime types and democratic experience in the following chapters. Specifically, I use Freedom in the World Index from the Freedom House to measure levels of democratization in different societies. The index is the mean score of political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are measured by questions such as open election, right to organize competing parties, and minorities' participation in decision-making process. Civil liberties are measured by questions such as free media, freedom of religion, and protection from political terror.

Two variables of passive politicization are used as individual level variables of authoritarian arrangements in our case study. The first one is *media exposure*. Respondents are asked about the frequency of using conventional media channels, including newspaper, television and radio. The other relevant variable is *political interest*, measured by the respondent's self-evaluation of their concern for government affairs, since it subjects people to more political propaganda in authoritarian societies.

H2.2. Democratic Institutional Designs and Political Trust

Within the democratic regimes, different institutional features may have different effects on trust in institutions. Political trust studies using institutional approach have been very limited and inconclusive. Studying institutional effects in different countries, scholars have reached different or even conflicting conclusions. In this research, I hope to respond to this discrepancy, and examine the institutional effects on political trust at different levels.

As the institutional arrangements usually change slowly, the best setting to examine the institutional effects on political trust is comparative researches that maximize the number of countries included and institutional variations. Thus, the global level analysis is the most important part to capture institutional effects on political support.

Specifically, with the global level analysis, I will use the World Values Surveys to study five democratic institutional arrangements that have been hypothesized to exert some effects on the level of political trust: party systems, democratic duration, electoral systems, executive-legislative dynamics, and party allegiance.

H2.2a. Two-party and moderate multi-party systems are expected to have higher levels of political trust than fragmented party systems.

Political parties are “the most important mediating institutions between citizens and the state” (Anderson 1998: 572). The different party systems influence the level of political trust. Norris (1999c) argued that predominantly one-party governments and fragmented party systems are both less likely to have high level of political trust since neither allows effective channeling and translation of the public opinion into government policy.¹¹ The Democracy Cross-National

¹¹ Alternatively, Miller and Listhaug (1990) found that the number of political parties corresponds to higher level of system support because the fragmentation of party systems reflects the meaningful issue representation which contributes to political support.

Dataset compiled by Norris in 2009 provides complete information on types of party system classified from effective number of parliamentary parties for countries across the world.

H2.2b. The levels of political trust should be higher among countries with higher levels of democracy.

The duration of democratic experience affects political trust. Torcal (2006: 157) argued that unlike established democracies, new democracies do not have a “recent and prolonged” democratic experience that could serve as reference when evaluating democratic performance. Citizens in older democracies, on the other hand, tend to use the democratic ideal as reference point and “evaluate the present with a future perspective”. Thus, democratic institutions usually present higher levels of confidence in older democracies. I will use the average Freedom House rating for each democratic country since 1972. Freedom House monitors countries across the world on an annual basis and rate the countries’ levels of democracy each year. The average Freedom House rating since 1972 captures both quality and tradition of democracy.

H2.2c. On average, democracies with proportional representation systems tend to demonstrate higher levels of political trust.

Democracies with proportional representation systems optimize democratic representation function (and arguably accountability function as well), promoting political trust (Aarts & Thomassen 2008). Proportional representation systems are associated with more flexible party system and more electoral volatility that are correlated with higher level of political trust (Miller & Listhaug 1990). The most important factor of electoral formula is the way votes are counted to allocate seats, and accordingly, we can identify different formulas of electoral systems: majoritarian, proportional, and mixed systems. For a classification of electoral systems, I will refer to the Electoral System Design Database published by International Institute

for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA 2004). The database divides the electoral systems into different categories: proportional representation, plurality/majority, and mixed.

H2.2d. Parliamentary systems tend to have higher levels of political support than presidential systems on average.

Different executive-legislative relationships shape political trust. Linz (1990a, 1990b, 1994) argued that compared with parliamentary systems, some presidential systems are more likely to suffer from structural problems such as executive–legislative deadlock, disproportionality, and temporal rigidity. In contrast, several advantages of parliamentary systems help attract more political trust: a united executive and legislature that enables efficient decision-making, collegial executives with fused powers that encourage diversity, and a more flexible institutional context for democratic consolidation. Moreover, parliamentary governments are more likely to use proportional representation (rather than single member district method) which is associated with more equality and better minority representation (Anderson & Guillory 1997; Lijphart 1999), and people are expected to show more support for democracy in proportional representation. Thus we should expect higher level of political trust in parliamentary systems. I will refer to the Democracy Cross-National Dataset for a classification of the executive types.

H2.2e. Party allegiance affects the level of political trust. Specifically, winners in electoral contests tend to have higher levels of political trust than losers.

In democratic societies, popular influence in government is mainly achieved through elections. Winning and losing electoral outcomes matter for political institutions because “the stability and continued functioning of political system depends on actors’ incentives for

institutional change” (Anderson & Tverdova 2001: 323). On the one hand, losers, i.e. voters whose preferred parties are not in the ruling circle, are more likely to challenge the maintenance of the current political systems. Winners, i.e. voters who identify with and endorsed the party that form (part of) the government, on the other hand, face a more friendly political system and have more incentives to avoid these changes and maintain the status quo. We expect that winners and losers of electoral contests may have different expectations and values towards government. As “home team hypothesis” or “winners effect” suggested, winners have more confidence in the existing government and institutions than losers (Holmberg 1999; Anderson & Guillory 1997). To examine the effect of party allegiance on political trust, I will check the winning parties in each country at the time of the survey and compare that with respondents’ reply to the question “in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year], which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) did you vote for?”.¹²

There are also some cross level interactions between party allegiance and other institutional settings. In other words, the effects of party allegiance would be context dependent. Country level institutional designs help explain why the effects of party allegiance on trust differs cross countries. Specifically, we can develop the following hypothesis to capture these cross-level interaction effects.

H2.2f_1. The trust gap between winners and losers is larger in countries with two party or moderate multi-party systems than in fragmented party systems. Winners would be more trusting of political institutions in countries with two party or moderate multi-party systems.

¹² A similar question was asked in the World Values Surveys – “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If you are uncertain, which party appeals to you most?”

H2.2f_2. Levels of democracy increase the trust gap between winners and losers. In more mature democracies, winners would be more trusting of political institutions than in winners in less democratic countries.

After examining these hypotheses at the global level, I will study the features of democratic institutional arrangements in East Asian context. This part of analysis will focus on institutional effects that have been proven significant from the global analysis, and go into the details of East Asian politics. As some institutional features identified above are relatively stable across East Asian democracies, while some other East Asia specific institutional arrangements deserve more discussion in the context of political support, we need to modify some of our original hypotheses.

A major difference from the original hypotheses is electoral systems. The electoral systems in almost all East Asia democracies are mixed-member electoral system. Besides, as Reilly (2007: 192) observed, unlike the international norm of mixed systems that feature an equal split between the district and list components, “all the East Asian mixed systems ... are highly majoritarian in practice”. Instead of the difference between majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems, the major institutional variation in electoral systems across East Asia democracies is personalistic voting. Democratic elections are more candidate-centered and personalistic in East Asia. Candidate centered voting may have some mediating effects on the role political and economic performance played on political support, as voters in personalistic electoral system tend to sympathize or even support the politicians and political institutions even if their performances are not most satisfactory (Chang & Chu 2006).

To capture the conditional effects of institutional designs on political performance, I will use interaction analysis to examine the potential mediating effects of personalist electoral systems. Specifically, we can modify and develop the new hypothesis:

H2.2g. Personalism mediates the influence of corruption on the level of political trust. Specifically, in non-personalistic electoral systems, people are less likely to show political trust when they perceive political institutions corrupt than they are in candidate centered electoral systems.

To measure personalism, I will refer to Hicken & Kasuya's (2002) survey for coding of candidate centered electoral systems where they compiled a dataset of constitutional structures and electoral systems of seventeen Asian-Pacific countries since 1945. Compared with separate votes for both candidates and parties, a single vote for candidates is considered as more candidate centered and personalistic.

3.1.3 Control: Other Sources of Political Trust

While political performance and institutional settings are the primary focus of this dissertation, I will include other important sources of political trust for control purposes. Specifically, I will control for the major explanations discussed in the existing literature.

First, economic performance, the other dimension of institutional performance, also influences political trust. At the macro level, countries with satisfactory economic performance are likely to have higher level of political trust, and countries with poor economic performance are associated with low level of political trust distrust. At the micro level, individuals who are

satisfied with economic performance of institutions have higher level of political trust than those who are not.¹³

Second, social capital affects political trust. On the one hand, interpersonal trust is a prerequisite of political trust, as social trust can spill over to social networks and political institutions. On the other hand, participation in voluntary activities and social associations help citizens build social trust and cooperation and develop a sense of political influence, thus promoting their level of political trust.¹⁴

Meanwhile, we should also notice that the proposed analyses have assumed the effect of social capital on political trust to be exogenous. However, some researchers proposed that the effect of social capital may be endogenous to trust in institutions and there may be a two-way reciprocal causality between social capital and political trust (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). Indeed, if the reciprocal causality does exist, our analyses will suffer from endogeneity bias – social capital variables including social trust and associational activism are reversely influenced by political trust variable and are thus correlated with the disturbance term in the regression.

Thus, we need to investigate the possibility of endogeneity bias. Helping sort out the causes and consequences and capture the over-time dynamics of trust, longitudinal research in the trust study has been most valuable but scarce. Data from the five waves of WVS provide valuable panel data at the aggregate level. To best examine the trust sources at the aggregate level, I will study the dynamics between social trust, associational activism, and political trust at the country level using panel data from the World Values Surveys in Chapter 4. Specifically, I

¹³ I will measure economic performance with standard macro economic indicators such as GDP per capita (PPP) and economic growth rate. I use the following question to measure individual satisfaction with the financial situation of the household: “How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was five years ago? Is it much better now (1), a little better now (2), about the same (3), a little worse now (4), or much worse now (5)?”

¹⁴ Interpersonal trust is measured by the following question: “In general, when you interact with people, do you believe that most people are trustworthy or do you think that one should be wary of being cheated?” Civic engagement is measured by respondents’ voluntary memberships in social and political organizations.

will build a three-wave reciprocal-effects causal model with country-level panel data from World Value Surveys between 1990 and 2000. I hope to capture the over time change in social capital and political trust, and to sort out the cause and effects between social trust, associations, and political trust.

Third, cultural values also play a role in shaping political trust. Post-modernization brings a shift in values from materialist rationality to post-materialist individualism. The emerging critical citizens tend to reject authority and value individual autonomy, which reduces political support. In contrast, the Confucian Asian values emphasize deference to authority and hierarchy, which promotes the public support for institutions and government. So post-materialist values and Asian values work at the opposite directions towards political trust.¹⁵

In the following chapters, I will empirically test the political performance hypotheses and institutional designs hypotheses at different levels and study the different sources of political trust in East Asia. First, I will compare the levels of political trust across countries and across time. This will put Asia and China in a comparative framework. The second part will focus on the East Asia and examine the different explanations in the Asian context. I will not only study political trust at both macro and micro levels, but also try to combine the two levels of analyses into multi-level analyses. In the last part of the dissertation, I will particularly study the patterns of political trust in China, and seek to explain the high national trust and low local trust from its political sources. I will also study the behavioral consequences of political trust and examine its

¹⁵ Post-materialist values are measured by citizen's priority of liberty (freedom of speech, participation in national and local governments) as compared to material and physical security (economic status, national defense, crime fighting) (Inglehart 1997). The Confucian Asian values are measured by four questions. Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the following statement: (1) "Even if unreasonable, parents' demands must be heeded by children." (2) "An older person should be asked to adjudicate when there are arguments." (3) "Even if the wrong is on the mother-in-law, the son should ask the daughter-in-law to concede." (4) "For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second." Scores were added together and form a single index.

impact in both democratic and non-democratic countries. Throughout the dissertation, I am most interested in the political bases of political trust.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA AND OUTLINE

In order to test the different hypotheses of political trust, we need survey data from different sources and at different levels. I will discuss the data sources and the outline of the dissertation in this section.

3.2.1 Data

This dissertation is a comparative research. I will assess different explanations and make comparisons at different levels. As this dissertation aims to explore the sources of political trust at different levels and compare political trust across countries and across individuals, we need comparative data at both aggregate and individual levels.

Part of the aggregate level data comes from the World Values Survey (WVS), an international collaborative project studying a wide range of political and social topics. The WVS is suitable for the macro level analysis of political trust. First, the WVS is the world's largest cross-cultural surveys covering 87 societies across the world, presenting the broadest range of variation for both cross-sectional and cross-level analysis. The WVS provides an ideal opportunity to examine the sources of political trust at the country level. I will use the WVS to compare the political trust in East Asia with other regions in the world (e.g. Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, and Africa). Second, the WVS

has also offered rich longitudinal information. To date, the WVS has been conducted with a time-span of over twenty years. The five waves of the WVS, carried out in 1981, 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 1999-2001 and 2005-2007, provide valuable aggregate level data across time.

Another major source of data is the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Part of the Global Barometer Survey (GBS), the ABS is a joint survey research conducted in thirteen East Asian societies (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). The project is headquartered in Taiwan and it is conducted by leading research institutes in different political systems in Asia. The ABS contains useful information including political attitudes, democracy, governance, and economic reforms. So far, two waves of surveys have been conducted in 2001-2003 and 2004-2008. Like the WVS, the data in the ABS were gathered through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected national samples. As the ABS specifically focuses on the Asian countries, it interviewed more respondents in each society and asked many Asian-specific questions to gauge the regional political and cultural context such as “Asian values”. I will mainly use the ABS for analysis of political trust in Asia and in China. The societies included in the analysis are Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia. To explore the effects of institutional context, multilevel analysis at both individual level and country level will be employed. This dissertation mainly relies on WVS and the ABS. I will also gather some aggregate-level data from various sources such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations.

The China part of the WVS survey was conducted by the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) of Peking University. The China part of the ABS was conducted

by Institute of Sociology of Chinese Social Science Academy (CSSA) for the first wave and RCCC for the second. Besides the WVS and ABS, I will use some national surveys for the analysis of political trust in China. These include the 2004 Chinese Value and Ethics Survey by RCCC and the 2008 China Survey conducted by College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University and RCCC. All of these surveys employed stratified multistage random sampling including both rural and urban residents in China. These surveys contain batteries of information gauging Chinese people's political attitudes and behavior, and they enabled us to study and compare citizens' political trust at different levels and across time. Chapter 6 of the dissertation will draw heavily on these individual-level data from China.

3.2.2 Research Plan

The first three chapters lay out the theoretical framework of this dissertation. I reviewed the existing literature regarding sources of political trust, and I proposed that political performance and institutional settings also play important roles in shaping citizens' trust in political institutions. The emphasis of this dissertation is the political bases of political trust. I will focus on East Asia and pay particular attention to the authoritarian Chinese case. The following chapters will examine these theories empirically and test the relevant hypotheses at different levels.

Chapter 4 will study East Asia in global perspective, comparing the levels and trends of political trust in East Asia with different groups of the countries in the world. I will conduct some country level descriptive analyses to map the patterns and trend of political trust across

countries and across time. This chapter aims to draw a big picture and put East Asia in a comparative setting. I will compare the levels of political trust in East Asia with other regions like Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, North America, and West Europe. Controlling for individual level explanations, the multilevel analysis in this chapter aims to examine the key political sources of political trust (i.e. the political institutional performance and institutional designs) at the country level with global data. These require both comparative and aggregate level data as well as individual level data from the WVS.

Chapter 5 goes into the details of East Asia. This chapter focuses on the East Asian democracies. I will compare and investigate East Asian societies and study the political sources of political trust at different levels. First, I will explore the relationships at the individual level, and focus on the roles of citizens' perceptions of political performance and personal experience with corruption. Then I will add contextual factors into analysis, and highlight the effects of aggregate political performance and regime types on the public trust in political institutions. The chapter also studies the impact of political performance and institutional settings with multilevel analysis that integrates the two levels of analysis. The EAB provides very rich and timely data of political trust in the region at both country and individual levels, and it will be the main source of data in these two chapters. I expect to find independent and significant effects of political performance and institutional designs on political trust in East Asian societies.

Chapter 6 goes a step further and studies political trust in non-democratic countries. Specifically, I focus on China, the largest non-democratic regime in the world. The chapter investigates the sources of the exceptionally high level of political trust in China: whether it is a result of authoritarian mobilization, an artifact of political fear, a product of traditional Chinese culture, or a rational response to the institutional performance. In this chapter, I will also study

the two characters of political trust in China: the high level of political trust in institutions in the center, and the low trust in local government in China. I will examine whether and to what extent do authoritarian settings contribute to political trust in China, noticeably the effect of authoritarian mobilization process involving political education and media control. I expect to find that Chinese people trust institutions not only basing on the economic performance and Confucian values; they are also greatly concerned with the political performance. In addition, public trust in China is shaped by authoritarian features as well.

Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter of the dissertation. I will study the implications of political trust on citizens' political attitudes and behaviors in East Asia. This chapter examines the consequences of trust in two areas: the democratic values, and the political participation. Both dimensions have serious implications for the future of democratization in East Asia. In this chapter, I will also review the major theories and empirical findings from previous chapters. The political story of political trust will be reiterated and summarized to emphasize the theme of the dissertation, i.e. the roles of political performance and political context in explaining political trust. This last chapter will also discuss the policy implications and directions for future research.

4.0 PATTERNS AND SOURCES: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL DATA

This dissertation studies the political sources of political trust. In the previous chapters, I reviewed the existing literature relating to this project, emphasized the relational nature of political trust, and highlighted the roles of political performance and institutional designs in shaping political trust. In this chapter, I will examine these political factors and test the hypotheses proposed in the last chapter at the global level. Specifically, this chapter aims to address the following questions: How do the levels of political trust vary across countries and across time? How does the level of political trust in East Asia compare with other regions in the world? What explains the variations of political trust across countries? In particular, how do political factors, including institutional settings and political performance, affect political trust?

As the first step to address these questions, I will use an extensive body of comparative survey data from the World Values Surveys and chart the general patterns and trends of political trust across the world. This not only allows comparisons across regions and time and puts East Asia in the global setting, but also sets the stage for the empirical testing of the key hypotheses proposed in the previous chapter. To examine the possible explanations for the variations across countries, I will review the main hypotheses, empirically test them, and present the statistical results. Institutional designs and political corruption at the country level are the primary interests in this chapter. To maximize the institutional variance and best capture the institutional effects

on political trust, this chapter focuses on the global level and includes as many countries as possible in the analyses.

4.1 PATTERNS OF THE LEVELS OF POLITICAL TRUST ACROSS THE WORLD

Since the 1960s, it has been reported that the levels of political trust have declined continuously. Most of these studies have been limited to democratic regimes, and many have focused on cross-time comparisons instead of cross-country comparisons due to data availabilities. Data from five waves of the WVS allow me to examine the levels of political trust across 53 countries for over twenty years. This will draw a bigger picture of the development of political trust across the world, and put East Asia in a larger comparative setting. The WVS covers industrialized Western Europe and North America, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Moreover, both democratic and non-democratic regimes are included in the analysis.

Table 4.1 Political Trust Mean across the World (2005)

Country	Region	C & E Europe	Western Europe	South America	N & C America	Asia	Oceania	Africa
Vietnam						86		
China						71		
Jordan						64		
Malaysia						62		
Ghana								57
Mali								55
South Africa								54
India						54		
Norway			54					
Turkey		54						
Switzerland			54					
Finland			53					
Cyprus			52					
Hong Kong						51		
Sweden			51					
Morocco								50
Indonesia						48		
Thailand						47		
Iran						47		
Canada					47			
Spain			46					
Zambia								45
Burkina Faso								45
South Korea						44		
Uruguay				44				
Australia							43	
United States					43			
New Zealand							43	
Great Britain			43					
Japan						42		
Italy			40					
Russia		39						
Brazil				39				
Ethiopia								39
Netherlands			38					
France			38					
Germany			37					
Colombia				37				
Georgia		36						
Ukraine		36						
Chile				36				
Trinidad & Tobago					36			
Bulgaria		36						
Mexico					35			
Taiwan						34		
Slovenia		33						
Moldova		33						
Romania		32						
Serbia		32						
Poland		32						
Guatemala					28			
Argentina				27				
Peru				22				
Mean		36	46	34	38	55	43	49

Source: World Values Surveys, 2005.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, trust in political institutions is the most appropriate level of analysis for comparative studies of political trust. It is less volatile than incumbency trust, and it is more realistic and travels better than trust in political values. To operationalize the concept of political trust and compare it across countries, I use the following questions from the WVS: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?”. As discussed earlier, I use the mean of five key political institutions for comparative purposes: the national government, political parties, parliament, the legal system, and the civil service. The index is converted to a 0-100 scale where 0 means none at all and 100 means a great deal of confidence in all five institutions.

Table 4.1 shows the levels of political trust in 53 countries in 2005. The countries are listed in the order of their levels of political trust and by their geographical locations. Two patterns emerge from Table 4.1. First, differences in the levels of political trust in institutions across regions are relatively modest but still obvious. Asia maintains the highest level of trust (55), Central and Eastern Europe and South America demonstrate the lowest levels of trust (36 and 34 respectively), and the levels of trust in the rest of the continents stand in the middle. In Chapter 5 and 6, I will focus on Asia, particularly East Asia, to explore why Asian countries constantly present high levels of political trust while the other parts of the world are losing it. Second, variations in the levels of political trust across countries are great. The actual political trust levels range from 22 (Peru) to 86 (Vietnam), and the average trust level of all the 53 countries from the World Values Survey is 44 out of 100. Within each region, there are sharp differences in political trust between countries as well.

Why do people trust political institutions more in some countries than in others? Why do some countries demonstrate lower levels of political trust on average? How do we explain the sharp variance in the levels of political trust between countries? What has been missing from the existing discussions on the sources of political trust? In the next section, I will examine these questions and attempt to shed some light with data from the WVS.

4.2 SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST – EVIDENCE FROM THE TWO MAJOR THEORETICAL TRADITIONS

4.2.1 Two Major Theoretical Traditions

As discussed in Chapter 2, the major existing explanations of differences in political trust can be framed within the economy versus culture debate. While I aim to study the political sources of political trust in this dissertation, I will also take into account the major hypotheses from the cultural and economic schools. To study the complicated relationship between social and political trust, we also have an excellent opportunity to revisit the two major theoretical traditions. This part of analysis not only aims to sort out the relationships between the key concepts, but also helps to reexamine the identified sources of political trust and to compare them with the political explanations, the key hypotheses of this dissertation. In the next section, I will turn to the political explanations of political trust, and empirically examine my key hypotheses while controlling for cultural and economic factors.

One major school of explanations emphasizes the role of economic development on the level of political trust. At the country level, countries with more satisfactory economic performance are expected to demonstrate higher levels of political trust on average. In this study, I will use standard indicators from the World Bank to measure economic performance, such as the GDP per capita and the growth rate of the GDP per capita.

The political culture school offers another important perspective on sources of political trust. According to the political culture arguments, political trust originated in cultural norms and personal values deeply rooted in societies. People's trust towards their fellow citizens or institutions is shaped by the prevalent values and norms in their society. Social capital theory, a prominent argument proposed by the political culture school, holds that social capital, including civic engagement and social trust, has great impact on political trust (Cole 1973; Keele 2004). However, evidence for social capital theory has been mixed and the relationship between social trust and political trust is far from conclusive. Before we anchor our analysis of the political explanations of political trust in the next section, we need to first revisit the political culture arguments, address these inconsistencies, and sort out the entangled relationship between social and political trust.

4.2.2 Social Trust and Political Trust – Revisit Political Cultural Explanations

There have been heated discussions on the relationship between the two types of trust (e.g. Cole 1973; Levi 1996; Brehm & Rahn 1997; Kaase 1999; Newton 1999; Keele 2004). Are they different sides of the same coin? Is social trust exogenous to political trust or do they affect each other? How does the causality flow between them, if at all? Unfortunately, the answers to these

questions remain inconclusive in the literature. However, the answers are important to our understanding of political trust. They not only clarify some unresolved issues of the political culture school, but also shed light on the relative importance of different explanations of political trust.

To address these questions and study the dynamics between social trust and political trust, I will use panel analysis with data from the different waves of the WVS. Specifically, I will build a three-wave reciprocal-effects causal model with country-level panel data from the WVS between 1990 and 2000. I hope to capture the over time change in social capital and political trust, and to sort out the cause and effects between social trust, associations, and political trust.

4.2.2.1 Hypotheses and Theoretical Links between Social Trust and Political Trust

Following Paxton's definition (2002), social capital contains two dimensions: civic engagement (or, participation in voluntary associations), and the trusting and positive relationships (of which interpersonal trust is an important indicator). On the one hand, participation in voluntary associations in a society bridges social cleavages and creates a tight web of social interaction and cooperation, and people become more trusting in this environment (Putnam 1993). On the other hand, in a trusting society, people are more confident in others' benevolence and are more likely to cooperate and participate in the associations (Wrightsmann 1992). Thus, I expect that the two dimensions of social capital promote and reinforce each other.

Many theoretical perspectives claim causation from social capital to political trust. If people do not trust their fellow citizens, they cannot possibly trust the elites and institutions that are endowed with considerable power to affect their lives (Almond and Verba 1963). Brehm and Rahn (1997) also pointed out that trusting people expect others to comply with authorities and

find it easier to follow the rules from authority. Therefore, in a society with a high level of social trust, people should have high levels of confidence in the political institutions. Civic engagement can also exert a positive impact on political trust, as citizens not engaged in civic activity have a weak sense of political influence, which in turn fuels distrust in political leaders and institutions (Keele 2004).

Some researchers argue that the causation flow can reverse as well. Institutions, by providing reassurance that defectors will not go unpunished, can potentially promote a general level of social trust (Levi 1996). Meanwhile, it may require some level of trust in government to participate in activities that engage political associations, thus political trust can also promote participation in associations (Brehm and Rahn 1997). If these arguments hold, we may expect that in a society where trust in institutions is high, people are more likely to have high levels of interpersonal trust and participate in associations. The measurement of the key variables can be found in the footnote.¹⁶

¹⁶ The measure for interpersonal trust comes from a simple but standard question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The percentage of individuals who answered yes in a country is used to measure interpersonal trust, which is a more refined measure than the simple zero-one dichotomy in most individual level studies (Delhey and Newton 2005).

Associations are measured by the summation of the mean number of voluntary associations in which individuals in a country have membership and for which individuals do unpaid voluntary work in the past year. The combined measure shows both the breadth and the depth of association membership in a country (Paxton 2002).

Institutional trust is measured by the country mean of individuals’ trust across five political institutions: the armed forces, the legal system, the police, the parliament, and the civil service. This question produces a 0-3 (high) scale indicator: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them?”

Besides the three key variables, we also need to control for some exogenous variables that have been shown to be linked with the variables of interest. First, I include three variables of social forces with theoretical merits: *ethnic homogeneity*, *secondary school enrollment*, and *protestant tradition* (Alesina et. al. 2003; CIA World Fact Book 2005; World Development Indicators 2002). Previous works on trust and social capital have identified them as important predictors and they are likely to correlate with both social capital and institutional trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Paxton 2002; Delly and Newton 2005). Second, I include the *GDP per capita* to control for the level of economic development in each country (United Nations 1990-2000). Third, literature has long identified economic performance as the most important contributor to institutional trust, and Lishaug and Wiberg (1995) particularly emphasize the effects of government stability and rate of unemployment (Rogowski 1974; Jennings 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001). Thus I include the *rate of unemployment* to account for the impact of government performance on institutional trust (World Development Indicators 2002).

4.2.2.2 Model Specification

The causal model aims to empirically test the above hypotheses and deal with the indeterminacy problem of the relationship between social and political trust. The analysis follows a cross-lagged design as specified in Figure 4.1. The control variables on the left are exogenous to the key causal process between social capital and political trust. All of the exogenous variables except the rate of unemployment are hypothesized to affect social capital and political trust in institutions at all three waves. As discussed earlier, the rate of unemployment should affect the political trust to control for the government performance. The exogenous variables are correlated with each other.

The three key variables of interest at *time (t-1)* are hypothesized to influence both themselves at *time t* (stability effects) and the other two variables at *time t* (cross-lagged effects). For instance, political trust in 1995 is a function of political trust in 1990 as well as interpersonal trust and associations in 1990. The stability effects of interpersonal trust controls for the influence of the trust level in the past (the same are for associations and institutional trust), thus we have stability effects from 1990 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2000. Both trust and social capital reflect a subtle and gradual social process at the macro level. Given the delay built into the movement of civic engagement and trust in a society, both trust and social capital should not react immediately to each other (Keele 2004). Therefore, in this macro-level analysis, I did not include the synchronous effects, as the effects are expected to be long-term, if any.




Figure 4.1 Three-Wave Cross-Lagged Model of Social Trust (ST), Associational Activism (AS), and Institutional Trust (IT)

Note: UNEM = unemployment rate; GDP = GDP per capita (logged); ETH = ethnic homogeneity; EDU = secondary school enrollment ratio; PRO = protestant tradition. All of the exogenous variables are correlated with each other (blue lines). Errors of each equation at the same time point are correlated with each other (purple lines).

The error terms of the interpersonal trust, associations, and institutional trust are assumed to be correlated with each other at each time point to reflect the covariation that has not been captured by the causal effects (i.e. stability effects, cross-lagged effects, and effects of the control variables) specified in the model. Finally, as the time lags between the three waves are the same, i.e. five years, I impose equality constraints to the model. Specifically, I equate the cross-lagged effects and stability effects across waves (as shown and discussed in Table 4.1 in the next section). The model also assumes the equal disturbance covariances between endogenous variables at the last two waves.

4.2.2.3 Statistical Results: Unidirectional Causality from Social Trust to Political Trust

This three-wave cross-lagged model was estimated in LISREL and the results are reported in Table 4.2. Each part in the table summarizes the estimation for one of the three dependent variables.

A high level of participation in voluntary associations nurtures a favorable environment for interpersonal trust in a society. However, the causality is unidirectional. Interpersonal trust does not exert a significant influence on civic engagement in voluntary associations, which seems to contradict Brehm and Rahn's (1997) earlier findings at the individual level. While the relationship between interpersonal trust and associations is regarded as the most direct representation of the social capital idea by Brehm and Rahn, it does not show a reciprocal pattern in this aggregated-level cross-lagged causal model.

The primary interest of the paper is the causal mechanism between social capital and political trust, and they show a very clear unidirectional pattern. Social capital, as predicted, does have a positive and significant impact on trust in institutions. The cross-lagged effects from both interpersonal trust and associations to political trust are significant, confirming the hypotheses that they promote political trust in a society. A ten percentage increase in the participation level in associations induces a one percent increase in trust towards the political institutions in a society. Social trust has an even stronger impact on political trust. The standardized effect is twice the size of that of associations.

Table 4.2 Coefficients from a Three-Wave Cross-Lagged Model of Social Capital and Political Trust

	Political Trust			Social Capital					
	IN			IP			AS		
	1990	1995	2000	1990	1995	2000	1990	1995	2000
Interpersonal Trust									
1990 (η_1)		.10 ^{+J} (.06)			.37 ^{***A} (.10)			.04 ^F (.05)	
1995 (η_2)			.10 ^{+J} (.06)			.37 ^{***A} (.10)			.04 ^F (.05)
Institutional Trust									
1990 (η_4)		.34 ^{***K} (.09)			-.13 ^B (.17)			-.03 ^G (.07)	
1995 (η_5)			.34 ^{***K} (.09)			-.13 ^B (.17)			-.03 ^G (.07)
Associations									
1990 (η_7)		.11 ^{*L} (.05)			.24 ^{+C} (.13)			.33 ^{***H} (.05)	
1995 (η_8)			.11 ^{*L} (.05)			.24 ^{+C} (.13)			.33 ^{***H} (.05)
Control Variables									
GDP pc (ln) (ξ_1)	-1.09 ⁺ (.67)	-.40 (.84)	-2.51 ^{**} (.92)	.19 (1.17)	.24 (1.20)	3.37 ⁺ (2.03)	-1.85 ^{***} (.45)	-6.06 ^{***} (1.51)	-.22 (.65)
Homogeneity (ξ_2)	4.13 (3.00)	1.44 (3.78)	9.39 [*] (3.90)	10.31 [*] (5.19)	13.48 [*] (5.32)	3.61 (8.51)	-1.61 (2.01)	-11.72 ⁺ (6.71)	1.06 (2.74)
School (ξ_3)	-.02 (.05)	-.03 (.06)	-.08 (.07)	-.04 (.09)	-.00 (.09)	-.08 (.16)	.12 ^{***} (.03)	.55 ^{***} (.11)	-.04 (.05)
Protestant (ξ_4)	3.64 [*] (1.70)	.11 (2.24)	4.68 [*] (2.34)	11.98 ^{***} (2.98)	3.53 (3.26)	-2.36 (5.09)	5.74 ^{***} (1.15)	12.17 ^{**} (3.89)	3.64 [*] (1.67)
Unemployment (ξ_5)	-.11 ⁺ (.06)	.05 (.18)	-.29 [*] (.15)						
Error Covariance									
IP & IN				18.88 ^{***} (Ψ_{14})	11.21 ^{+D} (Ψ_{25})	11.21 ^{+D} (Ψ_{36})	13.76 ^{***} (Ψ_{71})	-17.00 ^{***E} (Ψ_{82})	-17.00 ^{***E} (Ψ_{93})
IP & AS	18.88 ^{***} (Ψ_{41})	11.21 ^{+D} (Ψ_{52})	11.21 ^{+D} (Ψ_{63})	13.76 ^{***} (Ψ_{17})	-17.00 ^{***E} (Ψ_{28})	-17.00 ^{***E} (Ψ_{39})	6.63 ^{***} (Ψ_{74})	15.52 ^{***I} (Ψ_{85})	15.52 ^{***I} (Ψ_{96})
R ²	.10	.17	.43	.27	.38	.26	.32	.35	.57

Note: N=79 countries. The results are maximum likelihood estimates.

A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I coefficients are constrained to be equal.

Goodness-of-fit statistics: $\chi^2=74.78$, d.f.=27, p=.00; NFI=.85; PNFI=.25.

*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 (two-tailed tests) + p < .05 (one-tailed tests)

Political trust, on the other hand, does not have a significant effect on social capital. It is not too surprising, however, since the trust in political institutions such as parliaments, armed forces, and civil services does not necessarily encourage people to join various civic voluntary associations such as cultural and educational organizations. Similarly, while punishment for defection from institutions is more guaranteed, individuals are more likely to escape from the punishment, thus trust in the political institutions may not generalize to less secured trust in fellow citizens. The high level of political trust, as a result, may not transfer to more social capital in a society. In other words, social capital is exogenous to political trust.

So the three-wave reciprocal-effects causal model lends support to social capital theory and clarifies the relationship between social trust and political trust. The causal flow exists and it runs from the former to the latter. Social capital, including social trust, contributes to political trust. The two types of trust can and should be distinguished in our analysis to study the sources of political trust.

4.3 POLITICAL SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST

– A MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

I argue that people trust institutions more when they believe they are politically trust-worthy. As I discussed in the previous chapter, on average, I expect that institutions that are perceived as less corrupt and that have specific institutional designs are trusted more. Specifically, countries with lower levels of corruption, longer democratic history, parliamentary governments, moderate

numbers of parties, and proportional electoral systems are expected to be associated with higher levels of political trust.

Trust is a relational concept and it is shaped by the characteristics of both the truster and the trustee. As we discussed in the previous chapter, on the trusters' side, resources and values of individual citizens affect their trust in political institutions; on the trustee's side, the economic and political performance and institutional settings of the system shape whether and how much people trust them. Unfortunately, the existing research has predominantly focused on one side of the relationship, particularly the trusters' side.

In this dissertation, I will study both the object *and* the subject of political trust. I hope to draw attention to the trustee's side, and to focus on the performance and characteristics of the institutions. As institutional settings change very slowly and gradually across time, their effects on political trust at the macro level are difficult to catch with single case studies focusing on individual level differences, research involving only a small group of countries, or longitudinal analyses. Rather, the best way to maximize the variance in institutional settings and to capture its effects on political trust is to include as many countries as possible for cross-country analysis. Therefore, to study political trust as a relational concept, we need to examine not only individual-level characteristics such as individual resources and values, but also the institutional designs and performance of the systems where individuals are embedded. In this chapter, I will use multi-level models to study the institutional effects and examine the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3 about the contextual and individual-level sources of political trust.

4.3.1 Country and Individual Level Sources of Political Trust

4.3.1.1 Country Level Sources of Political Trust

The focus of this chapter is structural influences on citizen behavior. I am most interested in the contextual level sources of trust in political institutions. Specifically, I will study the effects of two groups of political variables at the country level: institutional settings and political performance.

In Chapter 2 and 3, I discussed in detail the theoretical links between institutional settings and political trust. I will first review the major hypotheses and present the data and measurements to test these hypotheses. Then in the following section, I will test them with a hierarchical linear model, and discuss the empirical results.

4.3.1.1.1 Institutional Settings and Political Trust – Hypotheses and Measurement

A. Regime Types and Political Trust

A fundamentally important yet widely neglected institutional feature is regime types. I argue that democratic and non-democratic regimes present different levels of political trust. Even within democracies, experience and level of democratization also matters. Overall, I expect that non-democratic regimes demonstrate higher levels of political trust because their governments often use media control and political education to mobilize regime support and public political confidence. Within democratic countries, I expect that countries with higher levels of democracy present higher levels of political trust because democratic accountability and representation requires greater support from voters.

For a dichotomous measure of democratic and non-democratic regimes, I use Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)'s Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited dataset. I refer to the Freedom in the World Index from the Freedom House for a continuous measure of the levels of democratization in different societies. The index is the mean score of political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are measured by questions such as open election, right to organize competing parties, and minorities' participation in the decision-making process. Civil liberties are measured by questions such as free media, freedom of religion, and protection from political terror.

B. Party Systems and Political Trust

Compared with fragmented party systems, I expect to find that two-party and moderate multi-party systems demonstrate higher levels of political trust because they allow effective channeling and translation of the public opinion into government policy. The Democracy Cross-National Dataset compiled by Norris in 2009 provides complete information on types of party systems classified from effective numbers of parliamentary parties for countries across the world. Specifically, party systems are classified into 4 categories: one party system, two party system, moderate multi-party system, and fragmented party system. I recoded this into 2 categories: fragmented party system (0) and two party system or moderate multi-party system (1).

C. Electoral Systems and Political Trust

On average, democracies with proportional representation tend to demonstrate higher levels of political trust because they are associated with more electoral volatility. For a classification of electoral systems, I will refer to the Electoral System Design Database published by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA 2004).

The database divides the electoral systems into different categories: proportional representation, plurality/majority, and mixed.

D. Executive-Legislative Relations and Political Trust

Parliamentary systems should present higher levels of political trust because of their flexible and adaptable institutional structures, efficient decision making, and fused executive power. Also, they are more likely to use proportional representation (instead of plurality) that optimizes democratic representation and produces more political support. I will refer to the Democracy Cross-National Dataset for a classification of the executive types.

Using data from the 2005 World Values Survey, Figure 4.2 summarizes the average trust scores across institutional settings we discussed. These descriptive figures show that different types of institutional designs demonstrate different levels of political trust. First of all, regime types make a big difference in the level of trust in political institutions. On average, the levels of political trust in democracies are much lower than in non-democratic regimes. This result partly supports our regime type hypothesis at the macro level. In Chapter 6, we will look into the case of non-democratic regimes like China, and study how authoritarian institutional settings affect political trust at the micro level.




Figure 4.2 Political Trust and Institutional Settings

Source: World Values Survey 2005.

Second, within democracies, levels of political trust differ across different institutional settings such as electoral systems, executive systems, and party systems. Figures in Figure 4.2 are only descriptive, and whether and how these institutional features affect political trust will be further discussed and examined in the multi-level analysis in the following section.

4.3.1.1.2 Political Performance and Political Trust – Hypotheses and Measurement

I specified two important indicators for political performance in Chapter 3: corruption and fairness. Due to data availability, I will only discuss corruption in this chapter. At the country level, I expect that on average, countries with less corruption will demonstrate higher

levels of political trust. Corruption at the aggregate level will be measured by Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, an international civil society organization against corruption. It measures perceived levels of corruption and abuse of power in public sector in nearly 200 countries. CPI covers both the administrative and political aspects of corruption. The measure indicates the perceived corruption on a recoded scale of 0-10 where 10 means highly corrupt and 0 means very clean. I use the 2001-2005 five year average of CPI in my analysis.

4.3.1.1.3 Country Level Control Variables

At the country level, I use the economic performance as a control variable. This was measured by the logged GDP per capita and the growth rate of GDP per capita from the World Bank. As discussed in Chapter 3, I expect that countries with better economic performance should demonstrate higher levels of political trust. As this study includes countries around the world, I also include regions as another control variable. Specifically, using Asia as comparison group, I include six region dummies: Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, South America, Oceania, North America, and Western Europe.

4.3.1.2 Individual Level Variables

4.3.1.2.1 Institutional Settings – Party Allegiance

Institutional effects work at both macro and micro levels. At the individual level, party allegiance affects the level of political trust. Winners in electoral contests, i.e. voters who identify and support the parties that form the government, face a more friendly political

environment and have more incentive to maintain status quo, rather than challenge existing institutional settings. Thus, winners tend to have higher level of trust in political institutions than losers.

To measure party allegiance, I created a dummy variable by comparing the ruling parties in each country at the time of the survey with respondents' reply to the WVS question "If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If you are uncertain, which party appeals to you most?".

4.3.1.2.2 Individual Level Control Variables

To control for the economic and cultural hypotheses of political trust, I included a series of control variables at the individual level. To consider two major political cultural hypotheses, I included two variables for social capital theories (interpersonal/social trust and civic engagement) and one variable for post-modernization hypothesis (post-materialist values). Post-materialist values are measured by citizen's priority of liberty (freedom of speech, participation in national and local governments) as compared to material and physical security (economic status, national defense, crime fighting) (Inglehart 1997). Meanwhile, I also included a set of variables to control for individual social-economic status at the individual levels, including age, education level, sex, satisfaction of family financial situation.

4.3.1.3 Cross-Level Interaction Effects

In Chapter 3, we argued that the effects of party allegiance can be context dependent. I hypothesized that country level institutional designs such as party systems and levels of democracy help explain the effects of party allegiance on trust across different countries.

Specifically, winners would be more trusting of political institutions in countries with two-party or moderate multi-party systems than in countries with fragmented party systems. Meanwhile, levels of democracy should also increase the trust gap between winners and losers. Winners are more trusting in more mature democracies than their counterparts in new democracies. These interactions will also be tested in the multi-level model.

Besides party allegiance, contextual level factors also work through other individual level variables to affect political trust. The strength of contextual effects should differ across different social groups. Political trust is the subjective evaluation of the political institutions, and it is reasonable to expect that citizens' socioeconomic backgrounds affect how they judge and trust political institutions. As discussed earlier, trust in political institutions is a rational decision based on institutional performance. Education enables citizens to acquire and process information for more accurate assessment of institutions ("accuracy-inducing" function), and it affects what types of normative values citizens hold in the process of performance evaluation ("norm-inducing" function) (Hakhverdian & Mayne. 2012: 741). Thus, people with higher levels of education are more likely to judge institutions based on their actual economic and political performance (rather than on their reported general image).

4.3.2 Methodology (HLM)

As discussed above, this study analyzes both the contextual and individual level sources of political trust. Accordingly, I rely on data with a hierarchical structure: one unit of analysis (individual respondents) is nested within contextual units (countries). While multi-level data provides rich information and allow us to take both levels of sources into account, they also

create some statistical challenges. Taking the WVS data for instance, when polling data collected from different countries together for analysis, researchers are risk violating the independent error terms assumption of OLS. Thus, when using multi-level data, we need to deal with the non-constant variance across contextual level units and clustering of individual-level data within contextual units (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Luke 2004; Rahn and Rudolph 2005). In response to these statistical challenges, I will employ hierarchical linear models to account for variation both between and within countries.

As specified below, our hierarchical linear model begins with the individual-level (Level 1) structural model whereas country-level (Level 2) structural model captures the contextual effects.

$$PTR_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}IPTR_{ij} + \beta_{2j}PSMT_{ij} + \beta_{3j}CVEG_{ij} + \beta_{4j}AGE_{ij} + \beta_{5j}EDU_{ij} + \beta_{6j}FECONSATS_{ij} + \beta_{7j}SEX_{ij} + \beta_{8j}WINNER_{ij} + \gamma_{ij} \quad (\text{Level 1 Equation})$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}CRPT_j + \gamma_{02}DEM_j + \gamma_{03}GDPGR_j + \gamma_{04}EXESYS_j + \gamma_{05}ELESYS_j + \gamma_{06}PTYSYS_j + \gamma_{07}LnGDPPC_j + u_{0j} \quad (\text{Level 2 Equation})$$

In the above structural models, PTR_{ij} , the dependent variable, represents trust in political institutions for the i th respondent in the j th country. The intercept β_{0j} at Level 1 is modeled as a function of contextual level explanatory variables and a contextual level error term. β_{0j} represents the mean level of political trust in the j th country and it varies across countries. u_{0j} denotes the residual country-specific variation around the country mean after controlling for the specified country-level variables in Level 2 model. Basically, I hypothesize that the between-country variation in the levels of political trust is shaped by different countries' institutional settings and aggregated levels of corruption, and within-country variation in the level of political trust is related to individual's party allegiance.

In addition, I will test the above hypothesized cross-level interaction effects. The equation below models the slope of party allegiance (β_{8j}) as a function of country's party systems (PTYSYS) and levels of democracy (DEM).

$$\beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80} + \gamma_{81} \text{PTYSYS}_j + \gamma_{82} \text{DEM}_j \quad (\text{Cross-Level Interaction Equation})$$

The equation below models the slope of level of education (β_{5j}) as a function of country's political performance (CRPT_j) and economic performance (GDPGR_j),

$$\beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50} + \gamma_{51} \text{CRPT}_j + \gamma_{52} \text{GDPGR}_j \quad (\text{Cross-Level Interaction Equation})$$

The full hierarchical model substitutes Level 2 Equation and Cross-Level Interaction Equation into Level-1 Equation. I will use HLM6.0.6 to estimate the full hierarchical model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

4.3.3 Statistical Results and Discussions

4.3.3.1 Analysis of Variance

The first step of HLM is to run an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model to check whether there is statistically significant country-level variance in the levels of political trust. Table 4.3 describes to what extent country-level variance makes an independent contribution in explaining levels of political trust.

Table 4.3 Analysis of Variance for Political Trust

Parameter	Estimate
Fixed Effects	
Constant	-.018 (.067)
Variance Components	
Country-level (τ_{00})	.200 [†]
Individual-Level (σ^2)	.773
ICC (Intraclass correlation ρ)	20.6 %

Sources: 2005 World Values Survey.

Note: Table entries are multilevel estimates of trust in political institutions.

[†] $\chi^2_{.43df} = 16,763.17, p < .01$.

I find statistically significant variation in political trust at country level (the chi-square is 16,763.17 with 43 degrees of freedom, $p = .000$). Following Raudenbush and Bryk's notations, we can calculate intra-class correlation (ICC) from the reported country-level variance and individual-level variance. ICC calculates the ratio of country-level variance (τ_{00}) to the total variance in our dependent variable ($\tau_{00} + \sigma^2$) and it tells us the relative importance of the country level of analysis. In our case, ICC is 21%, meaning 21% of variance in political trust can be explained by the country-level variance. As the political trust, our dependent variable, is measured at the individual level, it is no surprise that individual level variance account for most of the total variance (79%). The results show that a significant portion of variance is explained at the country-level analysis and a multi-level model is indeed necessary in our case.

4.3.3.2 Empirical Results and Discussion

Table 4.4 summarizes the statistical results from the HLM estimations. Model 1 includes all types of regimes, democratic or non-democratic, and I hope to study the effects of regime types and political corruption on political trust. Model 2, 3, and 4 only include democratic

regimes and aim to examine the effects of democratic institutional designs and performance. Model 2 includes the individual level predictors only. Model 3 presents the result from the random intercept model. Model 4 reports results from a random intercept model with cross-level interactions.

4.3.3.2.1 Findings at the Individual Level

I included a set of individual level determinants mainly to control for the individual level sources of political trust, including individual economic resources and cultural influence. Results from Model 2 and Model 3 support my hypotheses.

The most important finding is the significant effect of party allegiance, the institutional variable at the individual level. Consistent with our expectations, voters who identify or support government parties are more likely to trust political institutions while losers demonstrate lower levels of political trust. Though its effects are modest, party allegiance does significantly affect political trust at the individual level.

Other individual level variables are only for control purposes and their effects are mostly as expected. First, the two political culture hypotheses are supported by our analysis. Both social trust and civic engagement are positively associated with the individual level of political trust, lending support to social capital theory. Post-materialist values shaped people's values and created many critical citizens who challenge authority and value individual autonomy, thus individuals with higher levels of post-materialist values are less likely to trust political institutions. Second, political economy hypothesis also received supporting evidence. Individuals who are more satisfied with their family's financial condition are more likely to trust political institutions.

Table 4.4 Determinants of Trust in Political Institutions

Parameter	DV: Political Trust			
	All Countries Model 1: Random Intercept Model	Model 2: Individual-Level Predictors Only	Democracies Only Model 3: Random Intercept Model	Model 4: Random Intercept Model with Interactions
Individual-Level Factors				
<i>Party Allegiance</i>		.01*** (.00)	.01** (.00)	.01* (.00)
<i>Family Economic Satisfaction</i>	.08*** (.02)	.09*** (.02)	.09*** (.01)	.09*** (.01)
<i>Civic Engagement</i>	.07*** (.01)	.08*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)	.08*** (.01)
<i>Interpersonal Trust</i>	.10*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)
<i>Post-materialist Values</i>	-.03*** (.01)	-.04*** (.01)	-.04*** (.01)	-.04*** (.01)
<i>Age</i>	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
<i>Education</i>	-.04** (.02)	-.05*** (.02)	-.05** (.02)	-.06*** (.01)
<i>Sex</i>	.02*** (.00)	.01** (.01)	.01** (.01)	.01** (.00)
Country-Level Factors				
<i>Democratic Level</i>			.21** (.09)	.20** (.10)
<i>Executive System</i>			-.10* (.05)	-.11** (.05)
<i>Electoral System</i>			.07 (.06)	.08 (.06)
<i>Party System</i>			.16* (.08)	.16** (.08)
<i>Democracy dummy</i>	-.23*** (.08)			
<i>Corruption</i>	-.24*** (.09)		-.21** (.10)	-.19** (.10)
<i>GDP/pc growth</i>	.17** (.05)		.15** (.07)	.15* (.07)
<i>Ln GDP pc</i>	.18* (.10)		.16* (.09)	.16 (.11)
<i>Regions (not shown)</i>				
<i>Constant</i>	.01 (.05)	.02 (.07)	.05 (.05)	.04 (.05)
Cross-Level Interactions				
<i>Party Allegiance * Party System</i>				.02** (.01)
<i>Party Allegiance * Level of Democracy</i>				.04*** (.01)
<i>Level of Education * Corruption</i>				.05*** (.01)
<i>Level of Education * GDP/pc growth</i>				.02* (.01)
Variance Components				
Individual Level (σ^2)	.730 ^a	.740 ^b	.739 ^c	.736 ^d
Country Level (τ_{00})	.108	.178	.116	.119

Sources: 2005 World values Survey.

Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of political trust (HLM 6.06).

^a $\chi^2_{.31df} = 7301.46, p < .01.$

^b $\chi^2_{.38df} = 6,907.68, p < .01.$

^c $\chi^2_{.25df} = 3,375.28, p < .01.$

^d $\chi^2_{.25df} = 3493.82, p < .01.$

* $p < .10.$ ** $p < .05.$ *** $p < .01$

4.3.3.2.2 Contextual Effects

The contextual level determinants of political trust are the focus of this chapter. We find several country-level significant effects. On the institutional performance side, people's trust in political institutions is shaped by political performance of the countries they live in. People express less confidence in countries with more widespread corruption.

Of institutional designs, I am mostly interested in five institutional settings. First, results from Model 1 shows that the types of regime make a difference in the levels of political trust. Non-democratic regimes tend to have higher levels of political trust than democracies. Second, I specified four types of democratic institutional settings, and according to results from Model 3, three of them perform consistently with our hypotheses. Within democracies, countries with higher levels of democratization are more likely to demonstrate higher level of political trust. Combined with the previous findings regarding democratic versus non-democratic regimes, I find that the manner people trust institutions is conditioned by the democratization experience of the countries they live in. On average, non-democratic regimes tend to demonstrate higher level of trust than democracies; but within democracies, people are more likely to trust institutions in countries with higher levels of civic participation and protection of human rights.

The other two significant institutional variables are party systems and executive systems. As expected, people are more trusting in two party and moderate multi-party systems than in fragmented multi-party systems. This suggests that party systems remain an important mediating institution between citizens and the state, and a moderate number of "more broadly based and centrist" parties effectively aggregate interests and translate electoral choices into policy (Norris 1999c: 224). Executive systems also make a difference in political trust. Regimes with

parliamentary systems show higher level of political trust than presidential systems. This agrees with our argument that parliamentary systems have some institutional structures that encourage diversity, efficiency and stability, and therefore might attract higher level of political trust than presidential systems.

Electoral system is the only institutional variable that does not show any significant effects on political trust. Our multi-level analysis finds no evidence that political trust differs in majoritarian or proportional systems. Economic performance, as measured by GDP per capita growth and GDP per capita, positively affect the levels of political trust. People in countries with better economic performance are more likely to trust their institutions.

4.3.3.2.3 Cross-Level Interaction Effects

Model 4 includes cross-level interaction between party allegiance and country level institutional designs. I want to find out whether the effects of party allegiance on political trust are similar across countries with different institutional designs. I argued earlier that the effects of party allegiance on political trust are contingent upon institutional designs. The results from Model 4 confirmed these interaction effects.

In Model 4, I allowed the slope of the individual level effects of party allegiance to vary across countries, and regressed the slope on country-level institutional designs. The coefficient for party allegiance is 0.01, meaning the gap between winners' and losers' levels of political trust is 0.01 when the institutional designs interaction with party allegiance is fixed at zero. The two interaction terms between party allegiance and institutional designs are both statistically significant.

The interaction between party allegiance and party system is significant and positive (0.02). The coefficient for party allegiance is 0.01, so the winners in fragmented multi-party systems are 0.01 points more trusting of political institutions than losers in similar institutional settings. The positive interaction term between party allegiance and party system implied that with two party or moderated multi-party systems, winners are even more trusting of political institutions than losers ($0.01+0.02=0.03$). Also, winners who live in countries with two-party or moderated multi-party systems are about .18 points more trusting than winners living in more corrupted countries ($0.16+0.02=0.18$).

The interaction between party allegiance and levels of democracy is also significant and positive (0.04). As coefficient for party allegiance is only .01, this significantly changes the size of the trust gap. Winners are 0.05 points even more trusting than losers in more mature democracies ($0.01+0.04=0.05$). Winners are 0.24 points more trusting in more mature democracies than winners living in less mature democracies ($0.20+0.04=0.24$).

Now I turn to the cross-level interactions between citizens' educational levels and countries' institutional performances. I allow the effect of institutional performance to differ across different social groups. The regression coefficient for corruption on trust is negative (-.19). The cross-level interaction between corruption and level of education shows the extent the effect of corruption on trust differs across people with different levels of education. Specifically, for people with lower level of education (with a score of 0), the effect of corruption on trust is -.19. The effect of corruption on trust changes to ($-.19+3*-.05$) = -.34 for people with higher level of education (a score of 3). The level of education has a stronger effect on political trust for people with higher level of education than those with lower level of education.

The interaction effect between education level and economic growth is also significant. The regression coefficient for economic growth is significant (.15) and the interaction term is .02. The effect of economic growth on political trust is $(.15+1.5*.02=)$.18 for people with average level of education (with a score of 1.5). For people with lower level of education (a score of 0), the effect of economic growth on political trust is .15 while the effect increases to $(.15+3*.02=)$.21 for those with higher level of education (a score of 3). As we hypothesized, the level of education has a stronger effect on trust for people with higher level of education.

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 also tell us the variance we can explain at each level of analysis with each specified model. Using the σ^2 estimates obtained, I calculated the percentage of individual-level variance in political trust explained with Model 4 (4.8%). Using the τ_{00} estimates, we calculated how much Model 4 can explain country-level variance in political trust (33.1%). Our models do a better job explaining country-level variance than individual-level variance. χ^2 in our models are all highly significant. Overall, the models perform well and the statistical results meet our expectations.

4.4 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I examined political trust using data from approximately 50 countries around the world. I am interested in the political sources of political trust, and we explored the issue at the country level. First, I found that the levels of political trust vary across the countries and continents. Noticeably, East Asia demonstrates very high level of political trust on average.

Second, we examined the relationship between social trust and political trust with three-waved cross-lagged panel analysis, and found that social trust, an important part of social capital, significantly contributes to political trust. Political trust, on the other hand, does not affect social trust. Contrary to some earlier research, I found that the causal flow is unidirectional from social trust to political trust.

Last, and most importantly, I explored the political sources of political trust with hierarchical linear models, and found significant influences at both individual and country level. On the one hand, I found that institutional settings play significant roles in shaping the levels of political trust. Individual level characteristics such as individual's party allegiance affect how he/she trusts political institutions. Meanwhile, people's political trust is also shaped by the country-level characteristics. Noticeably, democratic experience is one of the most important predictors of the levels of political trust. Regime types significantly affect how people trust their institutions as people may demonstrate higher level of political trust as a result of authoritarian institutional arrangements and passive politicization. Within democracies, political trust is also affected by different democratic institutional settings, including democratic levels, party systems, executive systems, and party allegiance. Moreover, the effects of institutional performance should not be discussed independently from individual party allegiance. My results show that winners are generally more trusting than losers, and the gap in political trust between winners and losers is widened by economic and political performance. On the other hand, I found that institutional political performance, as measured by political corruption, is one of the strongest predictors for the level of political trust.

The multi-level analysis used in this chapter pays attention to both within-country and between-country variance in political trust. Data from nearly 50 countries from the WVS in this

chapter emphasizes the institutional effects at both country and individual levels. In the next chapter, I will shift my focus to East Asia, a region with a very high level of political trust and diverse institutional settings, and possibly a hard case for the effects of political corruption.

5.0 EXPLAINING POLITICAL TRUST: EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES

I study the effects of political performance and institutional settings on political trust in this dissertation. In Chapter 4, I examined global data from around 45 countries across the world, focusing on the effects of institutional designs on political trust. I found significant effects of both political performance and institutional designs on political trust at both individual and country levels. In this chapter, I will focus on one region where political trust has been exceptionally higher – East Asia. Whereas literature on political trust in East Asia is relatively scarce, the area is actually a great place to study the different determinants of political trust. The existing scholarship has attributed the high levels of political trust in East Asia to either the unique Asian Values or the regional economic miracles, and the effects of political performance and institutional settings have rarely been studied. It is necessary to go into the region and examine the political sources of political trust in East Asian societies. To distinguish the different mechanisms of political trust between democratic and non-democratic societies, I will focus on East Asian democracies in this chapter, and study China and other non-democratic societies in the Chapter 6.

This chapter starts with an examination of the levels and trends of political trust in East Asia. Then, I will study the individual level sources of political trust in seven East Asian democracies, focusing on the effects of political performance. The next part of the chapter employs multilevel analysis and adds country-level institutional effects into our analysis in

democratic country. Last, I add non-democratic regimes into the multilevel analysis and study the political sources of political trust in all types of regimes in East Asia.

5.1 POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA: LEVELS AND TREND

We reviewed the patterns of political trust across the world in Chapter 4, and Asia demonstrated the highest level of political trust. Within Asia, how do political trust distribute across countries and across institutions? How do levels of political trust change over years?




Figure 5.1 Political Trust in East Asia, by Country (2005)

Source: East Asian Barometer 2002 and 2005.

Using the latest data from the East Asia Barometer, Figure 5.1 displays the levels of political trust in 12 East Asian societies between 2002 and 2005. Except Japan, the levels of political trust in most East Asian countries dropped from 2002 to 2005. The average levels of political trust in the five key institutions in seven East Asian societies that were surveyed in both waves of EAB dropped slightly from 1.55 in 2002 (out of 3) to 1.45 in 2005¹⁷. The levels of political trust in 2005 varied greatly across societies in East Asia. South Korea demonstrated the lowest level of political trust (0.90) while Vietnam showed the highest (2.49). On average, the non-democratic regimes appear to have higher levels of political trust than democracies do in East Asia.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the levels of political trust by institutions. The levels of political trust are evenly distributed among the five key institutions. Between 2002 and 2005, political parties and parliament have consistently displayed slightly lower levels of trust among all institutions while civil service, national government, and legal system showed relatively higher level of trust in both waves of surveys. Political Trust does not vary greatly across specific institutions, and this seems to point to our earlier claim that political trust, as measured by trust in political institutions, is a general phenomenon. In the next section, I will return to this issue and examine the individual level sources of political trust in different institutions.

¹⁷ Seven East Asian societies were surveyed in both the first (2002) and second (2005) waves of EAB: South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Mongolia, Thailand, and Mainland China.




Figure 5.2 Political Trust in East Asia, by Institutions

Source: East Asian Barometer 2002 and 2005.

5.2 RECALL THE HYPOTHESES IN EAST ASIAN CONTEXT

In the previous chapters, we discussed four theories that attempt to explain political trust. The two major arguments in the existing literature come from political cultural theory and political economy theory. However, this dissertation argues that institutional settings and institutional performance also play important roles in explaining political trust and they should not be left out from the current discussion.

I have developed some hypotheses based on these theories, some of which have been tested and discussed by the existing literature in different geographical context. However, as discussed earlier, the majority of the scholarship of political trust has mostly focused in industrialized democracies, whether they are case studies or researches studying a group of countries. Trust studies have been very limited outside Europe and North America, and non-democratic countries have rarely been discussed. This dissertation hopes to extend the analysis and fill the literature gap. In Chapter 4, I examined the proposed hypotheses in nearly 50 countries around the world with diverse institutional settings including both democratic and non-democratic countries. Evidence from the global data in Chapter 4 supports both the institutional designs hypotheses and the performance hypotheses. In this chapter, I will test these hypotheses in East Asia, a much less studied region.

Now we recall and reiterate our hypotheses in the East Asian context. Researches often attribute the high levels of political trust to the economic miracles or the authoritarian “Asian Values” in the region (Wang 2005; Albritton, Bureekul, & Guo 2005; Dalton & Shin 2006; Nathan 2007; Shi & Lu 2007).

5.2.1 The Economic Growth Hypothesis

At the country level, the extraordinary economic growth and improved individual well-being in many East Asia societies (e.g. China and Singapore) brought the public with great satisfaction with their life, contributing to their high levels of trust in governments on average; and the slowed economic progress in some other East Asian societies (e.g. Japan, South Korea) lead to the decreased levels of political trust (*the Economic Growth Hypothesis*). At the individual level,

we are more concerned with the *perceived* economic performance. People who are more satisfied with the government economic performance are more likely to trust political institutions than those who are not.

5.2.2 The Asian Values Hypothesis

The deeply rooted traditional cultural values that emphasize on respect and deference to authority in East Asian societies promote the public trust and confidence in the government institutions. At the individual level, citizens who identify with the traditional authoritarian values are more likely to trust political institutions than those do not.

5.2.3 The Political Performance Hypotheses

While almost all the works on trust in East Asia pointed to the economic growth hypothesis or/and the Asian Values Hypothesis, this work draws attention to the political performance and institutional designs as sources of political trust in East Asia.

Corruption is generally regarded as an economic evil, but the roles of corruption in economic development have been questioned in East Asia. Most noticeably, the “East Asian Paradox”, the coexistence of high levels of corruption and economic growth in East Asia, has puzzled many economists and political scientists and inspired a series of interesting researches (Wedeman 2002; Kang 2002; Lim & Stern 2002; Chang & Chu 2006). To explain this exceptionalism and explore the roles of corruption in the economic and political development in

East Asia, scholars have studied several regional factors including the unique state-business relationships (i.e. the mutual dependence between the state and the business) (Wedeman 2002), the hierarchical Asian Values that emphasizes deference, harmony, and reciprocity (Bardhan 1997; Lipset & Lenz 2000), and the characteristics of electoral politics (i.e. personalistic elections and clientelism) in East Asia (Nathan 1993; Sidel 1996).

If corruption may not be detrimental in East Asia as some studies pointed out, we need to carefully examine its roles when discussing the sources of political trust in the area. Specifically, we proposed that people who perceive higher levels of political corruption are less likely to trust political institutions. In this chapter, we will examine East Asia, a possible hard case, and test the hypotheses in this relatively new setting.

Besides, we will also study the roles of the other aspects of political performance (as measured by perceived fairness and perceived responsiveness) in shaping the levels of political trust in East Asian societies.

To test these hypotheses of political performance, I use the following questions to measure the three aspects of political performance.

5.2.4 The Institutional Designs Hypotheses

At the individual level, I am interested in the effects of party allegiance on the level of political trust in democratic countries. I proposed that individuals who voted for the winning parties are more likely to trust government institutions than those who did not.

At the country level, I am most concerned with the four institutional features in East Asia: democratic experience, party system, electoral system, and executive system.

5.2.4.1 Democratic Experience

Non-democratic societies are expected to have higher levels of political trust than democracies. Within democracies, societies with higher levels of democratization are expected to demonstrate higher levels of political trust than those with lower levels.

East Asia has a naturally heterogeneous regime setting. With the third wave democratization starting in late 1980s, several East Asian societies have experienced historic transformation towards democratization and their levels of democratization have greatly improved (Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan). As Figure 5.3 shows, on a scale of 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic), the levels of democracy, as measured by Freedom House Index, were evenly distributed across East Asian societies by 2005. East Asia has both non-democratic and democratic regimes, including countries with extreme scores at both sides of the scale. Within democratic regimes, there are relatively new democracies like Thailand, consolidating democracies like South Korea and Taiwan, and established democracy like Japan. This is an interesting setting to test the hypothesis of levels of democratization.




Figure 5.3 The Levels of Democracy in East Asian Societies

Source: Freedom House, 1980 to 2005

5.2.4.2 Party System

In previous chapters, I proposed that in democratic countries, two-party and moderate multi-party systems should have higher levels of political trust than fragmented party systems. While party fragmentation and polarization varies across countries, the party systems have generally been weak and fragmented in East Asian democracies (Croissant 2002; Reilly 2008). Most major political parties in East Asia have shallow social base and thin organizational structure, and many are of recent creation and are leader-centered (Dalton, Chu, Shin 2008). As Dalton, Chu, and Shin (2008) argue, the citizen-party linkage is weak in East Asia and this nature of political parties “may weaken the linkage between parties and citizens, as well as attenuate the usefulness of partisanship in structuring citizens’ political orientations” in East Asia.

5.2.4.3 Electoral System

In recent years, electoral reform across East Asia brought a convergence of different electoral systems towards “mixed-member” electoral system models where part of the national level legislature is elected by proportional representation and part from local districts (Croissant 2002). However, unlike international norm where district and list element are often equal split, almost all the mixed-member systems in East Asian democracies are heavily weighted in favor of the district component of the system – making them “highly majoritarian in practice” (Reilly 2008: 192; Croissant 2002).¹⁸ Thus, instead of referring to the hypothesis that focuses on the difference between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, I will focus on a unique characteristic of East Asian electoral systems – the personalistic politics.

Researchers found that party systems in East Asian democracies often “do not have institutionalized programmatic electoral competition” (Dalton, Chu, and Shin 2007: 178). Instead, political parties are more likely to compete on valence issues, clientelism, and party leaders’ personal charisma. Some studies argue that citizens may support corrupt politicians because the elections in East Asian democracies are candidate centered and personalistic (Chang & Chu 2006). If this argument is right, we should expect to observe higher levels of political trust in electoral systems that are more personalistic or candidate centered.

5.2.4.4 Executive System

The executive systems range from presidential democracies to semi-presidential systems to parliamentary systems. As I proposed in Chapter 2, levels of political trust in parliamentary democracies are expected to be higher than those in presidential democracies.

¹⁸ In his study of 14 Southeast and East Asia countries, Croissant found that except Cambodia and Indonesia, all electoral systems in East Asia used in legislative elections can be classified as majoritarian systems.

5.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT

I will test these hypotheses with data from East Asia Barometer (EAB) in 2002 and 2005. The EAB is a comparative survey of citizens' orientation towards politics and democracy in thirteen Northeast and Southeast Asian societies: Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Under a common research design, face-to-face interviews were conducted in each country with standard questionnaire instruments in national probability samples. So far, two waves of surveys have been conducted in 2002 and 2005.

To test these hypotheses, we will use questions from the East Asia Barometer and other data sources. To measure political trust, the dependent variable, I will use a question from the EAB: "I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?" The institutions include the national government [in capital city], political parties, parliament, civil service, and the legal system.

To test the hypotheses of political performance, I will use the following questions to measure the three aspects of perceived political performance. For perceived corruption, "How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government [in capital city]? Would you say hardly anyone is involved (3), not a lot of officials are corrupt (2), most officials are corrupt (1), or almost everyone is corrupt (0)?" For perceived fairness, "Please tell me whether you strongly agree (3), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (1), or strongly

disagree (0) with each of these statements. Everyone is treated equally by the government.” For perceived responsiveness, “How well do you think the government responds to what people want? Is it very responsive (3), largely responsive (2), not very responsive (1), or not responsive at all (0)?”

The hypotheses of institutional designs that I proposed work at two levels. At the individual level, to study the effects of party allegiance, I created a dummy variable based on respondents’ reply to the EAB question “Which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) did you vote for?” Citizens who voted for the winning camp are coded as winners (1) and those who voted for losing camp are coded as losers (0).

At the country level, I will use the following data to tap into four aspects of institutional designs in East Asia: democratic experience (regime types and democratization level), party system, personalistic voting, and executive system.

For a dichotomous measure of democratic and non-democratic regimes, I will use Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)’s Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited dataset. For a continuous measure of the levels of democratization, I will use the average figure of the past 5 years of Freedom in the World Index from the Freedom House.

To study party systems in East Asia, I will use the effective numbers of political parties (ENPP) data in East Asian democracies calculated by Reilly (2008).

I will refer to Hicken and Kasayu’s (2003) data on Asian electoral system to capture the personalistic character. Electoral systems with separate votes for both candidates and parties are considered less candidate centered (0), while electoral systems with single votes for candidates are considered more personalistic (1).

I will refer to Norris's (2009) Democracy Cross-National Dataset and Reilly's (2007) survey on systems of government. Presidential systems are coded as 2, semi-presidential systems 1, and parliamentary systems 0.

I will include variables to control for the effects of Asian Values and economic performance. Specifically, I will use GDP per capita growth rate and logged GDP per capita from the World Bank to measure the aggregate level of economic performance. At the individual level, I will refer to a question from the East Asian Barometer for perceived economic performance: "How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? Is it much better (4), a little better (3), about the same (2), a little worse (1), or much worse (0)?"

To tap into Asian Values mechanism, I will use a battery of questions from the East Asian Barometer: "Please tell me how you feel about the following statements. Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? 1. Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask. 2. Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher. 3. When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person. 4. For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second."

I will also include a set of standard control variables at the individual level: sex, education, age, income, and political interest. Country dummies are also included in pooled analyses.

5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA DEMOCRACIES

5.4.1 Political Trust in Seven East Asian Democracies

In this chapter, I will first focus on the individual level effects of political performance and institutional settings on political trust in East Asian democracies. I will study the sources of political trust in non-democratic regimes in Chapter 6. Table 5.1 presented the results from pooled and country-by-country analyses in seven Asian democracies. Model 1 uses the pooled data set from seven democratic countries in 2005, and Model 2 uses pooled data set from five East Asian democracies in 2002. The Philippines is the comparison country in both analyses. Model 1A through Model 1G are country-by-country analysis with 2005 data.

My key interests are the effects of perceived political performance and party allegiance, and they both show strong predicting power. First, perceived political performance significantly contributes to the levels of political trust. The effects of the three aspects of political performance are all significant and go in the expected directions in both pooled analyses and country-by-country analyses. Specifically, people who perceive government officials as corrupt are less likely to trust political institutions. The effects of perceived fairness and perceived government responsiveness are also significant, and they are both negatively related to citizens' levels of political trust. Overall, all of the three aspects of political performance consistently and significantly affect political trust.

Table 5.1 Estimated Effects of Perceived Political Performance (Asian Democracies)

Table 5.1 Estimated Effects of Perceived Political Performance (Asian Democratic Countries)

	Model 1: Pooled (2005)	Model 2: Pooled (2002)	Model 1A: Japan (2005)	Model 1B: South Korea (2005)	Model 1C: Mongolia (2005)	Model 1D: Philippines (2005)	Model 1E: Taiwan (2005)	Model 1F: Thailand (2005)	Model 1G: Indonesia (2005)
<i>Perceived Political Performance</i>									
Perceived Corruption	-.15*** (.01)	-.14*** (.01)	-.24*** (.05)	-.24*** (.05)	-.08** (.03)	-.16*** (.04)	-.18*** (.04)	-.20*** (.05)	-.12*** (.03)
Perceived Fairness	.13*** (.01)	.07*** (.01)	.22*** (.04)	.02 (.05)	.09*** (.03)	.13*** (.03)	.25*** (.04)	.16*** (.04)	.05* (.03)
Perceived Responsiveness	.18*** (.02)	—	.17*** (.05)	.15*** (.05)	.20*** (.04)	.16*** (.04)	.17*** (.04)	.08* (.05)	.18*** (.03)
<i>Institutional Variable</i>									
Party Allegiance	.13*** (.02)	.10*** (.01)	.12** (.05)	.09* (.04)	.14** (.05)	.24*** (.06)	-.05 (.05)	.08 (.17)	.15*** (.05)
<i>Perceived Economic Performance</i>									
Evaluation of National Economic Condition	.09*** (.01)	.05** (.01)	.07** (.03)	.10*** (.04)	.13*** (.03)	.05* (.03)	.06** (.02)	.11*** (.04)	.10*** (.02)
<i>Cultural Values</i>									
Asian Values	.07*** (.01)	.12*** (.02)	.07** (.03)	.08* (.04)	.05** (.02)	.04 (.03)	.10*** (.04)	.11*** (.04)	.10*** (.02)
Associational Activism	.04*** (.01)	.01 (.01)	.03 (.02)	.01 (.03)	.07** (.03)	.05 (.05)	.03 (.03)	.00 (.04)	.04* (.02)
Interpersonal Trust	.08*** (.03)	.10*** (.01)	.12** (.06)	.06 (.06)	.16** (.08)	.01 (.12)	.09* (.05)	.08 (.06)	.02 (.08)
<i>Other Control Variables</i>									
Political Interest	.05*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.03 (.05)	.07* (.04)	.02 (.04)	.03 (.03)	.07** (.03)	.06 (.05)	.09*** (.03)
Sex	-.05*** (.02)	-.01 (.01)	.07 (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.03 (.05)	.05 (.06)	-.07 (.05)	.03 (.06)	-.22*** (.04)
Age	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Education	-.02*** (.00)	-.02*** (.00)	-.01 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.03*** (.01)	-.02 (.02)	-.05*** (.01)	-.03 (.02)	-.01 (.01)
Income	-.03*** (.01)	-.01** (.00)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.03 (.02)	-.00 (.04)	-.01 (.02)	.02 (.03)	-.07*** (.01)
Urban	-.06*** (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.04 (.06)	-.18* (.11)	-.09 (.05)	-.01 (.07)	-.11 (.07)	.23** (.10)	-.12*** (.04)
Constant	-.38*** (.08)	1.58*** (.05)	-1.03*** (.24)	-.76*** (.28)	-.57*** (.19)	-.80*** (.20)	-.80*** (.21)	-.82*** (.27)	-.62*** (.15)
<i>Country Dummies (not shown)</i>									
Japan	-.73*** (.05)	-.37*** (.03)							
Korea	-.78*** (.05)	-.33*** (.03)							
Mongolia	-.25*** (.05)	-.09*** (.02)							
Taiwan	-.53*** (.05)	-.19*** (.03)							
Thailand	-.25*** (.05)	—							
Indonesia	-.19*** (.05)	—							
Philippines (comparison)									
Adjusted R ²	.363	.309	.264	.135	.204	.143	.276	.181	.205
N	4819	4362	449	502	752	685	659	420	980

Source: East Asian Barometer 2005.
Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Second, party allegiance is also a strong predictor of political trust. Controlling for other factors, citizens who support the winning parties are most trusting of the government institutions in both pooled analysis. I run the country-by-country analyses to reinforce the confidence of the effects of political performance and party allegiance. Except for South Taiwan and Thailand, people's party allegiance is positively related to their trust in political institutions in the other five democracies. These results from East Asia are consistent with my earlier findings from global data in Chapter 4, and the significantly negative effects from the possible hard case confirms the corrosive effects of political corruption.

I also find support for both Asian values thesis and economic performance hypothesis. Generally, citizens who have higher evaluation of national economic condition and who are more influenced by Asian values are most likely to trust political institutions. Statistical results, however, do not lend much support to social capital theory. In pooled analyses, the effects of associational activism and interpersonal trust are significant and positive as social capital theory predicted, but they are not significant in all country-by-country analyses.

Several comments can be made regarding the other control variables. First, people who are more interested in politics are also more likely to trust political institutions. Second, age and sex do not show significant effects on the levels of political trust. Third, people with lower level of education, income, and urban experience are more likely to trust political institutions. This partly confirms modernization theory. However, all these effects are often not significant in country-by-country analyses. Together, these results proved that political trust is a political phenomenon and better explained by political factors instead of personal or social factors.

5.4.2 Sources of Political Trust in the Five Political Institutions

Political trust, the dependent variable, is the mean level of political trust in five key political institutions: civil service, national government, legal system, parliament, and political parties. At the beginning of the dissertation, I argue that political trust is inter-correlated and does not vary a great deal across the five institutions.

To improve our understanding and further reinforce the confidence that trust in five institutions reflect a general political orientation, I will study the sources of trust in five specific political institutions that compose the political trust index. In other words, I will run the same model specification of Model 1 with political trust in the five specific political institutions (i.e. civil services, national government, legal system, parliament, and political parties) as dependent variables to see whether the results would be different from political trust index model.

Table 5.2 Determinants of Political Trust in Five Key Institutions, 2005

Dependent Variable	Model 3A: Trust in National Government		Model 3B: Trust in Parliament		Model 3C: Trust in Political Parties		Model 3D: Trust in Civil Services		Model 3E: Trust in Legal System		Model 1: Political Trust Mean	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
<i>Perceived Political Performance</i>												
Perceived Corruption	-.10***	(.01)	-.05***	(.01)	-.11***	(.01)	-.05***	(.01)	-.17***	(.01)	-.15***	(.01)
Perceived Fairness	.19***	(.01)	.14***	(.02)	.12***	(.02)	.12***	(.01)	.16***	(.02)	.13***	(.01)
Perceived Responsiveness	.13***	(.01)	.14***	(.01)	.10***	(.01)	.13***	(.01)	.11***	(.01)	.18***	(.02)
<i>Institutional Variable</i>												
Party Allegiance	.22***	(.02)	.12***	(.02)	.09***	(.02)	.08***	(.02)	.13***	(.02)	.13***	(.02)
<i>Perceived Economic Performance</i>												
Evaluation of National Economic Condition	.13***	(.01)	.16***	(.01)	.12***	(.01)	.07***	(.01)	.07***	(.01)	.09***	(.01)
<i>Cultural Values</i>												
Asian Values	.03***	(.01)	.03***	(.01)	.05***	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.07***	(.01)	.07***	(.01)
Associational Activism	-.01	(.01)	.01	(.01)	-.03**	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.03**	(.01)	.04***	(.01)
Interpersonal Trust	.01	(.02)	.04*	(.02)	.05**	(.02)	.01	(.02)	.08***	(.03)	.08***	(.03)
<i>Other Control Variables</i>												
Political Interest	.00	(.01)	.05***	(.01)	.10***	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.04***	(.01)	.05***	(.01)
Sex	-.03	(.02)	-.05**	(.02)	-.06***	(.02)	-.01	(.02)	-.07***	(.02)	-.05**	(.02)
Age	-.00***	(.00)	-.00***	(.00)	.00	(.00)	-.00***	(.00)	-.00***	(.00)	.00	(.00)
Education	-.03***	(.00)	-.05***	(.01)	-.05***	(.01)	-.02***	(.00)	-.02***	(.00)	-.02***	(.00)
Income	.01	(.01)	-.02*	(.01)	-.02**	(.01)	-.02**	(.01)	-.02***	(.01)	-.03***	(.01)
Urban	-.11***	(.02)	-.14***	(.02)	-.09***	(.02)	-.06***	(.02)	-.04***	(.02)	-.06***	(.02)
Constant	1.14***	(.06)	1.08***	(.07)	1.02***	(.07)	1.41***	(.06)	1.44***	(.07)	-3.8***	(.08)
<i>Country Dummies (not shown)</i>												
Adjusted R ²	.253		.225		.196		.121		.188		.363	
N	5417		5450		5417		5441		5373		4819	

Source: East Asian Barometer 2005.
Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Several patterns emerge from Table 5.2. First, from Model3A to Model 3E, the empirical results are generally consistent with that of Model 1. Political trust in national government is best explained with the model specification, while trust in civil services is relatively less well-explained by the same independent variables. Second, the effects of political performance remain about the same. The significance and the direction of the effects and the magnitude of the coefficients for perceived political corruption, government fairness, and government responsiveness do not vary much across trust in the five different institutions. Third, the effects of party allegiance, the institutional variable, are also consistent across trust in national government, parliament, civil services, political parties, and legal system. Fourth, the coefficients of economic performance and Asian values do not change much across institutions, while the effects of the other control variables sometimes vary with different political institutions. Overall, I find that political trust is a general political orientation and the effects of political performance and party allegiance are consistent in different political institutions.

5.5 MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST

ASIA

I have studied the sources of political trust in East Asian democracies at the individual level. I found that perceived political performance and party allegiance play very important roles in explaining political trust. In this section, I will add the institutional designs variables at the country level to the current individual level model, and evaluate the relevance of different explanatory variables. First, I will follow the individual level analysis in the previous section

and explore the effects of democratic institutional designs on political trust in East Asian democracies. Then, I will expand my analysis to include non-democratic countries and study the effects of regime types on political trust.

5.5.1 A Multilevel Analysis of Political Trust in East Asian Democracy

First I run an ANOVA model to check whether there is statistically significant country-level variance in the levels of political trust. Table 5.3 describes to what extent country-level variance makes an independent contribution in explaining the levels of political trust.

The significant chi-square shows that there is statistically significant variation in political trust at the country level. To get intra-class correlation (ICC) and find relative importance of the country level of analysis, we calculate the ratio of country-level variance (τ_{00}) to the total variance in our dependent variable ($\tau_{00} + \sigma^2$). ICC is 33% in this case, meaning national variations alone count for 33% of the variance in political trust in East Asian democracies. This shows that a significant portion of variance is explained at the country-level analysis and a multi-level model including country level explanations is indeed necessary.¹⁹

¹⁹ This result is consistent with Albritton, Bureekul, and Guo (2005)'s observation.

Table 5.3 ANOVA for Political Trust in East Asia (Democratic Countries Only)

Parameter	Estimate
Fixed Effects	
Constant	-.172 (.170)
Variance Components	
Country-level (τ_{00})	.291 [†]
Individual-Level (σ^2)	.604
ICC (Intraclass correlation ρ)	32.5%

Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers Survey.

Note: Table entries are multilevel estimates of trust in political institutions.

[†] $\chi^2_{8df} = 3903.33, p < .01$.

As I only included seven East Asian democracies in my analysis, one might reasonably question whether that would be sufficient for accurate estimation. Indeed, a simulation study by Maas and Hox (2005) shows that small sample size at level 2 may lead to biased estimates of standard errors at the group level. While researchers have different insights on what constitute as small sample size in multilevel analysis, many believe 20 cases or more are recommended for group level.²⁰ However, the alternative, the usual non-multilevel model, is essentially a multilevel model with group-level variance set to 0 or infinity that introduces bias as well as causes incorrect standard errors. For lack of a better alternative, multilevel analysis is still the best option we have. I will use hierarchical linear model to study sources of trust at both contextual and individual levels. However, when interpreting the statistical results, we should bear in mind that though regression coefficients at both levels and variance at individual level are accurate, group level standard error estimates can be biased.

²⁰ For instance, Snijder & Bosker (1999) consider multilevel analysis attractive when number of groups is larger than 10; Kreft & De Leeuw (1998) hold that 30 is the smallest acceptable group number; Maax & Hox 2005 even argue that 50 cases or more at the group level is considered sufficient for multilevel analysis.

Now we turn to Table 5.4 for statistical results from HLM estimations. Model 4 and 5 study the effects of democratic institutional effects on political trust in East Asian democracies. Model 4 only includes individual level predictors, and Model 5 reports results of a random intercept model.

We studied the individual level explanations in the previous section, and in this section, I want to study the effects of democratic institutional designs while controlling for individual level sources of political trust.

Several findings are worthy of discussing. First, the individual level results of Model 4 and Model 5 are generally consistent with the OLS results in Model 1 in the previous section. Clearly, at the individual level, people's perceived political performance (corruption, fairness, and responsiveness) significantly contribute to their levels of political trust. The HLM results of the individual level institutional variable, party allegiance, are also consistent with Model 1. Winners are more likely to trust political institutions than losers.

Second, of particular interest are the effects of institutional designs at the country level. Most institutional variables showed significant effects in the multilevel analysis. Most noticeably, democratic experience is positively related to the level of political trust in East Asian democracies. On average, countries with higher levels of democracy showed higher levels of political trust, and newer democracies showed relatively lower levels of political trust. Another significant institutional variable is party systems. Party systems are negatively correlated with the levels of political trust in East Asia.

Table 5.4 Multi-Level Determinants of Political Trust in East Asian Democracies

Parameter	DV: Political Trust			
	Model 4: Individual Level Predictors Only		Model 5: Random Intercept Model	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
<i>Perceived Corruption</i>	-.12***	.01	-.12***	.01
<i>Fairness</i>	.11***	.01	.11***	.01
<i>Responsiveness</i>	.14***	.01	.14***	.01
<i>Party Allegiance</i>	.09***	.01	.09***	.01
<i>Satisfaction with National Economy</i>	.10***	.01	.10***	.01
<i>Civic Engagement</i>	.02**	.01	.02***	.01
<i>Interpersonal Trust</i>	.03***	.01	.03***	.01
<i>Asian Values</i>	.06***	.01	.06**	.01
<i>Political Interest</i>	.05***	.01	.05***	.01
<i>Sex</i>	-.02**	.00	-.03**	.01
<i>Age</i>	.00	.01	.00	.01
<i>Education</i>	-.05***	.01	-.05***	.01
<i>Income</i>	-.05***	.01	-.05***	.01
<i>Urban</i>	-.02**	.01	-.02*	.01
<i>GDP/pc growth</i>			-.04	.07
<i>Democratic Level</i>			.26**	.06
<i>Executive System</i>			-.10*	.04
<i>Party System</i>			-.14*	.06
<i>Candidate Centered Electoral System * corruption</i>			-.09	.05
<i>Constant</i>	-.04	.10	-.00	.05
Variance Components				
Individual Level (σ^2)	.439		.439	
Country Level (τ_{00})	.079 ^a		.013 ^b	
χ^2	649.8***		105.8***	

Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers.

Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of political trust (HLM 6.06).

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Countries with fragmented party systems are generally associated with lower levels of political trust than those with two or moderate party systems. The effects of executive systems

are also significant. Countries with parliamentary systems are associated with higher level of political trust than presidential systems. The only institutional variable that does not perform as expected is electoral systems. As Table 5.4 shows, HLM results did not find significant effects of personalistic voting on political trust.

Third, we can calculate the variance explained at each level of analysis. With reported σ^2 we obtained from Model 4 and 5, we find that our analysis explained 27.3% of variance at the individual level. Using the τ_{00} estimates in Table 5.3 and 5.4, we calculate that Model 4 explains 73% of country level variance partly due to composition effects, and adding four institutional designs variables helps explain an additional 23% of variance at the country level, leaving only 5% of unexplained variance in Model 5.

In sum, evidence from multilevel analysis supported that overall, democratic institutional designs at the country level are significantly related to the levels of political trust in East Asian democracies. Meanwhile, controlling for all other variables, political performance variables such as perceived corruption, government fairness, and responsiveness also significantly contribute to citizens' trust in political trust.

5.5.2 A Multilevel Analysis of Political Trust in East Asia (All Countries)

We should notice that the above analyses only included seven democratic regimes in East Asia. How do these conclusions hold when we include different types of regimes? Fortunately, the East Asian Barometer also includes 5 non-democratic regimes: Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Now I will include these societies in my analysis and test these hypotheses against all East Asian societies regardless of their regime types.

Table 5.5 ANOVA for Political Trust in East Asia (All Countries)

Parameter	Estimate
Fixed Effects	
Constant	.008 (.193)
Variance Components	
Country-level (τ_{00})	.451 [†]
Individual-Level (σ^2)	.619
ICC (Intraclass correlation ρ)	42.1%

Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers Survey.

Note: Table entries are multilevel estimates of trust in political institutions.

[†] $\chi^2_{.10df} = 7388.05, p < .01$.

The highly significant chi square (7388 with 10 degrees of freedom, $p = .000$) in Table 5.5 suggests significant variation between countries in their levels of political trust, making multilevel analysis necessary. Adding non-democratic regimes into our analysis, the new ICC changed from 33% to 42%. This tells us that as high as 42% of variance in political trust in East Asian societies can be explained by country level variance, indicating the importance of the country level analysis.

The individual level model specifications are the same as Model 1 through Model 5. However, as I am interested in non-democratic regimes, country level institutional variables (i.e. the four democratic institutional designs variables) in Model 5 are no longer applicable in the new analysis. Instead, I added three country-level variables into the analysis, including one institutional variable (regime types) and two variables for economic performance (logged GDP per capita and the growth rate of GDP per capita). The results of the multilevel analysis are presented in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Multi-Level Determinants of Trust in Political Institutions (All Countries)

Parameter	DV: Political Trust			
	Model 6: Individual Level Predictors Only		Model 7: Random Intercept Model	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Individual-Level Factors				
<i>Corruption</i>	-.08***	.01	-.08***	.01
<i>Fairness</i>	.11***	.01	.11***	.01
<i>Responsiveness</i>	.13***	.01	.13***	.01
<i>Satisfaction with Economic Development</i>	.09***	.01	.09***	.01
<i>Civic Engagement</i>	.02**	.01	.02**	.01
<i>Interpersonal Trust</i>	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
<i>Asian Values</i>	.06***	.01	.06***	.01
<i>Political Interest</i>	.05***	.01	.05***	.01
<i>Sex</i>	-.02**	.01	-.02**	.01
<i>Age</i>	.01	.01	.00	.01
<i>Education</i>	-.05***	.01	-.05***	.01
<i>Income</i>	-.05***	.01	-.05***	.01
<i>Urban</i>	-.02*	.01	-.02*	.01
Country-Level Factors				
<i>Democracy Dummy</i>			-.23**	.05
<i>GDP/pc growth</i>			-.01	.07
<i>Ln GDP pc</i>			-.31*	.12
<i>Constant</i>	-.23**	.09	-.12	.05
Variance Components				
Individual Level (σ^2)	.439		.439	
Country Level (τ_{00})	.071		.017	
χ^2	560.33***		77.02***	

Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers.

Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of political trust (HLM 6.06).

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Model 6 includes individual level predictors only, and Model 7 is a random intercept model and adds country level variables. After including both democratic and non-democratic societies in East Asia, I find that the individual level results of the multilevel analysis (Model 6 and Model 7) are consistent with Model 1 and Model 5 where only democracies are included.

Most importantly, all of the three political performance variables remain significant and in the same directions. Generally, people who perceive less levels of corruption and higher levels of government fairness and responsiveness are more likely to trust political institutions. Again, the evidence we obtained from multilevel analysis supports both the Asian values hypothesis and the economic performance hypothesis.

Institutional designs also play a significant role in explaining political trust in East Asia. At the individual level, people who identify with the winning parties have higher confidence in political institutions. At the country level, regime type is significantly related to the levels of political trust. In East Asia, non-democratic countries demonstrate higher levels of political trust than democracies.

Using σ^2 and τ_{00} obtained from Model 6 and 7, we can estimate the explained variance at each level of the multi-level analysis. Model 6 and 7 explain 29% of variance at the individual level. After adding regime types and economic performance variables, Model 7 now explains an additional 12% of variance at the country level in East Asia. Overall, including the five non-democratic East Asian societies and adding regime types as country-level predictor, the new models perform well. Statistical results supported our hypotheses of regime types, political performance, and party allegiance.

5.6 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter studies the effects of political performance and institutional designs on political trust in East Asia, a setting where political trust has been much less studied and where the political sources of trust have rarely been examined. I started with individual level analysis

in seven East Asian democracies. To examine the effects of corruption on political trust and the possible East Asian exceptionalism, this part of the analysis focuses on the effects of political performance. Controlling for the effects of the most prominent hypothesis of Asian values and economic performance, the pooled OLS and country-by-country analysis all confirm the corrosive effects of perceived corruption on people's trust in political institutions in East Asia. The effects of perceived corruption as well as the other two political performance variables (i.e. perceived government fairness and responsiveness) are all significant in explaining the level of political trust. Specifically, people who perceive lower levels of corruption and higher levels of government fairness and responsiveness are more likely to trust political institutions. Moreover, these effects hold in the multi-level analyses.

To account for the significant variance of the levels of political trust at both the individual and country levels, I use multilevel analysis to examine political trust in East Asia. When adding country-level predictors to the analysis of political trust in East Asian democracies, I am most interested in four institutional designs: level of democracy, party systems, executive systems and candidate-centered electoral systems. Three of these institutional characteristics are proven important when explaining political trust in East Asian democracies. On average, countries with higher levels of democracy, two or moderate multi-party systems, and parliamentary systems demonstrate higher levels of political trust. Results from individual level analysis and multi-level analysis also support the significant effects of party allegiance, another institutional variable. Generally, winners, people who support the winning camp, trust political institutions more than losers.

Most analyses in this chapter focus on the East Asia democracies. In the last part of the chapter, I extended my analysis to include both democratic and non-democratic societies in East

Asia. Evidence from multi-level analysis showed that regime type is a strong predictor for the levels of political trust in East Asia. Combining with my earlier findings within East Asian democracies, I find that overall, non-democratic countries show higher levels of political trust than democracies; while within democracies, countries with higher democratic levels demonstrate higher levels of political trust. Why do people in non-democratic societies trust political institutions? Or, how do non-democratic governments in East Asia maintain their levels of political trust? To shed light to these questions, the next chapter will turn to China, the largest non-democratic country in the world.

6.0 POLITICAL TRUST IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

In the previous chapters, I examined the sources of political trust with both global data and Asian data. Evidence from Chapter 3 and 4 shows that compared with democracies, non-democratic countries generally enjoy higher levels of political trust. This may seem counter-intuitive given the repressive nature of the regimes and the lack of accountable institutions and representative decision-making processes in non-democratic countries. The contrast of the levels of political trust in different types of regimes triggers some interesting questions: Why do people trust institutions in non-democratic countries? What are the sources of political trust in non-democratic regimes? Is this high level of political trust an artifact out of political fear? To what extent do cultural, economic, and political factors affect political trust in non-democratic countries? Is political trust different or comparable across different types of regimes?

To answer these questions of political trust, we need to go into non-democratic countries and study the public attitude there. Public opinion researches have been limited in non-democratic countries. Fortunately, the EAB provided detailed and valuable information in some non-democratic East Asian societies. In this chapter, I will focus on China, the largest non-democratic country in the world today, and study why Chinese people trust their political institutions.

This chapter starts with the issue of survey data validity in China. Then, I will study the major possible sources of political trust in China: institutional mobilization, perception of

political corruption, economic performance, and authoritarian values. I will also study and compare political trust in the other four non-democratic societies in East Asia: Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The last part of the chapter studies the trust gap in institutions between central and local levels in China.

6.1 THE VALIDITY OF SURVEY RESEARCH RESPONSES IN CHINA

As I use survey data to study political trust in authoritarian regimes like China, I may face a potential question that has been raised from time to time towards survey research in authoritarian regimes – the validity of survey research and social desirability bias. This is a legitimate question to ask. According to the theory of “preference falsification”, individual may express socially acceptable preferences (in our case, political support) that are different from what they genuinely want (discontent in this case) when articulating preferences (Kuran 1987, 1995). This is particularly the case in authoritarian societies, where the regimes do not hesitate to suppress unauthorized and divergent political opinions and respondents may not reveal their true feelings by refusing to answer or giving norm-seeking responses (Shi 1993, 1997; Manion 1994; Tang 2005; Ren 2009). Thus, before we proceed with statistical analysis in the following chapters, we need to make sure that survey data collected in China reflects the true feeling of respondents. I use three methods to check the validity of the survey research responses.

First of all, political fear does not seriously contaminate our survey responses, particularly with regards to the level of political trust. China has undergone some significant changes since the economic reform in the 1980s. The modernization process not only made

people economically better off, but also greatly improved people's education level and exposed them to more diverse media. As state penetration decreases and societal autonomy increases, the effects of political fear on surveys have greatly faded. Shi and his colleagues (Chen & Shi 2001; Shi 2006) have explicitly tested the effects of political fear on the level of political trust with national samples. Their results revealed that the levels and magnitude of respondents' political fear have declined dramatically from 1993 to 2002²¹. Moreover, they also showed a negative rather than positive relationship between political fear and political trust, the key variable in this dissertation. In other words, political trust reported by survey respondents is not a proxy of political fear.

Second, we can study the "don't know" answers in the survey responses (Shi 2001; Ren 2009). Rather than giving an exact trust score, respondents can lie, or they can refuse to answer or answer "don't know" to conceal their true opinion. First, I compared the rate of nonresponse in the 2005 EAB data with that of the 2005 WVS. If respondents refuse to answer or answer "don't know" to conceal their true opinion, the 2005 survey's level of nonresponse should be high. However, the actual average nonresponse level for the common institutions in the 2005 EAB survey is lower than China's level in the 2005 WVS, and China's nonresponse level in the 2005 WVS is lower or comparable to that of the major democratic countries (details not shown). Second, we can examine whether respondents give "don't know" answers because they want to conceal true opinions, because they truly do not know, or because they do not care. Ren (2009) found that level of education effectively reduces the number of "don't know" answers in surveys in China. Respondents as well as countries with higher levels of education report significantly

²¹ Shi (2006) investigated two questions in the survey: one asked respondent whether she worried that someone might snitch on her if she criticizes the government, and the other asked whether the respondent was worried that someone might snitch on her if she criticizes the party and national leaders. The percentage of people who reported themselves as at least "somewhat" afraid if criticizing the government or the party and national leaders has dropped from over 40% to around 20%.

less “don’t know” answers than those with lower levels of education. Besides, Ren (2009) also found that political interest plays a crucial role in the level of “don’t know” answers. People who lack interest in politics or survey questions tend to give more “don’t know” answers. Compared with education and political interest, political fear plays a much weaker role on the level of “don’t know” answers. Thus, people give “don’t know” answers more as a result of apathy and cognitive incapability than because of political fear.

The third method to check for political fear includes one indicator in multivariate analysis to control for political fear: the presence of the third party adult in the interview besides the interviewer and interviewee. The East Asian Barometer Surveys not only asked about the presence of the third party during the interview, but also specifically asked the identity of the third party – whether she is the spouse, the parent, the neighbor/passers-by, the government official, or others. If political fear exists, the respondent should be more concerned and less likely to reveal her true feelings when there is a third party during the interview. I will use third party presence as a proxy to control for political fear in my analysis.

6.2 SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN CHINA

6.2.1 Trust and Political Institutions in China

The first striking feature of political trust in China is its exceptionally high levels. As I discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, data from the WVS and the EAB both show that the average level of political

trust is one of the highest in the world. However, within China, how do Chinese people trust different institutions?

To examine the patterns of political trust within China, I refer to data from China. I draw heavily on the China Survey 2002 and 2008 of East Asian Barometer series. The 2008 survey contains a national random sample of 5,098 respondents in 29 provinces. The 2002 survey has a sample size of 3,183. Regarding political trust, the survey includes people's attitudes toward 10 institutions: the national government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the National People's Congress (NPC), People's Liberation Army (PLA), people's courts, police, local government, civil service, television, and newspaper.

To sort out the relationship among the 10 institutions, I use factor analysis, a statistical method that identifies and groups the highly correlated variables into factors by examining the correlation matrix among them. Factor analysis helps generate factors to group the institutions by how strongly they are correlated with each other.

In Table 6.1, factor analysis examines the internal correlations of the 10 institutions and the results show that they belong to three groups or factors. The first group includes the national government, the CCP, the NPC, and the PLA. These are the key and decision-making institutions of the state. The national government is the central executive bureaucracy of the political apparatus. The CCP is a distinct institution from the government in principle; but in reality, the two institutions' structures are often parallel at various levels and their roles are interconnected in China (Manion, 1999). The NPC lies at the center of the legislative process in China, encompassing constitutional enacting and amendment powers and other legislative powers. However, the CCP still maintains effective control of the NPC in China. The PLA is the world's largest military force and it is under the command of the Central Military

Commission (CMC) of the CCP and the state. These four institutions are the most important institutions in the Chinese political apparatus.

Table 6.1 Factor Analysis of Trust in Political Institutions in China

	Component		
	1	2	3
National Government	.798	.202	.089
CCP (party)	.851	.128	.123
NPC (parliament)	.850	.184	.145
PLA (armed forces)	.637	.171	.129
Legal System	.156	.795	.116
Civil Services	.208	.762	.193
Police	.171	.787	.207
Local Government	.177	.816	.081
Newspaper	.159	.239	.888
Television	.193	.174	.897
Eigenvalue	2.681	2.707	1.754

Source: EAB – The China Survey, 2008.

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Compared with trust in the above central political institutions, the second group that emerged from factor analysis is trust in relatively peripheral and less political institutions. These institutions include people's courts, police, local government, and civil service. The third group is trust in traditional media, including television and newspaper. These are traditional media, also the most popular types of media in China.

I have identified three types of political trust—trust in central institutions, in peripheral institutions, and in media. This dissertation is most concerned with the first

two types of political trust. In the following sections, I will first compare the levels of trust in these different institutions and then identify the sources of the first two types of political trust.




Figure 6.1 Political Trust by Institutions in China

Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2002 and 2008.

Figure 6.1 reports the patterns of public trust in the 10 institutions in China in 2008 and 2002. On a scale of 0 to 3, Figure 6.1 shows the average levels of trust in different institutions in China. First, in 2008, public trust is the highest in the four central institutions (with an average

level of 2.60) and the lowest in the 2 media institutions (average 1.69). The average level of trust in the four peripheral institutions is the medium (1.92). Noticeably, the levels of trust in the central institutions are extremely high and consistent (ranging from 2.5 to 2.6) across the four institutions. The variation in peripheral institutions is relatively large, ranging from 2.1 (people's courts) to 1.7 (civil services). The traditional forms of media are the least trusted institutions in China in 2007. Second, public trust decreased from 2002 to 2008 across all 10 institutions. However, the levels of public trust in central institutions have remained the highest across time. The average levels of trust in traditional forms of media decreased most between two waves (from 2.4 to 1.7). Third, there is a large gap between the levels of trust in national and local government in China in both 2002 and 2008. The national government enjoys the highest level of political trust, while the levels of trust in local government are among the lowest among all institutions in China. This gap sharply contrasts with the pattern we observed in the established democracies where local governments usually enjoy higher levels of political trust than national governments. I will return to this issue later in this chapter.

6.2.2 Political Sources of Political Trust in Authoritarian Regimes

Why is there a high level of political trust in authoritarian regimes like China? Why do Chinese people trust political institutions despite the lack of real elections and democratic accountability? How does the Chinese government maintain a high level of political trust? How effective are these institutional means and how do the Chinese people respond to these means? Is the reported political trust mainly an artifact out of fear and indoctrination? Or is it also shaped by similar factors as we observed in the democratic regimes? What are the sources of political trust in

China? To what extent do these different factors affect the public trust in institutions? I will try to study these issues in this section.

6.2.2.1 Hypotheses

I will examine the following sources of political trust in China: authoritarian indoctrination and mobilization, political performance, economic performance, and traditional values. I will focus on the two political explanations.

6.2.2.1.1 Institutional Mobilization and Resistance

The first political explanation for the high levels of trust in China is that the Chinese government uses institutional means of indoctrination to mobilize political support. The public attitudes, including their trust in political institutions, are shaped by the positive and negative information they are exposed to (Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbring 1979; Patterson 1993; Hetherington 2005). In democratic regimes, media serve as a watchdog, and they are usually more adversarial and critical. Thus, media consumption is negatively related to the levels of political trust in democracies.

In authoritarian countries, however, the government controls information through several institutional means. The most frequently used means of mobilization are media control and political education. Political mobilization was most intensive during socialist years, and the socialist generation should demonstrate higher levels of political trust than the later political generations in China. Even today, political meetings are held regularly in work units and schools where people get together to study the latest documents issued by the central government and the party. Studies show that exposure to political communication promotes popular acceptance for

the mainstream political norms embedded in the communication (Miller, Goldenberg, & Erbring 1979; Geddes & Zaller 1989; Chan 1997; Patterson 1999). Thus, I expect that in contrast to what we observed in democratic countries, factors such as media exposure and interest in politics make the Chinese people susceptible to regime influence and promote their trust in political institutions.

Media serve as the mouthpiece of the authoritarian governments (Chen & Shi 2001; Kennedy 2009). Authoritarian governments use media as a tool to manipulate and control the public attitudes towards authority and nurture the public trust. The media reform in China has decreased the state control over news content (Stockmann 2007). Although these changes are limited and the government still retains considerable media control, the reform greatly encouraged diversity of political information accessible to the public. The increased information diversity is best exemplified by the bloom of internet forums and the power of the Chinese netizens. People discuss politics and publish grapevine news online that the official media like television and newspaper are not allowed to report, often before the authority hears the news or has time to respond. The internet also makes it possible for some people to access alternate sources of information from abroad. The media consumers distinguish between different types of media. For instance, research shows that the urban Chinese people prefer reformed newspapers that are relatively more distant from the government line (Stockmann 2007). Thus we may expect that the traditional forms of media that sell propaganda, including TV and newspaper, encourage the public trust; whereas new forms of media that are relatively away from the government line, such as internet and phone messages, decrease people's political trust.

To test the mobilization hypotheses, I include four variables: media exposure, media types, political generation, and political interest. Media exposure is measured by the question,

“How often do you follow news about politics and government?”. Media type is a dummy variable asking respondents their main source of information about politics and government. Traditional forms of media including television, newspaper, and radio are coded as 1, and the new forms of media including internet, cell phone short message, and personal contact are coded as 0. People of the socialist political generation should demonstrate higher level of political trust than the Cultural Revolution generation and post-reform generation.

While the authoritarian governments use propaganda and political education to mobilize political support, the public resists these indoctrination means to different extents. As Geddes and Zaller (1989) argued, political support in authoritarian regimes depends on both the public’s exposure to pro-government messages and probability to accept or resist them. In this analysis, I include two variables to tap the public resistance: education levels and urban experience. I expect that these variables encourage people’s independent thinking and decrease their trust in institutions.

6.2.2.1.2 Political Performance

Another important yet often ignored political source of trust is the political performance. Existing research has mainly attributed the political support in China to either the very fast economic growth or the traditional Confucius culture (Shi 2001; Wang 2005; Yang & Tang 2010). Though political performance should theoretically contribute to political trust, explicit and clear political discussion is missing from the current analysis in China.

Corruption is one of the most important indicators of political performance, and it is a highly salient problem in China. The Chinese government views corruption as one of the greatest threats to communist rule today (Manion 2004). The Chinese people are also very

concerned about the issue of corruption. Manion (2006: 304) reported that corruption “has ranked at or nearly at the top of every public opinion poll as the most urgent problem confronting the country”.

The national importance judgment, i.e. the public evaluation on the most important problems the government should address, can produce priming effects by priming the public to focus the performance evaluations in given domains, thus affecting the political trust (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Hetherington & Rudolph 2008). Thus I expect that corruption, an issue of high saliency in China, should affect the level of political trust in China. Similarly, the perception of government responsiveness and fairness should promote the public trust in political institutions in China. The relationship between political performance and political trust in China will be systematically examined in the following section. I include three variables to tap political performance: perceived corruption, government fairness and responsiveness.

6.2.2.1.3 Other Sources of Political Trust

While I am most concerned with the political sources of political trust, I will control for the effects of economic performance and traditional values on political trust. Performance theories emphasize the rational side of political trust. Citizens trust institutions based on their assessment of economic and political performance of the institutions. The Chinese people will trust institutions when they are satisfied with the economic performance of the government. I use the public satisfaction with national economic development to measure economic performance. Cultural theories focus on the effects of culture and values on political trust. Confucianism emphasizes deference to authority and hierarchy, which promotes the trust level as a whole in China (Shi, 2001). At the individual level, Chinese people identify with

Confucianism to varying extents, contributing to the variation of political trust within China. Besides authoritarian values, I also include civic engagement and interpersonal trust to tap social capital. As discussed earlier, I also include two variables to control for political fear: the perceived political freedom and the third party presence during the interview.

6.2.2.1.4 The Interaction Effects of Resistance Factors

Resistance factors (i.e. education and urban experience) promote people's critical thinking, work against the government mobilization process, and decrease political trust in authoritarian countries. They not only directly influence political trust, but also interact with other variables and shape how others affect trust. Specifically, I will study their interactions with mobilization and performance variables.

First, I expect that citizens will assess institutions differently depending on their education levels. Education enhances citizens' capacity to access and process information, which helps them to evaluate institutions more rationally and accurately. Specifically, people with higher levels of education are more likely to value institutional performance and distinguish between official and new sources of media. The effects of political generations on political trust may also differ among people with different education levels. Second, urban experience broadens citizens' horizon and changes the way they perceive political institutions. Urban citizens are exposed to more diverse information and media options, and they are more likely to distinguish between official and new sources of media when evaluating institutions. I will also study these mediating effects of resistance factors in the following analysis.

6.2.2.2 Modeling Political Trust in China

Table 6.2 reports the OLS estimations of the sources of political trust in China, showing the effects of political performance, mobilization and resistance on two types of political trust while controlling for cultural and economic factors and political fear. I am most interested in the two political sources: the political performance and institutional mobilization variables.

Overall, political performance significantly contributes to the level of public trust in both the key political institutions (i.e. national government, CCP, NPC, & PLA) and in the peripheral institutions (i.e. local government, people's courts, civil service, police). People who perceive government as transparent, fair, and responsive are more likely to trust political institutions. For trust in the peripheral political institutions, the perceived corruption is the single strongest predictor, and responsiveness and fairness are both among the strongest predictors. Compared with other sources, the effects of the three perceived political performance variables are also the strongest for trust in the key political institutions.

Table 6.2 Determinants of Political Trust in China

	Model 1A: Trust in Key Political Institutions			Model 1B: Trust in Peripheral Political Institutions		
	b	se	β	b	se	β
<i>Political Performance</i>						
Corruption	-.08***	(.01)	-.12	-.24***	(.02)	-.30
Fairness	.11***	(.02)	.12	.14***	(.02)	.12
Responsiveness	.19***	(.02)	.23	.21***	(.02)	.21
<i>Exposure to Institutional Mobilization</i>						
Political Interest	.00	(.01)	.00	-.02	(.02)	-.02
Media Exposure	.02**	(.01)	.05	-.02*	(.01)	-.04
Official Media: TV, radio, newspaper	.24***	(.05)	.10	.13**	(.06)	.04
New Media: internet & grapevines (comparison group)						
Reform Generation	-.05*	(.03)	-.05	-.08**	(.03)	-.06
Cultural Revolution Generation	-.02	(.03)	-.02	-.07**	(.03)	-.05
Socialist Generation (comparison group)						
<i>Resistance Factors to Mobilization</i>						
Education Level	-.07***	(.02)	-.08	-.05**	(.02)	-.05
Urban Experience	.04	(.03)	.03	.03	(.03)	.02
<i>Economic Performance</i>						
Economic Development Satisfaction	.10***	(.02)	.12	.07***	(.02)	.07
<i>Cultural Values</i>						
Civic Engagement	-.01	(.04)	-.00	.05	(.04)	.02
Interpersonal Trust	.04**	(.02)	.04	.04	(.03)	.03
Authoritarian Values	.06***	(.08)	.06	.07***	(.02)	.07
<i>Political Fear</i>						
Political Freedom	-.06***	(.02)	.05	-.12***	(.03)	.09
3rd Party Presence	-.05**	(.02)	-.04	.00	(.03)	.00
(Constant)	1.31***	(.10)		.98***	(.12)	
Adjusted R ²	.21			.28		
N	2288			2288		

Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2008.

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$. ** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.1$.

The institutional mobilization means by the Chinese government turn out to be mostly effective. First, the effects of media on political trust are mixed. One of the most intriguing effects, and one that varies dramatically by trust types, is the effect of media exposure. People who follow more political news are more likely to trust the key political institutions; however, people who follow less political news show higher levels of trust in peripheral institutions. The

totally opposite effects of media exposure on the two types of political trust are not surprising if we take the media reform in China into account. As we discussed earlier, the deregulation and commercialization of media in China has loosened the state control over media content. Media are allowed to discuss or even raise political issues that do not threaten the fundamental regime stability. However, the media reform is limited as the state still maintains control over the official media forms and over the content and target of the political discussions. As a result, people hear different voices mainly on issues concerning the peripheral institutions. Today, the key political institutions remain seldom challenged in the traditional forms of media in China. In other words, the media enjoys more freedom to comment or even criticize peripheral institutions than the key political institutions. Thus, the media exposure to political news may increase the trust in the key political institutions but decrease the trust in peripheral institutions.

Media reform also produces different degrees of freedom in different types of media, as demonstrated in the contrasting effects of the different forms of media on the levels of political trust. Traditional media (including television, newspaper, and radio) promote the Chinese people's trust in political institutions, while the new forms of media such as internet and grapevine rumors decrease the public trust in political institutions. This is consistent with our expectations as the traditional media are much more pro-government whereas the new media forms enjoy less state control and more freedom. On the one hand, the rapidly development of internet in China brings hope of greater freedom to the public and more challenges to the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, we should notice the strong positive effects of the use of television, newspaper, and radio on the trust in key political institutions, which confirms the effectiveness of the government propaganda.

Political trust varies across political generations. The intensity of institutional mobilization has decreased through years. As expected, people of the socialist generation demonstrate higher levels of political trust than those of the reform and the Cultural Revolution generations. Political interest, however, does not show any independent effect on political trust.

While indoctrination and mobilization were largely successful in China, the effects of resistance to mobilization are evident as well. The eroding effects of education levels on political trust are strong and consistent with what has been observed in democratic societies. People with higher level of education are more critical towards political institutions. Urban experience, however, does not show any significant effects on the two types of political trust in China.

The statistical results partly supported cultural theories. People who identify with the traditional values are more likely to trust political institutions. However, social capital theories do not receive any support as neither interpersonal trust nor civic engagement variables showed significant effects on political trust. Overall, I find more support for institutional performance theories than for cultural theories. Both the political performance and the economic performance of institutions demonstrate significant explanatory powers for political trust.

Lastly, the effects of political fear on political trust are significant but limited. The perceived political freedom is positively rather than negatively related to the level of political trust, indicating that political trust is not a proxy for political fear. The presence of the third party during the survey interviews has an independent effect on trust in the key political institutions, but not on trust in the peripheral institutions.

To deal with the possible endogeneity problem caused by inclusion of independent variables that may be heavily affected by socioeconomic status, I also run a “clean” version of

analysis that excludes “political interest” and “economic development satisfaction”. The main results of the analysis remain the same (details not shown).

Table 6.3 reports the interaction effects between resistance factors and other variables. To highlight the interaction effects, I only listed variables involved in interaction terms. Results show that the two resistance factors interact with and condition the effects of mobilization factors and performance factors on trust in both key political institutions and peripheral institutions.

First, for trust in key political institutions, the effects of official sources of media on trust should increase with a person’s level of education. Specifically, for people with lowest level of education (with a score of 0), the preference of official or unofficial sources of media makes no difference in how they trust institutions. However, for people with highest level of education (with a score of 3), the effect of official media on trust is $(.09+10*3=)$.39, meaning exposure to different forms (official versus unofficial sources) of media significantly changes their levels of political trust. More education also dramatically increased the effects of institutional performance on trust in key political institutions. Specifically, the effect of satisfaction with national economic development on trust is .09 for people with lowest levels of education, and this effect doubles $(.09+.03*3=.18)$ is -.07 for the least educated, and the effect almost triples $(-.07+3*-.04= -.19)$ for the most for people with highest levels of education. Similarly, the effect of perceived corruption on trust educated. For trust in key political institutions, the interactions between education and political generations and between urban experience and media sources are irrelevant. Overall, the R square improved from .21 in Model 1A to .22 in interaction model in Model 2A.

Table 6.3 Interaction Effects of Resistance Factors

	Model 2A: Trust in Key Political Institutions			Model 2B: Trust in Peripheral Political Institutions		
	b	se	β	b	se	β
Corruption	-.07***	(.01)	-.11	-.23***	(.02)	-.29
Economic Development Satisfaction	.09***	(.02)	.11	.06***	(.02)	.06
Official Media: tv, radio, newspaper	.09	(.11)	.04	.34**	(.14)	.11
New Media: internet & grapevines (comparison group)						
Reform Generation	-.03	(.05)	-.02	-.06	(.06)	-.05
Cultural Revolution Generation	-.05	(.05)	-.04	-.05	(.06)	-.04
Socialist Generation (comparison group)						
Education Level	-.13*	(.07)	-.15	-.13	(.09)	-.12
Urban Experience	-.17	(.16)	-.12	.33*	(.19)	.19
<i>Interaction</i>						
Official Media * Education	.10*	(.05)	.12	.18**	(.09)	.07
Official Media * Urban	.22	(.17)	.15	.37**	(.19)	.21
Corruption * Education	-.04*	(.02)	-.04	-.07**	(.03)	-.07
Economic Satisfaction * Education	.03**	(.01)	.07	.05**	(.02)	.08
Reform Generation * Education	-.07	(.05)	-.10	-.04*	(.02)	-.04
Culture Revolution Gen. * Education	-.07	(.04)	.08	-.03	(.05)	-.03
<i>Control Variables (not shown)[#]</i>						
Adjusted R ²	.22			.30		
N	2288			2288		

Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2008.

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$. ** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.1$.

[#] Variables in Table 6.2 included in the analysis but not shown.

Second, the general pattern of interaction effects in trust in peripheral institutions is mostly consistent with that of trust in key institution. Education significantly increases the effects of both political and economic performance on trust in peripheral institutions. Urban experience and education level both significantly interact with media sources and boost its effect on trust in peripheral institutions. Unlike the model of trust in key political institutions, there is significant and positive interaction effect between political generations and education on trust in peripheral institutions. Trust difference between different political generations is larger for people with higher levels of education. Overall, R square of the interaction model, .30, represents an improvement over .28 from Model 1B.

6.3 TRUST IN OTHER NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN EAST ASIA

In this section, I will examine and compare the sources of political trust in five non-democratic societies in East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Figure 6.2 shows the democratic levels of the four non-democratic regimes in 2005, around when the second wave of EAB was taken. According to the Freedom in the World index, in 2005, China was the least democratic regime in Asia, followed by Vietnam, Cambodia, and Singapore. Following the FIW categories, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia are considered “not free”, while Singapore is “partly free”. Hong Kong was not included in Figure 6.2 due to data availability, but its democratic level should be close to that of Singapore.²²

We study the sources of political trust in the above five societies, following the models in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Some variables are omitted because they were not asked in all societies in the survey. For comparative purposes, our dependent variables are the mean levels of trust in the five key institutions: civil services, national government, legal system, parliament, political parties.

²² According to Democracy index that measures the democratic levels in 167 countries, Hong Kong rates very close to Singapore. Democracy index, by Economist Intelligence Unit, is a comprehensive index based on criteria of five categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties. The Democracy index has been largely consistent with Freedom in the World Index.




Figure 6.2 Democracy Index for 4 Non-Democratic Asian Societies

Source: Freedom House, 2005

Note: FIW Index ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 means completely free and 7 means not free at all.

Table 6.4 reports the results of sources of trust in the five non-democratic regimes in East Asia. The second column in each model includes interaction effects. Results of the models highlight the importance of political performance. The three perceived political performance variables consistently show strong predicting powers in all five non-democratic regimes. Perceived economic performance is another important source of political trust. Asian values that emphasize hierarchy and harmony also contribute to political trust. However, the institutions when they experience satisfactory institutional performance – both political and institutions when they experience satisfactory institutional performance – both political and economic performance. To maintain public trust in political institutions, the non-democratic regimes should work on improving their political performance, rather than emphasizing economic performance only.

Table 6.4 Sources of Political Trust in Five Non-Democratic Asian Societies

	Model 3: Pooled		Model 3A: China		Model 3B: Vietnam		Model 3C: Cambodia		Model 3D: Singapore		Model 3E: Hong Kong	
	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
<i>Political Performance</i>												
Corruption	-.15*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.23*** (.02)	-.22*** (.03)	-.20*** (.05)	-.08 (.06)	-.15*** (.06)	-.11** (.05)	-.19*** (.04)	-.12* (.06)	-.13*** (.05)	-.10 (.10)
Fairness	.09*** (.01)	.09*** (.01)	.17*** (.03)	.17*** (.03)	-.05* (.03)	-.05* (.03)	.20*** (.04)	.19*** (.03)	.13*** (.03)	.13*** (.04)	.10** (.04)	.09** (.04)
Responsiveness	.18*** (.01)	.18*** (.01)	.29*** (.02)	.29*** (.02)	.26*** (.05)	.27*** (.05)	.31*** (.06)	.31*** (.04)	.18*** (.04)	.18*** (.06)	.26*** (.04)	.26*** (.04)
<i>Mobilization & Resistance</i>												
Political Interest	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.10** (.05)	.09** (.04)	.07** (.04)	.07** (.04)	-.05 (.03)	-.05 (.04)	-.00 (.03)	-.00 (.03)
News Exposure	N/A	N/A	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.04 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	N/A	N/A	.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
Media Type	N/A	N/A	.27*** (.07)	.31** (.14)	.22* (.13)	.06 (.27)	N/A	N/A	-.10 (.12)	-.02 (.30)	N/A	N/A
Age	.00* (.00)	.01* (.00)	.08*** (.03)	.05*** (.01)	-.12** (.06)	.03 (.03)	-.03 (.06)	-.05 (.03)	.13*** (.06)	.13*** (.06)	.02 (.05)	.02 (.05)
Education Levels	-.04*** (.01)	-.04*** (.01)	-.23*** (.06)	-.20 (.12)	-.05 (.04)	-.72*** (.23)	-.06 (.04)	-.02 (.14)	-.02 (.13)	-.16 (.18)	-.04 (.03)	-.29** (.16)
Urban	N/A	N/A	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)	-.24*** (.07)	-.05 (.07)	-.06 (.08)	-.06 (.08)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<i>Economic Performance</i>												
Economic Satisfaction	.08*** (.01)	.08*** (.01)	.12*** (.02)	.04 (.04)	.08 (.05)	.04 (.05)	.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.14*** (.03)	.14*** (.03)	.05 (.03)	.07 (.07)
<i>Cultural Values</i>												
Authoritarian Values	.03*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.09*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.07*** (.04)	.07*** (.02)	.03 (.03)	.03 (.03)	.06 (.04)	.07 (.04)
Civic Engagement	N/A	N/A	.03 (.05)	.03 (.05)	-.09*** (.03)	-.09*** (.03)	N/A	N/A	-.03 (.07)	-.03 (.07)	.10* (.05)	.10* (.05)
Interpersonal Trust	.08*** (.01)	.08*** (.01)	.04 (.03)	.03 (.03)	.25*** (.06)	.25*** (.06)	.06 (.12)	.06 (.12)	.18*** (.12)	.18*** (.07)	.04 (.05)	.04 (.05)

Table 6.4 (Continued).

Table 6.4 (Continued).

	Model 3: Pooled		Model 3A: China		Model 3B: Vietnam		Model 3C: Cambodia		Model 3D: Singapore		Model 3E: Hong Kong	
	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
<i>Political Fear</i>												
Political Freedom	.05*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)	.13*** (.03)	.06 (.04)	.06 (.04)	.06* (.04)	.07** (.03)	.02 (.03)	.03 (.03)	.17*** (.05)	.16*** (.05)	
3rd Party Presence	N/A	N/A	-.04 (.03)	-.14** (.06)	-.14** (.06)	.00 (.06)	-.01 (.06)	-.17*** (.07)	-.18*** (.06)	N/A	N/A	
(Constant)	1.66*** (.05)	1.66*** (.07)	-.93*** (.15)	.46* (.26)	.46* (.26)	-1.24*** (.23)	-1.14*** (.25)	-.16 (.20)	-.04 (.20)	-.96*** (.19)	-.58** (.28)	
<i>Interaction</i>												
Corruption * Education		-.03*** (.01)	-.03* (.01)		-.07 (.05)		-.05* (.02)		-.04* (.02)		-.02 (.06)	
Economic Satisfaction * Education		.01* (.00)	.07*** (.03)		.15*** (.05)		.01 (.02)		.02 (.03)		.06** (.03)	
Official Media * Education		N/A	.06 (.06)		.20* (.11)		N/A		-.07 (.12)		N/A	
Official Media * Urban		N/A	.51** (.22)		-.21 (.26)		N/A		N/A		N/A	
Age * Education		.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)		.01 (.02)		.01 (.02)		.05*** (.02)		.02 (.01)	
R ²	.38	.39	.29	.28	.29	.32	.32	.16	.16	.22	.23	
N	4781	4781	2078	536	536	623	623	538	538	363	363	

Source: EAB 2005.

Notes: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.

Country dummies are included in the pooled analysis but not shown.

The influence of political mobilization is limited and mixed. Mobilization variables show different effects in five regimes. Mobilization effects are evident in countries with extremely low levels of democracy (China, Vietnam, and Cambodia), where people with higher levels of political interest and preferences for official media show higher levels of political trust. In societies with higher levels of democracies (Singapore and Hong Kong), these variables have no significant effects on political trust. Meanwhile, resistance factors generally work against mobilization. Their corrosive effects on trust are both direct and indirect (by interacting with other variables). The strongest interaction effects are between education and institutional performance, showing that the effects of perceived political and economic performance on political trust increase with a person's level of education. The effects are consistent across countries, and they are consistent with our earlier observation at country level (Chapter 4).

6.4 THE INVERSE TRUST GAP IN CHINA

Another interesting observation about political trust in East Asia is the trust gap between central and local government. If we recall the levels of trust in different political institutions in Figure 6.1, we will notice that the Chinese people trust central government much more than they do local governments. In other words, if we define the trust gap as deviation of local trust from central trust, we observe a large positive trust gap in China.

Table 6.5 Relative Trust in Local Level and Central Level Institutions in China

	Trust Center (%)	Trust Local (%)	Neither (%)	Total (%)
CCP	91.02	7.01	1.96	100
Court	90.59	7.59	1.82	100
People's Congress	91.07	7.22	1.7	100
Government	90.99	7.3	1.72	100

Source: China Values and Ethics Survey, 2004; Table 1 from Yang (2004).

This gap is even clearer when asked in a relative term. Using 2004 China Values and Ethics Survey, Yang (2004) found that the vast majority of the Chinese people choose the central institutions and only less than 10% chooses the local level or none of the above when asked whether they trust the local CCP, the court, the people's congress and government or those at the central level more (Table 6.5). This is consistent with some other studies in China (Li 2004; Tang 2010).

Figure 6.3 presents the trust gap between central and local governments in twelve Asian societies. The trust gap is positive in three Asian countries: China (.83), Vietnam (.23), Singapore (.21); and the gap is negative in eight societies: Hong Kong (-.01), Mongolia (-.02), Indonesia (-.11), Cambodia (-.15), Thailand (-.15), Korea (-.21), Taiwan (-.21), Japan (-.26), and the Philippines (-.38). The trust gap seems only positive in some non-democratic societies. In other words, people trust local governments more than central governments only in democratic societies in Asia. This observation seems to echo what has been observed in some established democracies (Jennings 1998).




Figure 6.3 Trust Gap in East Asia

Source: EAB 2005.

How do we explain the large positive trust gap in China? Why are levels of trust in national government so much higher than in local government? To answer these questions, we need to study the sources of political trust in local institutions. Research on local trust has largely been omitted from the trust literature, and the lack of suitable data is a major reason (Rahn and Rudolph 2005). To study the sources of political trust in both local and central governments in China, I will refer to the EAB-China 2008 data in this section.

Why do Chinese people trust the central government more than local governments? An important reason for the low trust in local institutions is that many people regard the local institutions as having “capacity” to enforce the center’s “intentions” (Li 2004). Field work in rural China shows that many villagers trust the good intentions of the Center, while they doubt local capacity to enforce it at local level (Li 2004).

The distinction between capacity and intentions is a result of both cultural influences and institutional means. First, the Confucian values that have influenced the Chinese culture for thousands of years have a tradition of believing in the divinity of the emperor. As a result of the Confucian influence, the Chinese people blame corrupt officials for what goes wrong but exclude the emperor from accountability systems (Pye 1996; Li 2004, 2012). In its modern form, local institutions resemble corrupt officials and the central institutions resemble the emperor. While the Chinese people may blame the local institutions for things that go wrong, they still have faith in the good intention of the central government.

Second, the perceived performance of the local institutions may not be as satisfactory as their central counterparts. On the one hand, local institutional performance is more visible if institutions do not live up their promises and propaganda. On the other hand, research shows strong positive relationships between educational attainment and experience and predicted career rank (Landry 2008). We may expect relatively lower education levels and experience in local officials. As a result, people may perceive less satisfactory performance of the local institutions.

Third, the media also plays an important role in shaping public trust towards different levels of institutions. As discussed earlier, the media may enjoy more freedom discussing and criticizing local institutions. Propaganda works best for the central government. As people are exposed to more critical views of local institutions, they are more likely to hold different

opinions and have less confidence in local institutions. Overtime, media criticism of local governments erodes public confidence (Landry & Stockmann 2009).

In Table 6.6, I study the sources of central and local trust with the same set of explanatory variables. Three findings are worth discussing. First, performance factors, both political and economic, play the most important role in explaining trust at both levels. While both traditional values and institutional performance shape political trust in the expected directions, performance factors are more significant contributors to political trust in China (cf. Shi 2001; Chen 2004; Yang & Tang 2010). Fortunately, the EAB-China survey specifically asks respondents how they perceive the institutional performance of both central and local levels. The results show that people trust different levels of institutions based on their perceptions of the institutional performance at the corresponding levels. At the central level, the Chinese people trust institutions when they are satisfied with the political and economic performance of national institutions.

Specifically, people who perceive more fairness and responsiveness and less corruption in national government and better national economic development are more likely to trust central government. At the individual level, people who perceive more fairness and responsiveness and less corruption in local governments and better family economic conditions are more likely to trust local government.

Table 6.6 Sources of Trust in Central and Local Governments in China

	Model 4: Trust in National Government			Model 5: Trust in Local Government		
	b	s.e.	β	b	s.e.	β
Political Performance						
National Corruption	-.24***	.02	.31	-.04	.03	-.04
Local Corruption	-.02	.02	.03	-.28***	.03	-.30
Fairness	.09***	.03	.09	.06*	.03	.05
Responsiveness	.14***	.03	.15	.22***	.03	.18
Economic Performance						
Satisfaction with National Economy	.11***	.03	.11	.02	.03	.02
Satisfaction with Family Economy	.00	.02	.00	.08***	.03	.07
Cultural Values						
Authoritarian Values	.03*	.01	.02	.11**	.06	.06
Civic Engagement	.04	.05	.02	.04	.06	.02
Interpersonal Trust	.12***	.03	.10	.13***	.04	.08
Institutional Mobilization						
News Access	.03*	.01	.05	-.03*	.01	-.04
Traditional Media Type	.19***	.07	.07	.13	.09	.03
New Media Type (comparison group)						
Political Interest	-.01	.02	-.01	-.02	.03	-.02
Resistance Factors						
Education Level	-.06**	.02	-.06	.00	.03	.00
Reform Generation	-.04*	.01	-.04	-.14**	.05	-.09
the Cultural Revolution Generation	-.03	.04	-.02	-.08*	.04	-.05
Socialist Generation (comparison group)						
Urban Experience	.04	.04	.03	-.10**	.05	-.05
Political Fear						
Political Freedom	-.02	.03	.01	.19***	.04	.12
3rd Party Presence	-.04	.03	-.03	-.00	.03	-.00
Constant	1.89***	.15		.78***	.21	
Adjusted R ²	.240			.243		
N	1445			1445		

Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2002 and 2008.

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$. ** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.1$.

The second important feature is the opposite effects of media on different levels of political trust. I examined the effects of media access and media types on political trust. First, as we discussed earlier, the media enjoys greater critical freedom towards local institutions and affairs, and criticism of local officials and affairs is not uncommon on internet or even in official

media. On the one hand, people who have more media access are exposed to different opinions about local institutions, and they are less likely to trust local governments. People who are exposed to more political news are more likely to trust the central government due to limited media freedom towards central institutions. Second, different types of media have different effects on trust in national government. People who prefer traditional types of media (such as television and newspaper) to new media (such as internet) are more exposed to propaganda and are more likely to trust central government. However, media types have no independent effect on local trust since both official media and new media have more balanced reports on local governments.

Lastly, the results show that resistance factors have different effects on the different levels of political trust. Education has an eroding effect on national government, but no effect on local government. Compared with younger political generations, the socialist generation has a much higher level of local trust while the effect of political generations on central trust is relatively limited. Urban experience decreases local trust but has no effects on central trust.

6.5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS

This chapter studies the sources of political trust in non-democratic regimes in East Asia. I focus on the case of China, the largest authoritarian country in the world. The first part of the chapter discusses the major institutions in China and the levels of trust in each institution. I identified three types of political trust in China: trust in key political institutions, trust in peripheral political institutions, and trust in media. This dissertation focuses on key and peripheral political

trust. Survey results show that political trust in China is high across different institutions, particularly in the key political institutions.

The next part of the chapter attempts to explain political trust in China, as well as in other Asian non-democratic societies. I examined the major arguments in existing literature and focused on two political sources of trust in China: the political performance and the authoritarian political mobilization. Statistical results show strong predicting powers for both of the political explanations. First, contrary to the findings of some previous works, I found that political trust is more legal-rational based than traditional based trust in China. Institutional performance, both political and economic performance, is the most important source of political trust in China. Although traditional values significantly affect the levels of political trust, their effects are limited compared with the effects of perceived performance. Thus, the high level of political trust in China is not merely a product of traditional Chinese values, but more of a rational choice based on institutional performance. In this sense, political trust in China is comparable to that in western democratic societies. Studies of non-democratic regimes in East Asia confirmed the importance of perceived political performance.

Second, trust in China is also different from that in democratic societies due to its institutional mobilization sources. The effects of institutional mobilization are significant but become complicated as a result of media reform. This is best demonstrated by the media effects. First, access to political news promotes levels of trust in key political institutions but decreases levels of trust in peripheral political institutions. Second, people with more exposure to traditional forms of media are more exposed to government propaganda, and they are more likely to have higher levels of political trust; while access to unconventional types of media increases exposure to different voices, which, in turn, decreases the level of political trust. The effects of

mobilization and indoctrination are evident in non-democratic regimes where the levels of democracy are extremely low.

Next, I studied the trust gap between central and local governments in China. Unlike many democratic societies, China shows higher level of trust in central government than in local governments. I identified three reasons to explain the different levels of trust in central and local governments: the Confucian values that emphasize deference and respect to the authority, the difference in the perceived political performance at different levels of government, and the media effects. Whether intentionally designed by the central government or not, the trust gap between central and local governments boosted public trust in the central government in China (cf. Li 2012).

This chapter finishes my inquiry into the sources, especially the political sources, of trust in institutions in East Asia. I found that political performance is a very strong predictor for political trust, both for democratic and non-democratic countries. Regime types make a difference on the levels of political trust. In democratic societies, democratic institutional settings have significant effects on the levels of political trust at the country level. In non-democratic societies with extremely low levels of democracy, institutional mobilization is effective in boosting the levels of public trust in political institutions.

The question following the above discussions is what are the consequences and implications of political trust. In the concluding chapter, I will examine the consequences of political trust, summarize the main results of the dissertation, and discuss the policy implications.

7.0 CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation explores the political sources of political trust. The previous chapters have studied the issue at different levels. So far, the data and statistical results have supported the major hypotheses I proposed in the first part of the dissertation. In this concluding chapter, I will first review and summarize the major findings of the previous chapters. Then, I will take a step further and examine the consequences of political trust. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of the study and suggest the directions of future research.

7.1 THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE DISSERTATION

At the beginning of the dissertation, I argued that political performance and institutional arrangements significantly influence levels of political trust at both national and individual levels (Chapter 2). Specifically, I studied three aspects of perceived political performance: corruption, government fairness, and responsiveness. Regarding institutional arrangements, I am most concerned with the effects of regime types. Within democratic societies, I examined the effects of different executive systems, electoral systems, levels of democracy, party systems, and party

allegiance. With authoritarian societies, I focused on the effects of political mobilization and media reform on trust.

To study the political sources of trust in institutions, I examined approximately 50 countries across the world (Chapter 4), and then focused on 12 East Asian societies (Chapter 5 and 6). I will briefly summarize the major findings of the dissertation in this section.

First, the levels of political trust vary significantly across individuals, countries, as well as regions. Overall, we observe the highest levels of political trust in Asia. Most of the existing research of trust has focused on individual level explanations. However, sharp difference in trust levels across countries indicates that structural level factors and political context shape individual attitudes such as political trust and they should be incorporated into our analysis of political trust. Thus, multi-level analysis that combines both individual and country level predictors is the most appropriate model for explaining political trust (Chapter 4 and 5).

Second, at the country level, institutional arrangements have significant effects on the levels of political trust. The most important institutional factor is regime type, as non-democratic regimes have much higher levels of political trust than democratic regimes on average. Unlike previous research on trust, this dissertation includes both democratic and non-democratic regimes and studies how different political factors shape political trust in different regime types.

Within democratic regimes, I studied four types of democratic institutional settings, and analysis using global and Asian data both confirmed that three of them have significant effects on trust (Chapter 3, 4 and 5). First, countries with higher levels of democratization generally display higher levels of political trust because the democratic principles of accountability and representation require greater support from voters. Second, compared with fragmented party systems, two-party and moderate multi-party systems are often associated with higher levels of

political trust because they promote effective channeling of public opinion to government policies. Third, compared with presidential democracies, parliamentary systems tend to present higher levels of political trust as some of their institutional structures encourage diversity, efficiency and political stability, attracting more political trust. Overall, institutional designs including the democratization levels, party systems and executive systems all significantly affect the levels of political trust.

Third, at the individual level, institutional features also influence the levels of political trust. In democratic societies, voters who identify and support the winning parties have more incentives to maintain the status quo rather than challenging existing institutional settings. Thus winners have higher levels of political trust than losers. The effect of party allegiance on political trust in democratic regimes is strong and robust across different models (Chapter 4 and 5).

In authoritarian regimes, the government uses institutional means such as media control and political education to manipulate public attitudes and mobilize political support (Chapter 6). Thus, unlike in democratic societies, media exposure shows strong mobilization effects and significantly promotes the levels of political trust. However, reform and modernization processes bring resistance forces in authoritarian societies, as demonstrated in the eroding effects of the new forms of media and education levels on political trust. Overall, the government mobilization in authoritarian regimes is successful, but with deepening reform processes, their effects become more and more limited.

Fourth, political performance proves to be one of the strongest predictors of political trust across different types of regimes (Chapter 4, 5 and 6). At the country level, societies where political corruption is prevalent have lower levels of political trust. In contrast, societies with

lower levels of corruption show higher levels of political trust. At the individual level, people who perceive government as less corruptive and more responsive and fair are more likely to trust institutions than those who do not.

The strong effects of political performance on political trust are robust. Using hierarchical linear models, I first tested the hypotheses with global data, and the statistical results supported my argument (Chapter 4). Then, I tested the hypotheses in East Asia, a region where the paradoxical coexistence of corruption and economic miracles may challenge the detrimental effects of political corruption on economic and political development (Chapter 5 and 6). Again, the data from 12 East Asian societies (both pooled OLS of East Asian societies and country-by-county analysis) confirmed that the corruption decreases levels of political trust. The negative effects of corruption and positive effects of perceived government responsiveness and fairness hold true across different models.

Fifth, the political sources of political trust, including political performance and institutional settings, showed significant effects on political trust. To best explain political trust, I controlled for the effects of the two most discussed predictors, economic development and cultural values. The results generally supported their roles on trust. The effects of economic performance on political trust seem to be stronger than cultural values, supporting performance theories. However, throughout different analyses in the dissertation, while economic performance and cultural values shape political trust, the roles of political performance and institutional settings on trust proves consistently strong and significant. I also studied political trust by different political institutions, and the results stand robust across trust in different institutions (Chapter 5).

7.2 THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TRUST

So far, the dissertation has examined different political sources of the political trust. The question follows is “does it matter?” In this section, I take a step further and study the impact of political trust on people’s political behavior and attitudes. Specifically, I am interested in how political trust affects political participation and democratic values in democratic and non-democratic regimes. I will focus on the following democratic values and behaviors:

7.2.1 The Consequence for Support for Democracy

Political trust may have different consequences on citizens’ support for democracy in different types of regimes. In democratic societies, trust promotes the public acceptance of democratic values and ideals, which in turn, increases the support for democratic regimes (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998; Mishler & Rose 2005). In contrast, political trust in non-democratic societies may facilitate the public support for undemocratic alternatives.

To measure democratic support, I use the following questions from the WVS: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (1) having a strong leader (2) having experts make decisions (3) having the army rule (4) having a democratic political system.”

Table 7.1 The Effects of Political Trust on Democratic Support

	Dem.		Non-dem	
	b(s.e.)	Beta	b (s.e.)	Beta
(Constant)	-.387 (.041)		2.548 (.099)	
Political Trust	.129 ^{***} (.016)	.044	-.078 ^{***} (.025)	-.031
Income	.005 ^{***} (.002)	.018	-.011 ^{***} (.003)	-.033
Political Interest	.050 ^{***} (.004)	.068	.046 ^{***} (.007)	.062
Post-materialist Values	.200 ^{***} (.011)	.091	.039 [*] (.020)	.017
Sex	-.010 (.007)	-.007	.004 (.012)	.003
Age	.017 ^{***} (.002)	.040	.010 ^{**} (.004)	.020
Education	.023 ^{***} (.002)	.078	.018 ^{***} (.003)	.056
Interpersonal Trust	.057 ^{***} (.008)	.038	.121 ^{***} (.016)	.068
Level of Democracy	.160 ^{***} (.004)	.209	.010 ^{**} (.004)	.025
GDP per capita (ln)	.116 ^{***} (.005)	.151	-.111 ^{***} (.010)	-.112
Adjusted R ²	.147		.022	
n	33884		12998	

Source: WVS 2005.

Notes: *** $p < 0.001$. ** $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$.

Table 7.1 summarizes the OLS results for the effects of political trust on democratic support. Controlling for individual level and country level factors, political trust shows a significant effect on democratic support. The directions of the effects are opposite in different types of regimes. The results are consistent with our expectations. Trust in political institutions promotes democratic support in democratic societies but decreases democratic support in non-

democratic societies. I also used EAB data to test the effects of political trust on support for democracy as a form of government, and the results remain the same (details not shown).

7.2.2 The Effects on Political Participation

Political trust may also have a role in political activism. I will study the effect of political trust on both conventional and protest participation. On the one hand, people who do not trust institutions are less likely to participate in the conventional political process. For comparison across different types of regimes, conventional participation is gauged by organization activism, measured by the number of voluntary associations the respondents belong to. The organizations can be political, economic, or social.

On the other hand, it is believed that political cynicism increases protest participation (Seligson 1980; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). High level of political trust prevents protest and violence, both of which create political instability. To measure protest activism, the WVS 2005 asked the respondents “Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things (2), whether you might do it (1) or would never, under any circumstances, do it (0): A signing a petition; B joining in boycotts; C attending lawful demonstrations D join unofficial strikes.

Table 7.2 The Effects of Political Trust on Political Participation

	Organizational Participation				Protest Activism			
	Dem.		Non-Dem.		Dem.		Non-Dem.	
	b (s.e.)	Beta	b (s.e.)	Beta	b (s.e.)	Beta	b (s.e.)	Beta
(Constant)	.396 (.010)		-.335 (.022)		-1.469 (.033)		-1.054 (.090)	
Political Trust	.092*** (.004)	.114	.049*** (.006)	.071	-.096*** (.012)	-.036	-.221*** (.021)	-.109
Income	.006*** (.000)	.075	.007*** (.001)	.074	.004*** (.001)	.016	-.020*** (.003)	-.073
Political Interest	.023*** (.001)	.112	.026*** (.002)	.130	.148*** (.003)	.226	.125*** (.006)	.208
Post-materialist Values	.044*** (.003)	.073	.026*** (.005)	.040	.262*** (.009)	.133	.131*** (.017)	.067
Sex	.011*** (.002)	.030	.017*** (.003)	.044	.034*** (.006)	.028	.051*** (.011)	.043
Age	.000 (.001)	.002	-.007*** (.001)	-.051	-.012*** (.002)	-.032	.003 (.004)	.008
Education	.008*** (.000)	.096	.014*** (.001)	.160	.039*** (.001)	.146	.024*** (.003)	.088
Interpersonal Trust	.031*** (.002)	.072	.011*** (.004)	.022	.052*** (.006)	.038	.018 (.014)	.012
Level of Democracy	.025*** (.001)	.115	.030*** (.001)	.280	.134*** (.003)	.192	.032*** (.004)	.091
GDP per capita (ln)	-.053*** (.001)	-.247	.029*** (.002)	.108	.104*** (.004)	.146	.141*** (.009)	.181
Adj. R ²	.130		.164		.282		.179	
n	38961		14794		36872		10641	

Source: WVS 2005.

Notes: *** $p < 0.001$. ** $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$.

Again, the statistical results confirmed our expectations. As Table 7.2 shows, the effects of political trust on both forms of political participation are significant, *ceteris paribus*. The

effects are positive on organizational activism and negative on protest activism. Specifically, holding all the other factors constant, people with higher levels of political trust are more likely to join political, social and economic organizations. Meanwhile, the more trust people have in political institutions, the less likely they would sympathize with or take part in protest politics, holding other variables constant. Comparing the four models in Table 7.2, we find that political trust has similar effects on political participation in both types of regimes. Results using EAB 2005 largely confirmed the effects in East Asian societies (details not shown).

7.2.3 The Impact on Voluntary Law Compliance

Successful exercise of legal authority is based on actors from both sides of the line: the coercive enforcement mechanism by the authority and the trust in the law's legitimacy by the citizens (Scholz 1998). Although governments may be able to implement the law with coercion, voluntary compliance and cooperation of citizens promotes stability and order with much less costs and risks (Tyler 1998). People trust institutions because they have higher confidence in the legitimacy of the law, thus they are more likely to obey the laws, allowing effective governance without the need to refer to coercion (Easton 1965; Norris 1999). We should expect political trust promotes legal compliance.

The 2005 WVS contains four questions that can measure voluntary law compliance: (1) Claiming government benefits; (2) avoiding a fare on public transport; (3) cheating on taxes; (4) someone accepting a bribe. Respondents put their attitudes for each situation on a 0-2 scale. The scores for four questions are added and recoded to form a factor index with 0-1 scale where 0 means that it's always justified and 1 denotes never justifiable.

Table 7.3 The Effects of Political Trust on Voluntary Law Compliance

	Dem.		Non-dem.	
	b (s.e.)	Beta	b (s.e.)	Beta
(Constant)	-1.469 (.033)		-1.054 (.090)	
Political Trust	.096*** (.012)	.036	.221*** (.021)	.109
Income	.004*** (.001)	.016	-.020*** (.003)	-.073
Political Interest	.148*** (.003)	.226	.125*** (.006)	.208
Postmaterialist Values	.262*** (.009)	.133	.131*** (.017)	.067
Sex	.034*** (.006)	.028	.051*** (.011)	.043
Age	-.012*** (.002)	-.032	.003 (.004)	.008
Education	.039*** (.001)	.146	.024*** (.003)	.088
Interpersonal Trust	.052*** (.006)	.038	.018 (.014)	.012
Level of Democracy	.134*** (.003)	.192	.032*** (.004)	.091
GDP per capita (ln)	.104*** (.004)	.146	.141*** (.009)	.181
Adjusted R ²	.282		.179	
n	36872		10641	

Source: WVS 2005.

Notes: *** $p < 0.001$. ** $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$.

As we expected, political trust significantly and positively affects voluntary law compliance. The more people trust political institutions, the more likely they will comply with the law and play within the system. However, compared with other variables, the effects of

political trust on voluntary law compliance are modest in democratic societies. In contrast, the effects are particularly strong in non-democratic regimes.

7.3 IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

Political trust is important for both democratic and non-democratic regimes. It ensures that government can operate effectively, make decisions without resorting to coercion, and retain certain leeway in times of insufficient short-time performance. As discussed above, political trust has significant consequences on political values and behavior in all types of regimes. On the one hand, in democratic societies, political trust increases democratic support, promotes organizational activism, decreases unconventional participation, and contributes to voluntary compliance with the law. In other words, political trust may help improve the quality of democracy. Thus, the “trust crisis” in many democratic societies today should raise serious concerns, and democratic countries need to take measures to boost the declining levels of political trust.

On the other hand, in non-democratic societies, although political trust promotes conventional participation and voluntary law compliance, and discourages unconventional participation, it also increases support for regime types other than democracy at the same time. Thus, although it seems that the gains are greater than losses, it is too quick to conclude that the extremely high levels of trust are good for the prospect of democracy in non-democratic societies. As Norris (1999: 27) pointed out: “Too much blind trust by citizens and misplaced confidence in leaders, for good or ill, can be as problematic for democracy as too little.” The consequences of

political trust in non-democratic societies are partly dependent on its nature: whether it is highly rationally based, whether it is greatly induced by propaganda, or whether it is mainly a result of traditional hierarchical values.

To better understand the nature of political trust, this dissertation has focused on the political sources of political trust that have been less studied. I found that institutional settings and political performance significantly contribute to levels of political trust. These findings have important implications for both democratic and non-democratic regimes.

First, institutional settings have important implications for both political studies and public policy making. Theoretically, it is important to incorporate institutional settings into analysis of political attitudes such as political trust. To better understand individual political attitudes, we should also try to understand the political settings the individuals are embedded in. For public policy makers, especially for those in new and consolidating democracies where institutional choices and reforms are still under debate, these findings may shed some light.

Second, institutional performance, not only economic, but also political performance, is the key to deal with the “trust crisis” for established democracies. In this dissertation, I studied various sources of political trust including institutional settings, economic performance, political performance, and cultural values. Compared with other variables we have examined that have significant effects on political trust, political performance is the most manageable aspect to improve and it is relatively easier to achieve in the short run. Thus, for established democracies suffering from declining trust and new democracies with extremely low levels of trust, governments should focus on improving the political performance of the institution. The specific measures include combating political corruption and promoting government fairness and responsiveness.

Third, results from China, the largest authoritarian country today, show that political trust is not just a product of political mobilization and strong Confucian values. Rather, it is legal-rational based and comparable to trust in democratic countries. Future changes in political trust in China highly depend on institutional performance. While traditional hierarchical values are difficult to change in the short term, the modernization process may contradict and modify them gradually and promote political independence (Inglehart, 1999). Meanwhile, government control of the media is expected to erode with more convenient and flexible modern communication. Thus, political mobilization and traditional values are both likely to play a less significant role in political trust in the future. As a result, government performance, which directly and significantly influences political trust, is likely to play an even larger role in the future.

In the short run, the Chinese government can still safely rely on traditional values and propaganda to promote or maintain political trust and system support. However, the findings of this study suggest that performance plays a major role in determining people's trust in institutions. Hence, the most reliable way to maintain political trust lies in the continued improvement of institutional performance.

Meanwhile, political performance is no less important than economic performance for authoritarian regimes. For China, political performance also has larger room for improvement than economic performance. Thus, for the Chinese government, to maintain political trust and support, they should not only focus on economic performance, but also start improving the political performance of institutions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aarts, Kees and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. "Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter?", *Electoral Studies*, 27/1: 5-18.
- Aberbach, Joel. 1969. "Alienation and Political Behavior". *American Political Science Review* 63/1: 86-99.
- Aberbach, Joel and Jack Walker. 1970. "Political Trust and Racial Ideology". *American Political Science Review* 64/4: 1199-1219.
- Abramson, Paul. 1972. "Political Efficacy and Political Trust among Black Schoolchildren: Two Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, 34: 1243-1275.
- Abramson, Paul, and Ada Finifter 1981. "On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978". *American Journal of Political Science* 25/2: 297-307.
- Albritton, Robert, Thawilwadee Bureekul, and Gang Guo, 2005. "Contexts of Asian Democracy: A Cross-National, Within-Nation Analysis of Asian Nations." CSD Working Papers, Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Romain Wacziarg. 2000. The Economics of Civic Trust, in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 149-172). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Alford, John. 2001. We're All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1996, in *What is it About Government that Americans Dislike*. Eds. John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (p. 28-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, Christopher. 1998. "Party Systems and Satisfaction with Democracy in the New Europe." *Political Studies* 46/4: 572-88.
- Anderson, Christopher. 2009. Nested Citizens: Macropolitics and Microbehavior in Comparative Politics, in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Eds.

Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman: 314-332. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, Christopher, and Christine Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *The American Political Science Review* 91/1: 66-81.

Anderson, Christopher, and Yuliya Tverdova. 2003. "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 47/1: 91-109.

Baldassare, Mark. 1986. *Trouble in Paradise*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Baier, Annette. 1986. "Trust and Antitrust", *Ethics* 96: 231-60.

Bardhan, Pranab. 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues." *Journal of Economic Literature* XXXV (September): 1320-46.

Becker, Lawrence. 1996. Trust as Noncognitive Security about Motives. *Ethics* 107/1 (Oct): 43-61.

Blendon, Robert, John Benson, Richard Morin, Drew Altman, Mollyann Brodie, Mario Brossard, and Matt James. 1997. Changing Attitudes in America, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King (p. 205-216). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bowler, Shaun, and Jeffrey Karp. 2004. "Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government." *Political Behavior* 26/3: 271-287.

Braithwaite, Valerie and Margaret Levi eds. 1998. *Trust and Governance*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Brehm, John, and Wendy Rahn. 1997. "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital". *American Journal of Political Science* 41/3: 999-1023.

Campbell, William Ross. 2004. "The sources of institutional trust in East and West Germany: civic culture or economic performance?" *German Politics* 13/3 (Sep): 401-418.

Cappella, Joseph and Kathleen Jamieson. 1997. *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Catterberg, Gabriel, and Alejandro Moreno. 2006. "The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 18/1: 31-48.

- Chang, Eric, and Yun-han Chu. "Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?" *The Journal of Politics* 68/2: 259-271.
- Chanley, Virginia, Thomas Rudolph, and Wendy Rahn. 2000. "The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 64/3: 239-256.
- Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited," *The Public Choice*, vol. 143, no. 2-1, pp. 67-101.
- Chen, Jie. 2004. *Popular Political Support in Urban China*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Chen, Jie, Yang Zhong, and Jan Hillard. 1997. "The Level and Sources of Popular Support for China's current Political Regime". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30/1: 45-64.
- Chen, Jie, Yang Zhong, Jan Hillard, and John Scheb. 1997. "Assessing Political Support in China: Citizens Evaluations of Governmental Effectiveness and Legitimacy". *Journal of Contemporary China* 6/16: 551-66.
- Chen, Xueyi, and Tianjian Shi. 2001. "Media Effects on Political Confidence and Trust in the People's Republic of China in the Post-Tiananmen Period." *East Asia*, Fall: 84-118.
- Chu, Yun-han, Larry Diamond, Andrew Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. 2008. "Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Legitimacy in East Asia", in *How East Asians View Democracy* (pp. 1-38). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Citrin, Jack. 1974. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government." *American Political Science Review* 68/3: 973-988.
- Citrin, Jack & Donald Green 1986. "Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government". *British Journal of Political Science*, 16/4: 431-53.
- Citrin, Jack and Christopher Muste. 1999. Trust in Government, in *Measures of Political Attitude*. Eds. John Robinson, Phillip Shaver, Lawrence Wrightsman (pp. 465-530). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Clark, Harold, Nitish Dutt, and Allan Kornberg. 1993. "The Political Economy of Attitudes towards Polity and Society in Western European Democracies." *Journal of Politics* 55/4: 998-1021.
- Cole, Richard. 1973. "Toward a Model of Political Trust: A Causal Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 17: 809-17.

- Coleman, James. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *The American Journal of Sociology* 94: S95-S120.
- Craig, Stephen. 1996. The Angry Voter: Politics and Popular Discontent in the 1990s, in *Broken Contract: Changing Relationships Between Americans and Their Government*. Ed. Stephen Craig (pp. 46-66). Boulder: Westview.
- Craig, Stephen, Richard Niemi, and Glenn Silver. 1990. "Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items". *Political Behavior*, 12/3: 289-314.
- Croissant, Aurel. 2002. *Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative Perspective*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia - Singapore, 2002 - VI, 370 S. Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES, 2002. Singapore: South East Printing Pte Ltd.
- Cuitice, John and Roger Jowell. 1997. Trust in the Political System, in *British Social Attitudes: The 12th Report*, Eds. Roger Jowell et al. (140-72). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Cusack, Thomas. 1999. "The Shaping of Popular Satisfaction with Government and Regime Performance in Germany." *British Journal of Political Science* 29/1: 641-672.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dalton, Russell. 1996. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Dalton, Russell. 1999. "Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies." In *Critical Citizens*, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell. 2000. Value Change and Democracy, in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 252-269). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dalton, Russell. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell, and Christopher Anderson. 2010. Citizens, Context, and Choice: An Introduction, in *Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens' Electoral Choices*. Eds. Russell Dalton and Christopher Anderson. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell, and Doh Chull Shin. 2006. *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets around the Pacific Rim*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell, Doh Chull Shin, and Yun-han Chu. 2008. *Party Politics In East Asia: Citizens, Elections, and Democratic Development*. Lynne Rienner Pub.

- della Porta, Donatella. "Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption", in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 173-201). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1991. "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Political Cultural Change in Eastern Europe." *World Politics* 44 (October): 49-80.
- Denters, Bas. 2002. "Size and Political Trust: Evidence from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom". *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 20: 793-812.
- Denters, Bas, Oscar Gabriel, and Mariano Torcal. 2007. Political Confidence in Representative Democracies, in *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*. Eds. Jan van Deth, Jose Montero, and Anders Westholm, p 66-87. NY: Routledge.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Dunn, John. 1990. *Interpreting Political Responsibility*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley.
- Easton, David. 1975. "The Concept of Political Support". *British Journal of Political Science* 5/4: 435-457.
- Edwards, George, William Mitchell, and Reed Welch. 1995. Explaining presidential approval: The significance of issue salience. *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 108-34.
- Elazar, Daniel. 1997. "Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems". *International Political Science Review*, 18/3: 237-51.
- Feldman, Stanley. 1983. "The Measurement and Meaning of Political Trust". *Political Methodology* 9/3: 341-54.
- Finifter, Ada. 1970. "Dimensions of Political Alienation". *The American Political Science Review* 64/2: 389-410.
- Finkel, Steven, Edward Muller, and Mitchell Seligson. 1989. "Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica", *British Journal of Political Science* 19/3: 329-251.
- Finkel, Steven, Christopher Sabatini and Gwendolyn Bevis. 2000. "Civic Education, Civil Society, and Political Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of Dominican Republic". *World Development*, 28/11: 1851-74.

- Fiorina, Morris. 1981. *Retrospective voting in American national elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fournier, Patrick. 1998. "Review: Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies Ronald Inglehart Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. x, 453". *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 31/02: 391-392.
- Fuchs, Dieter. 1999. The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Ed. Pippa Norris (p123-145). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Gamson, William A. 1968. *Power and Discontent*. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.
- Gerring, John, and Strom Thacker. 2004. "Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34/2: 295-330.
- Gilmour Robert, and Robert Lamb. 1975. *Political Alienation in Contemporary*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Gilley, Bruce. 2007. "Legitimacy and Institutional Change: The Case of China." *Comparative Political Studies* 41/3: 259-284.
- Gilley, Bruce, and Heike Holbig. 2009. "The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China: a Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis." *Journal of Contemporary China* 18/59: 339-358.
- Goldsmith, Arthur. 1999. "Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political Corruption in Emerging Markets." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 58/4: 865-83.
- Hakhverdian, Armen and Quinton Mayne. 2012. "Institutional Trust, Education, and Corruption: A Micro-Macro Interactive Approach." *The Journal of Politics* 74/3: 739-750.
- Hardin, Russell. 1996. Trustworthiness. *Ethics* 107, Oct: 26-42.
- Hardin, Russell. 1998. "Trust in Government", in *Trust and Governance*, eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hardin, Russell. 1999. Do We Want Trust in Government? in *Democracy and Trust*. Ed. Warren, Mark (pp.22-41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hardin, Russell. 2002. *Trust and Trustworthiness*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hart, Vivien. 1978. *Distrust and Democracy: Political Distrust in Britain and America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Hayward, Jack. 1995. *The Crisis of Representation in Europe*. London: Frank Cass.
- He, Baogang. 1996. *The Democratisation of China* (Routledge Studies on China in Transition). Routledge.
- Hetherington, Marc. 1998. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust", *American Political Science Review* 92/4: 791-808.
- Hetherington, Marc. 1999. "The Effect of Political Trust on Presidential Vote, 1968-96." *American Political Science Review* 93: 311-326.
- Hetherington, Marc. 2005. *Why Trust Matters*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hetherington, March & Thomas Rudolph. 2008. "Priming, Performance, and the Dynamics of Political Trust." *Journal of Politics* 70/2: 498-512.
- Heidenheimer, Arnold, Michael Johnston, and VictorLeVine. 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Hibbing, John, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2001. *What is it About Government that Americans Dislike*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hicken, Allen, and Yuko Kasuya. 2003. "A Guide to the Constitutional Structures and Electoral Systems of East, South and Southeast Asia," *Electoral Studies* 22: 121-151.
- Holmberg, Soren. 1999. Down and Down We Go: Political Trust in Sweden, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Ed. Pippa Norris (p103-122). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997a. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997b. Postmaterialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King (p. 217-236). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1999a. Trust, Well-being and Democracy. In *Democracy & Trust*, ed. Mark Warren (pp. 88-120). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Inglehart, Ronald. 1999b. Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Ed. Pippa Norris (p236-256). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jennings, Kent. 1991. 'Thinking about Social Injustice', *Political Psychology* 12: 187–204.
- Katz, Daniel, Barbara Gutek, Robert Kahn, and Eugenia Barton. 1975. *Bureaucratic Encounters*. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research.
- Katz, Elihu and Paul Lazarsfeld. 1955. *Personal Influence: the Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communication*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Kaase, Max, and Kenneth Newton. 1995. Beliefs in Government. Vol. 5 of *Beliefs in Government*. Ed. Kenneth Newton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keele, Luke. 2007. "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 51/2: 241-254.
- Kennedy, John. 2009. "Popular Support and the Rural and Urban Divide in China: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media" *Political Studies* 57: 517-536.
- King, Anthony. 2000. Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism, in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (p74-100). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter and Dieter Fuchs. 1995. *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klingemann, Hans_Dieter. 1999. Mapping Political Support in 1990s: A Global Analysis, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Ed. Pippa Norris (p31-56). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kuran, Timur. 1987. "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism", *The Economic Journal*, 97/387: 642-665.
- Kuran, Timur. 1995. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Harvard University Press.
- Lane, Robert. 1959. *Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Landry, Pierre-François. 2008. *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press

- Landry, Pierre- François. 2011. The Legacies of Maoism and Popular Trust in Legal Institutions, in *Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China*. Eds. Margaret Woo and Mary Gallagher. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Landry, Pierre F. and Daniela Stockmann. 2009. "Crisis Management in an Authoritarian Regime: Media Effects During the Sichuan Earthquake." *Working paper*.
- Lawrence, Robert. 1997. Is it Really the Economy, Stupid?, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King (pp. 111-132). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Levi, Margaret, and Laura Stoker. 2000. "Political Trust and Trustworthiness", *American Review of Political Science* 3: 475-507.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael. 1988. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press.
- Li, Lianjiang. 2004. "Political Trust in Rural China." *Modern China* 30/2: 228-258.
- Li, Lianjiang. 2008. "Political Trust and Petitioning in the Chinese Countryside", *Comparative Politics* 40/2: 209-226.
- Li, Lianjiang. 2012. "The Magnitude and Resilience of Trust in the Center: Evidence from Interviews with Petitioners in Beijing and a Local Survey in Rural China", *Modern China* XX(X): 1-34.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Linz, Juan. 1990a. "Perils of Presidentialism", *Journal of Democracy* 1(1): 51-69.
- Linz, Juan. 1990b. "The Virtues of Parliamentarism", *Journal of Democracy* 1(4): 84-91.
- Linz, Juan. 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it make a difference?. in *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Chp. 1), Linz and Valenzuela, eds. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City: Doubleday & Company.
- Lipset, Seymour. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review* 59: 1-22.
- Lipset, Seymour, and Gabriel Lenz. 2000. "Corruption, Culture and Markets." In *Culture Matters*, eds. Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington. New York: Basic Books, pp. 112-24.

- Lipset, Seymour and William Schneider. 1983. *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind*. New York: Free Press.
- Lipset, Seymour and William Schneider. 1987. *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind*, rev. edn. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Listhaug, Ola. 1995. The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians, in *Citizens and the State*, Eds. Klingmann, Hans-Dieter and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Listhaug, Ola, and Matti Wiberg. 1995. Confidence in Political and Private Institutions, in *Citizens and the State*. Eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Luhmann, Niklas. 1979. *Trust and Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Manion, Melanie. 1994. "Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: Learning from Local Samples." *China Quarterly*, 139: 741-765.
- Manion, Melanie. 2004. *Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Manion, Melanie. 2006. "Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China." *Comparative Political Studies* 39/3: 301-324.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1997. Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with US Government, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King (p. 133-154). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- McAllister, Ian. 1999. "The Economic Performance of Governments", in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Ed. Pippa Norris (p188-203). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, Arthur. 1974a. "Political Issues and Trust in Government, 1964-70." *American Political Science Review* 68/3: 951-72.
- Miller, Arthur. 1974b. "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?" *American Political Science Review* 68/3: 989-1001.
- Miller, Arthur, and Ola Listhaug. 1990. "Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 29/3: 357-386.
- Miller, Arthur, and Ola Listhaug. 1999. "Political Performance and Institutional Trust", in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Norris, Pippa (p204-215). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Miller, Arthur, Edie Goldenberg, and Lutz Erbring. 1979. "Type-set Politics: Impact of Newspaper on Public Confidence." *American Political Science Review* 73/1: 67-84.
- Miller, Arthur, Vicki Hesli, and William Reisinger. 1996. "Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies." *American Political Science Review*, 90/1: 153-66.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 1994. "Support for Parliaments and Regimes in the Transition toward Democracy in Eastern Europe." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 19/1: 5-32.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 1997. "Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies." *Journal of Politics* 59: 418-5.
- Misher, William and Richard Rose. 1999. Five Years after the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Norris, Pippa (p78-99). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2001a. "What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies." *Comparative Political Studies* 34/1: 30-62.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2001b. "Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures." *International Political Science Review* 22/4: 303-320.
- Moore, Stanley, James Lare, and Kenneth Wagner. 1985. *The Child's Political World*. New York: Praeger.
- Moreno, Alejandro. 2001. Democracy and Mass Belief Systems in Latin America. In *Citizen views of democracy in Latin America*. Ed. Roderic Camp (pp. 27-50). Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Morris, Stephen and Joseph Klesner. 2010. "Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from Mexico." *Comparative Political Studies* 43/10: 1258-1285.
- Muller, Edward and Thomas Jukam. 1977. "On the Meaning of Political Support". *The American Political Science Review* 71/4: 1561-1595.
- Nathan, Andrew. 1993. "The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of Electoral System." *Asian Survey* 22 (April): 424-38.
- Nathan, Andrew. 2003. "Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy* 14/1: 6-17.
- Nathan, Andrew. 2007. "Political Culture and Diffuse Regime Support in Asia". *Working paper*.

- Neustadt, Richard. 1997. The Politics of Mistrust, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King (p. 179-201). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Newton, Kenneth. 1999. Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Norris, Pippa (p169-187). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Newton, Kenneth. 2006. "Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society and Political and Economic Performance." *Political Studies* 54/4: 846-864.
- Newton, Kenneth, and Norris Pippa. 2000. Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance?, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Nye, Joseph, Philip Zelikow, and David King (pp. 52-73). Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 1999a. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 1999b. Introduction: the Growth of Critical Citizens, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Ed. Pippa Norris (p1-30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 1999c. Institutional Explanations for Political Support, in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Ed. Pippa Norris (p291-310). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2000. The Impact of Television on Civic Malaise, in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 231-251). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nye, Joseph. 1997. The Decline of Confidence in Government, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King (pp. 1-18). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nye, Joseph and Philip Zelikow. 1997. Reflections, Conjectures, and Puzzles, in *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Joseph Nye and Philip Zelikow (p 253-281). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nye, Joseph, Philip Zelikow, and David King. 1997. *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Offe, Claus. 1999. How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens, in *Democracy and Trust*. Ed. Warren, Mark (pp.42-87). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Olsen, Marvin E. 1965. "Alienation and Political Opinions." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 29: 200-212.
- Orren, Gary. 1997. Fall from Grace: The Public Loss of faith in Government. in *Why People Don't Trust Government*, Eds. Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Otake, Hideo. 2000. Political Mistrust and Party Dealignment in Japan, in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 173-201). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Owen, Dinana, and Jack Dennis. 2001. Trust in Federal Government: The Phenomenon and Its Antecedents, in *What is it About Government that Americans Dislike*, Eds. John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (p. 209-26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parker, Suzanne. 1995. "Toward an Understanding of 'Rally' Effects: Public Opinion in the Persian Gulf War." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59: 526-46.
- Patterson, Orlando. 1999. "Liberty against the Democratic State: On the Historical and Contemporary Sources of American Distrust", in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Patterson, Thomas. 1993. *Out of Order*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Paxton, Pamela. 2002. "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship". *American Sociological Review* 67: 254-277.
- Pew Research Center. 1998. *Deconstructing Distrust: How Americans View Government*. Philadelphia: Pew Research Center for People and the Press.
- Pharr, Susan. 1997. Public Trust and Democracy in Japan. In *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Eds. Nye, Joseph, Philip Zelikow, and David King (pp. 237-252). Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Pharr, Susan. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Discontent: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies, in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 173-201). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pharr, Susan and Robert Putnam. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Transitions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Putnam, Robert. 1995. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, Robert, Susan Pharr, and Russell Dalton. 2000. Introduction: What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?, in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 3-30). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rahn, Wendy M. and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2005. "A Tale of Political Trust in American Cities." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69:530-560.
- Reilly, Benjamin. 2007. "Electoral Systems and Party Systems in East Asia," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 7: 185-202.
- Ren, Liying. 2009. *Surveying Public Opinion in Transitional China: An Examination of Survey Response*. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pittsburgh.
- Robinson, Michael. 1976. "Public affairs television and the growth of political malaise: The case of 'The Selling of the Pentagon' ", *American Political Science Review* 70/2: 409-32.
- Rose, Richard. 1994. "Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust," *Journal of Democracy* 5/2: 18-30.
- Rose, Richard, and William Mishler. 2002. "Comparing Regime Support in Non-democratic and Democratic Countries". *Democratization*, 9/2: 1-20.
- Rose, Richard, William Mishler, Yun-han Chu, and Neil Munro. 2003. "Asian Values, Post-Communist Legacies and Generic Influences on Political Trust: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis." Working Paper.
- Scharpf, Fritz. 2000. "Interdependence and Democratic Legitimation", in *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Pharr Susan and Robert Putnam (pp. 101-120). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Seeman, Melvin. 1959. "On the Meaning of Alienation". *American Sociological Review* 24: 783-791.
- Seligson, Mitchell. 1980. "Trust, Efficacy and Modes of Political Participation: A Study of Costa Rican Peasants." *British Journal of Political Science* 10/1: 75-98.
- Seligson, Mitchell. 1983. "On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico". *Social Indicators Research* 12: 1-24.
- Seligson, Mitchell. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* 64: 408-433.

- Shi, Tianjian. 2001. "Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan." *Comparative Politics*, July: 401-19.
- Shi, Tianjian. 2006. "What Explains the Gap between Incumbent Based and Regime Based Trust in the PRC", unpublished paper.
- Shi, Tianjian. 2008. "China: Democratic Values Supporting an Authoritarian System", in *How East Asians View Democracy*. Eds, Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin (pp. 209-37). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Shin, Doh Chull. 1999. *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Sidel, John. 1996. "Siam and Its Twin?: Democratisation and Bossism in Contemporary Thailand and the Philippines." *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin* 27 (2): 36-52.
- Solinger, Dorothy J. 1996. "Despite Decentralization: Disadvantages, Dependence and Ongoing Central Power in the Inland – The Case of Wuhan." *China Quarterly* 145: 1–34.
- Stockmann, Daniela. 2007. *Propaganda for Sale: The Impact of Newspaper Commercialization on News Content and Public Opinion in China*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan.
- Stokes, Donald. 1962. "Popular Evaluations of government: An Empirical Assessment," in *Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military*, eds. Harlen Cleveland and Harold Lasswell. New York: Harper.
- Sztompka, Piotr. 1996. "Trust and Emerging Democracy." *International Sociology* 11/1: 37-62.
- Tang, Wenfang. 2001. "Political and Social Trends in the Post-Deng Urban China: Crisis or Stability?" *China Quarterly* 168:890-909.
- Tang, Wenfang. 2005. *Public Opinion and Political Change in China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Tang, Wenfang. 2010. "Public Dissatisfaction and Regime Change in China." *Working paper*.
- Torcal, Mariano. 2006. Political Disaffection and Democratization History in New Democracies, in *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions and Politics*, eds. Mariano Torcal and Jose Montero. New York: Routledge, pp. 157-175.
- Tyler, Tom, Kenneth Rasinski, and Kathleen McGraw. 1985. "The Influence of Perceived Injustice upon Support for the President, Political Authorities, and Government Institutions", *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 15: 700-725.
- Tyler, Tom. 1990. *Why People Obey the Law*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Van der Meer, Tom. 2010. "In What We Trust? A Multi-Level Study into Trust in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics." *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 76/3: 517-536.
- Wang, Zhengxu. 2005a. Political Trust in China: Forms and Causes. In *Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia*. Ed. Lynn White. Singapore: World Scientific Press, pp. 113-140.
- Wang, Zhengxu. 2005b. "Before the emergence of critical citizens: economic development and political trust in China." *International Review of Sociology* 15/1: 155-171.
- Wang, Zhengxu. 2006. "Explaining Regime Strength in China." *China: An International Journal* 4/2: 217-237.
- Wang, Zhengxu and Ern-Ser Tan. 2006. "Self-Expression, 'Asian Values', and Democracy: East Asia in Global Perspective", in *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets around the Pacific Rim*, eds. Russel Dalton and Doh Chull Shin (pp. 50-72). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Warren, Mark ed. 1999. *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weatherford, Stephen. 1984. "Economic 'Stagflation' and Public Support for the Political System." *British Journal of Political Science* 14: 187-205.
- Wedeman, Andrew. 2002. Development and Corruption: The East Asian Paradox. In *Political Business in East Asia*, ed. Edmund Gomez. London: Routledge, pp. 34-61.
- Wedeman, Andrew. 2012. *Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China*. Cornell University Press.
- Williams, John. 1985. "Systematic Influences on Political Trust: The Importance of Perceived Institutional Performance". *Political Methodology* 11/1-2: 125-142.
- Yang, Kaifeng and Marc Holzer. 2006. "The Performance – Trust Link: Implications for Performance Measurement." *Public Administration Review* 66/1: 114-126.
- Yang, Qing and Wenfang Tang. 2010. "Exploring the Sources of Institutional Trust in China: Culture, Mobilization, or Performance?" *Asian Politics and Policy* 2/3: 415-436.